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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996). Section 78-2a-3 states in part that "[t]he Court
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction . . . over . . . appeals from the district court
involving domestic relations cases."
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Cross-Appeal: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding Bert

Thomas's income to be $69,567 for purposes of support, when the marshaled
evidence does not support this finding?
Standard of Review:

A trial court is granted significant latitude in making

findings of fact. The Court of Appeals will only review the trial court's findings to
determine if the trial court abused its discretion, or to determine if the trial court's
findings were clearly erroneous. Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260, 263-64 (Utah
App. 1993)(citations omitted); Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877,879 (Utah App.
1995).
2.

Reply to Appellant's Brief: Should the trial court's findings

regarding child custody, alimony, real estate division, and the value of Bert Thomas
Construction Inc.(BTCI) be reversed given the fact Ann Thomas failed to marshal
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then show that the findings
were unsupported by the evidence, and given the fact the evidence was sufficient to
1

support the trial court's findings?
Standard of Review: In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact on
appeal, the challenger "must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings in
question." Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996).
In determining custody of a child, trial judges are accorded broad discretion.
"Only where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of
discretion, will [an appellate court] interpose its own judgment." Shioji v. ShiojL
712 P.2d 197, 210 (Utah 1985).
To fix alimony, at least three factors must be considered: (1) financial need
of the receiving spouse; (2) the receiving spouse's ability to produce income; and
(3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d
193, 198 (Utah App. 1992)(citations omitted). "If these three factors have been
considered, [an appellate court] will not disturb [alimony] unless such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Rappleve v.
Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah App. 1993)(citations omitted).
For marital property, "the trial court is empowered to make such distributions
as are just and equitable." Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980).
A trial court's determination of marital property will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of discretion. Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App. 1995).
2

The Court of Appeals will only review the trial court's findings to determine
if the trial court abused its discretion, or to determine if the trial court's findings
were clearly erroneous. Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992);
Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989); Richie v. Richie. 784
P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This cross-appeal arises from the divorce proceeding between Ann Thomas,
Appellant/Plaintiff, and Bert Thomas, Appellee/Defendant. Bert Thomas crossappeals from the Findings of fact and Conclusion of Law, and Decree of Divorce
signed and dated July 9, 1997. Bert Thomas was an employee of Bert Thomas
Construction Inc. (BTCI). The trial court determined Bert Thomas's gross income
for child support and alimony purposes by adding to his personal income all the net
income of BTCI. Bert Thomas argued that the trial court erred in determining his
income to be so high. The trial court stated that Bert Thomas's contention may be
correct, but "it is best left for the appellate courts to revisit the complex financial
arrangements of the parties." (Finding of Fact U 115, Record at 1116.) This appeal
followed.
Ann Thomas argued that the trial court abused its discretion in determining
child custody, alimony, real estate division, and the value of Bert's business. Bert
3

Thomas supports the trial court's decision regarding these issues.
Course of Proceedings
Trial was held in December 1995 and was continued to February 1996. Oral
arguments were heard on April 1, 1996. The trial court's Ruling was entered
August 19, 1996. In the trial court's ruling, the issue of alimony was reserved to
reflect the award of custody and allow financial statements to be resubmitted.
Subsequent motions were heard. The trial court issued its final Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce on July 9, 1997. This appeal followed.
Disposition Below
The trial court found Bert Thomas's income to be $69,567 per year. Based
on this finding, the trial court set alimony and child support. The trial court
awarded custody of the two children to Bert Thomas, subject to a liberal visitation
schedule. The trial court distributed the parties personal property so that the values
of the assets of both parties were nearly equal. No attempt was made to place a
value on BTCI other than the value of the hard assets. The hard assets (tools,
equipment, materials) of BTCI were included in the equitable distribution of
personal property. Bert Thomas was awarded a $150,000 value in the real estate as
premarital property. After the marriage, the property appreciated. Ann Thomas
received one half of the appreciated value of the real estate to compensate her for
her maintenance and modest contributions to the home.
4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Bert Thomas raises two argument on appeal. First, the trial court abused its
discretion in finding his income to be $69,567 per year. All of the evidence
marshaled in support of the trial court does not support this finding. Second, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Bert Thomas custody of the
children, limited alimony to three years, awarded Bert Thomas a $150,000
premarital value in the home, and valued Bert Thomas Construction Inc. (BTCI).
Both arguments will be summarized below.
1.

Bert Thomas's income was not $69,567
per year.

The trial court relied on the testimony and exhibits of Dirk Rasmussen, Ann
Thomas's expert, to find that Bert Thomas's income was $69,567 per year.
However, Dirk Rasmussen imputed income to Bert Thomas which he did not have.
Income which was earned by BTCI and maintained for expenses and bonding was
added to Bert Thomas's personal income. It was an abuse of discretion to impute
the cash reserves of BTCI as income to Bert Thomas because Bert Thomas did not
receive the cash reserves and the court did not find and could not find that Bert
Thomas received a personal benefit from them.

5

2.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining child custody, alimony, real estate
division, and the value of BTCI.

A.

Marshaling the Evidence.

The Appellant is required to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings, and then show that the evidence is still insufficient to support that
finding. Ann Thomas has failed to marshal the evidence. She has only reargued the
evidence which supports her position. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should not
disturb the trial court's findings.
B.

Child Custody.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody of the
children to Bert Thomas because the evidence showed that Bert Thomas was a
competent parent who could provide for the needs of the children without deficit.
The evidence showed that the influence of Mr. Sauer, Ann's lover, illuminated the
deficiencies in Ann's judgment, parenting ability, and character. Specifically, Ann
Thomas put her desires ahead of the needs of her children and had exposed her
children to the negative influence of her lover.
C.

Alimony.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the duration of alimony
to three years. Ann Thomas argued that the trial court did not articulate a change in

6

financial conditions that would justify limiting the duration of alimony to three
years. However, this is not accurate. The trial court found that Bert Thomas's
expenses would increase because he had custody of the children. The trial court
also found that Ann Thomas's expenses were overstated and that she had access to
income from gifted stocks and bonds. Ann Thomas even testified that some of her
expenses were only temporary expenses because she was in the process of
furnishing her home. Ann Thomas was employed as a school teacher by Alpine
School District. The evidence showed that Ann Thomas could maintain her
standard of living. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting
alimony to three years.
D.

Real Estate Division

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Bert Thomas a
premarital value of $150,000 in the home. Before the marriage, Bert Thomas
owned the Sundance real estate, cleared timberfromthe lot, excavated a 400 foot
long access road with a 12% grade, erected extensive retaining walls, connected
power, sewer, and utilities, completed 35% of the home, and purchased enough
materials to build on the home for a year after being married. In essence, 70% of
the construction was complete before Ann and Bert were married. The premarital
value was determined to be $150,000. The value of the home had appreciated to
$355,000. To compensate Ann Thomas for her modest contributions to the home,
7

she was awarded one half of the $205,000 appreciation value, less certain expenses.
This was an equitable division.
The evidence also showed that awarding Ann Thomas one half of the
premarital value could force Bert Thomas to sell his home. This could severely
disadvantage the children, and would place Bert Thomas's livelihood at risk. Bert
Thomas worked exclusively in Sundance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding Bert Thomas a premarital value of $150,000.
E.

BTCI Value

Ann Thomas argued that the trial court failed to divide the assets of Bert
Thomas Construction Inc. (BTCI). This is not accurate. The trial court divided the
hard assets of Bert Thomas's construction company when it divided the personal
property of the parties. The trial court found that the personal property awarded to
Bert Thomas, including the hard assets of BTCI, was nearly equal in value to the
personal property awarded to Ann Thomas. Ann Thomas did not attempt to value
BTCI beyond its hard assets. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Ann Thomas also argued that Bert Thomas had dissipated BTCI's savings
account which she claimed was subject to equitable division. However, the
evidence does not support this argument. Ann Thomas's own expert testified that
there were no inappropriate takings or skimmings from the corporation's (BTCI)
savings account.
8

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
BERT THOMAS'S INCOME TO BE $69,567 PER YEAR
BECAUSE THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THIS FINDING.

The trial court abused its discretion in finding Bert Thomas's income to be
$69,567 per year because the marshaled evidence does not support this finding. The
evidence in support of the trial court's findings regarding Bert Thomas's income
included: (1) Bert's tax returns; and (2) the testimony and exhibits of Dirk
Rasmussen, Ann's expert witness. After marshaling the evidence, it is clear that the
evidence does not support the trial court's finding.
At trial, Bert Thomas submitted tax forms and financial statements showing
his W-2 income to be approximately $36,000 per year.1 In addition, Bert Thomas
had "passive" income from his leasing company of approximately $17,000 per
year.2 Bert Thomas argued that some of Dirk Rasmussen's calculations were
incorrect because they did not account for taxes, or they imputed Ann Thomas's
income to Bert Thomas. However, in order to challenge the trial court's findings,
the evidence must be marshaled in favor of the trial court's finding and the evidence

1

Bert Thomas's tax documents are not included in the Addendum because they are
accurately reflected by Dirk Rasmussen's Exhibit #14.
2

On Exhibit #14 this is identified as "Lease Expense" listed under the heading
"Adjustments to Net Income."
9

must still be insufficient to support the trial court's finding. Marshall. 915 P.2d at
516. Therefore, the focus of this argument must be on the testimony and exhibits
provided by Dirk Rasmussen.
Dirk Rasmussen testified that Bert Thomas did not inappropriately take
money or skim from BTCI. (Trial Transcript volume II, 126, Record at 1583.) The
income that Bert Thomas took from BTCI was clearly identified and legitimate, and
it was declared on his personal tax return. (Trial Transcript volume II, 133, Record
at 1583.)
Exhibit #14, prepared by Dirk Rasmussen, is a summary of BTCI's financial
activity from 1988 to 1994. Exhibit #14 outlines the method Dirk Rasmussen
employed to calculate Bert Thomas's income. To simplify Dirk Rasmussen's
methodology, the analysis will be broken down into two steps.
Step one: for each year (1988-1994) Dirk Rasmussen calculated the wages
and passive income which Bert Thomas received. At the bottom of Exhibit #14,
Bert's wages and passive income were broken down into four categories listed
under the heading "Adjustments to Net Income." The four categories were labeled
"Officer's Compensation," "Personal Cost of Goods Sold," "Lease Expense," and
"Personal Payroll Expense." To determine Bert Thomas's personal income, Dirk
Rasmussen added the four categories together.
Bert Thomas has no argument with step one of the methodology. The four
10

categories represent the personal income of Bert Thomas.
Step two: for each year (1988-1994) Dirk Rasmussen calculated the net
income of BTCI, a Utah corporation, and then added the total BTCI income to Bert
Thomas's personal income, even though Bert Thomas did not receive any benefit
from that money. Dirk Rasmussen knew that the net income of BTCI was kept in
the corporation and that Bert Thomas did not receive the money. In fact, during
cross-examination Dirk Rasmussen was asked if the net income of BTCI was kept
in the corporation in 1988. (Trial Transcript volume II, 131-32, Record at 1583.)
Dirk Rasmussen answered "yes." (Trial Transcript volume II, 131-32, Record at
1583.) It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to include the net income of
BTCI as part of Bert Thomas's personal income when the evidence showed that
Bert Thomas did not receive this money and did not receive a personal benefit from
this money.
One might wonder why net income would be left in a corporation. Dirk
Rasmussen stated that "there are good reasons for a construction company to
maintain a good cash balance." (Trial Transcript volume II, 132, Record at 1583.)
Some of the reasons a construction company may need to maintain a good cash
balance is to pay bills and the corporation may need capital for bonding. (Trial
Transcript volume II, 132, Record at 1583.) The only way Bert Thomas could reach
the income level found by the trial court ($69,567 per year) was if he personally
11

used the entire cash reserves of BTCI each year. However, this would make
operating BTCI impracticable. Besides, it would be inequitable to require Bert
Thomas to use up the cash reserves of BTCI every year. Because the net income of
BTCI was not received by Bert Thomas or used to personally benefit Bert Thomas,
it was an abuse of discretion to impute the total net income of BTCI as part of Bert
Thomas's personal income for child support and alimony purposes.
If the trial court is to impute corporate income to a shareholder or officer, it
should be required to make specific findings of the specific economic benefit to the
officer or shareholder.3 In this case, that was not done.
Although Dirk Rasmussen could not determine why Bert Thomas's income
declined in 1993-1994, there are good reasons why Bert Thomas's income declined.
Foremost among these reasons is the fact that Bert Thomas has been almost a fulltime father. (Trial Transcript Volume IV 55, Record at 1585.) Another reason was
that Ann Thomas, who formerly performed secretarial functions, was helpful with
customers on the telephone, no longer helped in the business. (Affidavit of Ann
Thomas, Record at 718.) Bert Thomas assumed all of her duties when she left, in
addition to the child rearing obligations. It is not consistent to assume, as the trial

3

Title 78-45-7.5(4)(a). Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business
shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a
business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the
parent to satisfy a child support award....
12

court has done, that Bert Thomas has been almost a full-time father, award him
custody and then accept Dirk Rasmussen's testimony that Bert Thomas' income
should reflect the income of a full-time contractor.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DETERMINING CHILD CUSTODY, ALIMONY, REAL
ESTATE DIVISION, AND BERT THOMAS CONSTRUCTION
INC. (BTCI) VALUE.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining child custody,
alimony, real estate division, and Bert Thomas Construction Inc. (BTCI) value. In
order to challenge a trial court's findings, the Appellant must marshal the evidence
in favor of the trial court's findings and then show the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court's findings. Ann Thomas failed to marshal the evidence.
Therefore, Ann Thomas should be prevented from challenging the trial court's
findings. Even if the Court of Appeals does not follow the above argument, there
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings regarding child custody,
alimony, real estate division, and BTCI value.
A.

Marshaling the Evidence.

Ann Thomas's has failed to marshal the evidence as required by this Court in
order to challenge findings of fact. Thus, Ann Thomas should be prevented from
challenging those findings. This Court stated:
In order to challenge a trial court's finding of fact of Appeal,
the challenger must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings
13

and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings in question. We will uphold the trial court's finding of fact if
a party fails to appropriately marshal all of the evidence. Marshall v.
Marshall. 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996)(citations omitted).
In viewing this marshaled evidence, the evidence must be viewed "in the light most
favorable to the findings" and the evidence must still be "insufficient to support the
findings." Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1,7 (Utah App. 1992). When a party
challenging findings of fact fails to marshal all of the evidence, the Court of
'Appeals upholds the trial court's findings of fact. Marshall. 915 P.2d at 516.
As shown in each section below, Ann Thomas has failed to marshal the
evidence regarding the findings of child custody, alimony, division of real estate,
and BTCI value. She did not demonstrate why the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the findings, would be insufficient. Instead, Ann Thomas
has simply restated the evidence she believes supports her position and reargued the
original case to the Court of Appeals. In Marshall, this Court was faced with a
similar situation. This Court concluded:
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence but
has merely recited the findings on point and then
highlighted the evidence which he deems contrary to the
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial
court's findings and affirm the awards on appeal.
Marshal, 915 P.2d at 516.
Likewise, in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. this Court refused to disturb the trial
court's findings because the appellant had "not marshaled the evidence, but had
14

merely reargued the evidence supporting his position." 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah
App. 1994).
Because Ann Thomas had failed to marshal the evidence and has only
reargued the evidence supporting her position, this Court should not disturb the trial
court's findings of fact but should affirm the trial court's decision.
B.

Child Custody

In determining permanent custody of a child, trial judges are accorded broad
discretion. "Only where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an
abuse of discretion, will [an appellate court] interpose its own judgment." Shioji v.
ShiojL 712 P.2d 197, 210 (Utah 1985).
Ann Thomas argued that the trial court found that it was clearly in the best
interests of the children to be awarded to Ann Thomas, but then awarded custody to
Bert Thomas. (Appellant's Brief 23.) However, this is a misunderstanding of the
trial court's finding. The meaning of the trial court's statement must be understood
in context.
The trial court stated that "this is a complicated case with no easy, clear-cut
answers." (Findings of Fact ^j 61, Record at 1131.) Based on the evaluations of Dr.
Jensen and Dr. Stewart, the trial court found that both parents are competent and
love their children. (Finding of Fact ^ 59, 61, Record at 1131.) Although Ann
Thomas was the primary care taker prior to separation, Bert Thomas has also
15

contributed and been involved with the children's activities, including "schooling,
health care, religious training, and day to day activities." (Finding of Fact ^ 65, 66,
Record at 1131.) Bert Thomas was "involved with the children on a daily basis
until the separation." (Finding of Fact Tf 68, Record at 1130.) Since separation, the
"children have . . . had an opportunity to rely upon their father for meeting their
needs to a greater extent than existed prior to separation." (Finding of Fact <[j 68,
Record at 1130.) In fact, the "children have flourished in the relationship they have
with Mr. Thomas." (Finding of Fact ^ 68, Record at 1130.) Dr. Jay Jensen reported
that there were "no apparent deficits in the ability of either parent to provide for the
children's physical, emotional, and spiritual needs." (Exhibit 1, Dr. Jensen's
Custody Evaluation 7.) Although Ann Thomas was the primary care giver before
separation, Bert Thomas was an exceptional parent, able to provide for the
children's needs without deficit. Without considering the negative influence of Mr.
Sauer, this was a close call that would have been tipped in favor of Ann Thomas
because she was the primary care giver.
However, Mr. Sauer was part of the environment to which the children would
be exposed if Ann Thomas had been awarded custody. The appearance of Mr.
Sauer into Ann Thomas's life had two significant effects which concerned the trial
court. First, Ann Thomas permitted the children to be exposed to Mr. Sauer's
negative influence. (Findings of Fact If 79, Record at 1125.) Second, Mr. Sauer's
16

influence upon Ann Thomas illuminated the deficiencies in her judgment, parenting
ability, and character. It showed her inability to subordinate her own pleasures to
the needs of her children. This is why the trial court found Mr. Sauer to be "a very
complicating factor." (Finding of Fact If 71, Record at 1129.)
Because of the presence of Mr. Sauer in Ann Thomas's life, the trial court
had to weigh which arrangement would be best for the children: (1) they could
reside with Ann Thomas who was under the negative influence of Mr. Sauer and
had exposed the children to his negative influence; or (2) they could reside with Bert
Thomas who had no deficiencies in judgment, parenting ability, or character. The
trial court did not punish Ann Thomas for her past moral conduct. The trial court
did not award custody based upon sexual misconduct. The trial court simply
weighed which arrangement was best for the children.
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the parties for several days in
trial, hear their testimony, observe Mr. Sauer, hear his testimony, hear the testimony
of two experts, visit with the children, and judge the personal and individual
circumstances of this case. (Finding of Fact ^ 55, Record at 1133.) Regarding Mr.
Thomas, the trial court found that:
a.
Mr. Thomas is a greater source of stability in the children's
lives (Finding of Fact % 81, Record at 1125.)
b.
Mr. Thomas will not threaten the children's integration into their
present environment by a change of residence. Mr. Thomas has indicated
17

that he plans to remain in the area where his business is established. It is the
area where the children were born. He plans to continue to rear the children
in these familiar surroundings. At earlier stages of the separation, Mrs.
Thomas wished to move then from the area regardless of the separation of
the children from their father. (Finding of Fact Tf 81, Record at 1125.)
c.
Mr. Thomas has no plans to diminish Mrs. Thomas' role in the
children's lives. (Finding of Fact ^ 81, Record at 1125.)
d.
Mr. Thomas was not unfaithful in the marriage and has set a better
example in that regard. (Finding of Fact ^f 81, Record at 1125.)
e.
There is no indication that Mr. Thomas would subject the children to
the deleterious effects of a relationship as Mrs. Thomas has done. (Finding
of Fact f 81, Record at 1125.)
f.
Mr. Thomas has maintained the proper orientation to his family and is
more interested in the children having a meaningful relationship with both
parents. (Finding of Fact Tf 81, Record at 1125.)
Because Ann Thomas failed to marshal the evidence concerning Bert Thomas's
ability to care for the children and then show the above findings were clearly wrong,
the Court of Appeals should not disturb these findings. Clearly, Bert Thomas was a
capable parent, able to be the primary care giver for the children. In fact, until the
court ruled, the children had spent half their time with Bert Thomas. (Dr. Jensen's
Custody Evaluation 4.)
Regarding Mr. Sauer, the trial court found:
a.
Mr. Sauer is married and has several small children. (Finding of Fact
H 73, Record at 1129.)
b.
During the pendency of this action, Pedro Sauer fathered a child
during a time of reconciliation with his wife while still maintaining an
18

intimate relationship with Mrs. Thomas. (Finding of Fact ^f 73, Record at
1129.)
c.
After commencing a relationship with Mrs. Thomas, Pedro was
charged with domestic violence with his wife. (Finding of Fact Tj 73, Record
at 1129.)
d.
Pedro, a non-citizen of the United States, was charged with possession
of a firearm/revolver at Lake Powell in the company of Mrs. Thomas. This
may have also violated his work permit status in the United States. (Finding
of Fact 1f 73, Record at 1129.)
e.
Pedro, in his young marriage and with several young children, has
participated in other adulterous affairs. (Finding of Fact ^f 73, Record at
1129.)
f.
Based on the evidence, the court finds a link that Mr. Sauer has or will
negatively impact the children. The affair has impacted the family
financially. The testimony is that Mr. Sauer has not contributed financially
to the family despite the frequency of his overnight stays. In addition, scarce
resources have been expended on Pedro for gifts and travel.
The affair did result in a confrontation at the children's home
with Mrs. Sauer. That exposure, albeit brief, was not positive for the
children.
Mrs. Thomas's affair with a convicted criminal is of concern to
this court. His spousal abuse charge during this time is of concern to
this Court as is his illegal possession of a weapon. Such activity
always places the children's mother at risk and such illegal choices
can potentially, negatively affect the family. (Finding of Fact % 77-78,
Record at 1127.)
g.
Mr. Sauer had a dramatic effect on the ultimate breakup of the
Thomas family. That breakup has affected these children
significantly. (Finding of Fact ^f 78, Record at 1127.)
h.
Pedro has less than desirable characteristics: immorality, social
irresponsibility, his womanizing and infidelity, his criminal activity and his
spousal abuse. This court cannot conceive how Pedro is a positive role
model for little Joseph. Mr. Thomas offers a more stable environment to the
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children. (Finding of Fact % 80-81, Record at 1125.)
Ann Thomas did not marshal the evidence from the record to show these
findings about Mr. Sauer were clearly wrong. Although Mr. Sauer testified that the
spousal abuse charge was not prosecuted, and a plea in abeyance was entered
regarding the gun charge, these and other facts were sufficient to find that Mr. Sauer
provided a negative influence on Ann and the children. There was also testimony
from Dr. Jay Jensen that since the arrival of Mr. Sauer, Ann Thomas had put her
own needs ahead of the children. (Exhibit 1, Dr. Jensen's Custody Evaluation 10.)
It is also interesting to note the threat Mr. Sauer made to Dr. Jensen. Mr. Sauer
conveyed a message through Dr. Sanderson that he planned to mess up Dr. Jensen.
(Trial Transcript volume 1,46, Record at 1582.)
Because Bert Thomas has the ability to provide for the children's physical,
emotional and spiritual needs, because Ann Thomas has put her own needs ahead of
the children, and because Mr. Sauer had exposed the children to his negative
influence, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award custody of the
children to Bert Thomas.
C.

Alimony.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the duration of alimony
to three years. To determine alimony, at least three factors must be considered: (1)
financial need of the receiving spouse; (2) the receiving spouse's ability to produce
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income; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Roberts v.
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah App. 1992)(citations omitted). "If these three
factors have been considered, [the appellate courts] will not disturb [alimony] unless
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah App. 1993)(citations omitted).
The trial court considered the financial needs of Ann Thomas, Ann Thomas's
earning capacity, Bert Thomas's ability to pay, the length of the marriage, the fault
of the parties, and the standard of living of the parties. (Findings of Fact ^f 115-127,
Record at 1116.) Ann Thomas even stated in her Appellate Brief that the trial court
properly considered the factors to determine alimony. (Appellant's Brief 28.)
Ann Thomas went on to argue that the trial court "inexplicably limited the
duration of alimony to three years." (Appellant's Brief 28.) Ann Thomas argued
that because the trial court did not make a finding "showing some anticipated
change in circumstances" and because "there [was] nothing to suggest that
circumstances will change in any financial sense," the trial court abused its
discretion in limiting alimony to three years. (Appellant's Brief 28-29.) Ann
Thomas cited to Thronson v. Thronson. 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), as
authority to support her argument. (Appellant's Brief 29.)
There are two problems with Ann Thomas's argument. First, contrary to
Ann Thomas's assertion, the trial court did make findings regarding anticipated
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change in financial circumstances. Second, Thronson does not require a trial court
to "articulate" a change in financial circumstances before limiting the duration of
alimony.
The Trial court made several findings regarding anticipated financial
changes. The trial court found that Bert Thomas's expenses would increase because
he was awarded custody of the children. (Findings of Fact % 124, Record at 1113.)
The trial court found that Ann Thomas's expenses were exaggerated, and that her
financial needs were less than what she had reported. (Findings of Fact <[ 124,
Record at 1113.) The trial court also found that Ann Thomas had access to money
from gifted stocks and bonds. (Findings of Fact f 124, Record at 1113.) Ann
Thomas even testified that some of her expenses were only temporary because she
was setting up a new home and purchased furniture, kitchen items, and household
supplies. (Trial Transcript volume III, 129, Record at 1584.) Apparently, the trial
court felt that Ann Thomas needed alimony for three years to set up her new life.
Given these specific findings, and given the fact that Ann Thomas did not go to the
Record and marshal the evidence in support of these findings and then show the
findings to be clearly wrong, the Court of Appeals should not disturb these findings.
The purpose of alimony is to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of
living enjoyed during marriage. Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984). The
evidence showed that Ann Thomas could maintain her standard of living. Ann
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Thomas had a Bachelor of Science degree and a teaching certificate in special
education from the University of Utah. (Trial Transcript volume II, 144, Record at
1583.) Ann Thomas made $25,824 per year teaching in the Alpine School District.
(Finding of Fact ^ 109, Record at 1117.) Ann Thomas had additional income from
inherited stocks and bonds. (Finding of Fact If 124, Record at 1113.) Bert Thomas,
on the other hand, had less than a high school education. (Trial Transcript volume
IV, 44, Record at 1585.) Bert Thomas worked in the construction business which
was unpredictable from year to year. Bert Thomas was also awarded custody of the
children, increasing his financial needs. (Finding of Fact Tf 124, Record at 1113.)
Although Ann Thomas experienced some temporary expenses to set up her new life,
these were temporary expenses which would not continue longer than three years.
Because no specific challenge has been made by citing to facts in the Record why
these findings are wrong, Ann Thomas has failed to marshal and the findings should
stand.
Thronson does not require a trial court to articulate anticipated change in
financial circumstances before limiting the duration of alimony. Thronson held that
it was an abuse of discretion to limit alimony to one year when the receiving spouse
could not produce enough income to meet her financial needs, but the payor spouse,
after meeting his financial needs, had a surplus of income. Id at 435. It has not
been shown that Ann Thomas cannot meet her financial needs, especially in light of
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her exaggerated expenses and extra money from stocks and bonds. It has not been
shown that Bert Thomas, after providing for his children and meeting his financial
needs, has a surplus of income. It has not been shown that limiting alimony to three
years was inequitable or an abuse of discretion.
D.

Real Estate Division

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Bert Thomas a
premarital value of $150,000 in the home. When dividing property, "the trial court
is empowered to make such distributions as are just and equitable." Jackson v.
Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980). In fashioning an equitable property
division, the trial court should generally award a party their separate property that
they brought into the marriage or inherited during the marriage. Mortensen v.
Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
Prior to marriage, Bert Thomas solely and exclusively owned real estate in
Sundance, Utah. (Trial Transcript volume IV, 78, Record at 1585.) Bert Thomas
made improvements upon the real estate prior to marriage. He planned the building
site, cleared timber, excavated and graded a 400 foot access road up the mountain,
built massive retaining walls to retain the mountain from the house and road, and
connected power, sewer and utilities. (Trial Transcript volume IV, 78-93, Record at
1585.) Bert Thomas also had commenced construction of a home, which was 35%
complete by marriage, and stockpiled enough materials to build on the home for a
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year after marriage. (Finding of Fact ^33, Record at 1141.) Total construction of
the project was 70% complete when Ann and Bert were married. (Trial Transcript
volume III, 45-46, Record at 1584.) The value of this premarital asset was
$150,000. (Trial Transcript volume III, 19-20, Record at 1584.)
Because the value of Bert Thomas's premarital asset could be determined,
and because Ann Thomas made little contribution to this premarital value, it was
clearly within the trial court's discretion to award Bert Thomas his premarital
interest of $150,000 in the home. The trial court's decision was in accordance with
Mortensen that a trial court should award a party their premarital property.
During the marriage, Ann Thomas made some modest contributions to the
construction of the home including her own manual labor, the acquisition of
materials, the building of retaining walls, and generally assisting Bert Thomas who
acted as the general contractor for the building of the home. (Finding of Fact ^f 36,
Record at 1139.)
The only debt on the real estate was a mortgage of $27,000 borrowed after
marriage. (Trial Transcript volume IV, 84, Record at 1585.) The mortgage had
been reduced to approximately $17,500 at the time of trial. (Trial Transcript
volume IV, 84, Record at 1585.) Although title was transferred to facilitate the
security of the note payable to Mrs. Thomas's grandfather, the evidence was clear
that Bert Thomas did not make a gift of the home to Ann Thomas. (Finding of Fact
25

1f 34, Record at 1141.)
At the time of divorce, the real estate was worth $355,000. (Finding of Fact
Tf 44, Record at 1137.) During the marriage, the real estate had appreciated
$205,000. Ann Thomas was awarded one half of this appreciated value, less certain
expenses, to compensate her for the maintenance and contributions she made during
the marriage. (Finding of Fact Tf 41, 50-53, Record at 1138, 1135.) The trial court
was fair and equitable because Mr. Thomas retained his premarital interest, and
Mrs. Thomas was rewarded an equitable interest based on her efforts.
Ann Thomas argued that the home should have been considered a
commingled marital asset because Ann Thomas enhanced, maintained, and
protected the home. The authority for Ann Thomas's argument is Mortensen v.
Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). After analyzing Mortensen. it is clear that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Mortensen states that premarital property which has been enhanced,
maintained, or protected during marriage by the other spouse should generally be
divided equitably between the parties. Id at 308. However, this is just a general
guideline. Mortensen clearly states that equity does not require mathematical
equality. Id at 308 (citations omitted). In fact, Mortensen allows significant
disparity if the disparity is based on an equitable rationale other than on the sole fact
that one spouse was awarded separate gifts or inheritance. Id at 308. For example,
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Mortensen states that disparity may be appropriate if the home is "utilized to
provide housing for minor children or utilized in other extraordinary situations
where equity so demands." Id at 308.
Ann Thomas argued that the rationale of the trial court in awarding Mr.
Thomas $150,000 as premarital property was solely because she had received gifted
stocks and bonds. (Appellants Brief 32.) Although this was referred to in the trial
court's decision, it does not accurately reflect the trial court's rationale. The reason
the trial court awarded Bert Thomas his premarital interest in the home was because
of the extraordinary circumstances of this case. The trial court found that if it did
not award Bert Thomas his premarital value, it "may force Mr. Thomas to sell his
home, which would be much to the disadvantage of the children, and it would
ignore the simple fact that he had a substantial asset for which he had worked for
many years before the marriage and acquired before the marriage." (Finding of Fact
T| 35, Record at 1140.) Selling the home would also adversely impact Bert
Thomas's livelihood, and effect his social and political opportunities for the
following reasons:
a. Mr. Thomas has lived in Sundance since five years before the marriage
although not continuously until the home was habitable. (Finding of Fact Tf
35, Record at 1140.)
b. Since the fall of 1983, he has lived there continuously and is very much
involved in the social and political activities there. For example, he is the
Fire Chief, member of the North Fork Special Services District, and Vice
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Chairman for three years. He is a past president of the Homeowners'
Association, Chairman of the Architectural Committee, and he drafted the
Architectural Covenants of the SCAPO subdivision. (Finding of Fact ^f 35,
Record at 1140.)
c. Mr. Thomas earns his livelihood and established his business at
Sundance, and has earned his livelihood almost exclusively in that
community since 1977. (Finding of Fact ]f 35, Record at 1140.)
d. Given his income, it is not probable that he could acquire other
accommodations in that community. (Finding of Fact ^f 35, Record at 1140.)
e. It would prove far more difficult for him to maintain his maintenance
contracts if he were to leave the area. (Finding of Fact ^f 35, Record at 1140.)
In accordance with Mortensen. the trial court considered the extraordinary
circumstances of this case, and found that equity did not justify awarding Ann
Thomas an interest in the premarital value of the real estate. Because Ann Thomas
failed to marshal to assault the findings which established the extraordinary
circumstances of this case, and then show that the decision was clearly wrong, the
Court of Appeals should not disturb these findings on appeal.
Ann Thomas also argued that the evidence did not support a finding that the
premarital value of the home was $150,000. (Appellant's Brief 32-33.) Judd
Harward, an appraiser who had performed appraisals in Sundance for over twenty
years, (Trial Transcripts volume III, 7, Record at 1584), testified that the total value
of the real estate prior to marriage was $150,000. (Exhibit 31, 6-7.) This figure
included a lot value of $70,000, site improvement (driveway, retaining walls, septic
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tank, water line, and electrical service) value of $10,000, and a 35% completed
home value of $70,000. (Trial Exhibit 31, 6-7.) The trial court accepted Judd
Harward's value of the premarital home. (Findings of Fact Tf 48, Record at 1135.)4
Ann Thomas argued that Judd Harward's testimony could not be used. She
claimed that Judd Harward testimony violated Utah Rules of Evidence 705 because
the data he used to make his calculations were not available at trial. (Appellant's
Brief 32-33.) Utah Rule of Evidence 705 states that:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data, unless, the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on crossexamination.
Rule 705 is not a reason for the Appellate Court to remand the case for five
reasons. First, Ann Thomas did not make this argument to the trial court. Ann
Thomas had an opportunity to object and argue before the trial court that Rule 705
was not satisfied, but she did not. Because she did not raise it, she waived it.
Second, neither counsel nor the trial court requested or required Judd Harward to
disclose the underlying facts or data used. Third, Rule 705 implies that an expert is
not under an obligation to disclose his underlying facts or data until requested to do

4

The trial court rejected Ann Thomas's expert because the photos of the comparables
were wrong, the comparables were not visited, the quality of materials and workmanship of the
comparables were considerably different, and did not consider the unique aspect of the Sundance
community. (Finding of Fact 13-14, Record at 1146.)
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so. During cross-examination, Ann Thomas never required Judd Harward to make
his data available. (See testimony of Judd Harward, Trial Transcript volume III, 676, Record at 1584.) Fourth, "disclosure" only means that the expert must identify
data he employed to calculate his opinion, it does not require the expert to bring the
data to the courtroom. Fifth, during cross-examination, Judd Harward did disclose
the underlying facts and data he used. Specifically, Judd Harward testified that his
data was based on his appraisals, appraisals of other experts in the area, multiple
listing information, price information from Realtors in the area, and extensive
experience in the Sundance area. (Trial Transcript volume III, 51-52, Record at
1584.) There was nothing magical about his data; it contained the same information
which was available to any appraiser. (Trial Transcript volume III, 52, Record at
1584.) For these five reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using the
testimony of Mr. Harward to find that the premarital value of the home was
$150,000.
E.

BTCI Value.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing and distributing the
assets of Bert Thomas Construction Inc. (BTCI). Ann Thomas argued that the trial
court refused to place a value on BTCI. (Appellant's Brief 33.) This is not
accurate. The trial court did value and divided the assets of BTCI. Ann Thomas did
not offer sufficient evidence to make a business valuation of BTCI. (Finding of
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Fact If 31, Record at 1142.)
The value of the hard assets of BTCI totaled $7,634. (Exhibit #63.) Ann
Thomas's argued that the trial court should have equitably divided these assets.
This argument is surprising because the trial court did equitably divide these assets.
The trial court awarded Bert Thomas the hard assets of BTCI and determined the
value to be "nearly equal, fair and equitable" to the personal property awarded to
Ann Thomas. (Finding of Fact ^f 24-27, Record at 1144.) The trial court did not
"refuse to place a value on Bert Thomas Construction Company [BTCI]."
(Appellant's Brief 33.) The trial court valued the hard assets of BTCI and equitably
divided them.
Ann Thomas also argued that the liquid assets of BTCI were subject to
equitable division, but were dissipated by Bert Thomas. The only evidence Ann
Thomas introduced on this issue was that BTCFs savings account averaged $37,000
for the four years prior to trial, but only $7,364 at trial. (Appellant's Brief 34.)
BTCI's savings account does not represent the assets or value of BTCI. BTCI
receivables were generally deposited into a BTCI savings account where they
earned interest. When these funds were needed to pay various business expenses,
they were transferred to BTCI's checking account. (Exhibit 36, 37.) The account
balance fluctuated significantly from month to month. (Exhibit 7.) Clearly, the
savings account on any given day did not represent the assets of BTCI. The trial
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court was correct in finding that "the amount in a corporate savings account on a
given date is not controlling. To determine the value of the marital asset, one must
determine the value of the company." (Finding of Fact 1} 31, Record at 1142.)
However, Ann Thomas offered no evidence to value BTCI beyond its hard assets.
Because Ann Thomas offered no other evidence to value BTCI, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that there was insufficient evidence to award Ann
Thomas one half of an average monthly balance in BTCI's savings account.
Ann Thomas also argued that Bert Thomas dissipated this marital asset.
However, Ann Thomas failed to marshal the evidence on this issue. Her own expert
testified that the money earned by Bert's corporation was appropriately accounted
for. (Trial Transcript volume II, 126, Record at 1583.) There was no skimming or
inappropriate takings from Bert Thomas's corporation. (Trial Transcript volume II,
126, Record at 1583.) Bert Thomas's wages and personal draws after separation
were the same even two years before separation. (Trial Transcript volume II, 135;
Exhibit 14, Record at 1583.) Clearly, Bert Thomas was not taking money from
BTCI for any improper or personal purpose, which was not declared on his personal
return. There is no evidence to show otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should affirm the trial court's findings regarding the
issues of child custody, alimony, real estate division, and the value of BTCI.
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Because Ann Thomas failed to attempt to marshal the evidence and because Mr.
Thomas had to reply the issue of attorney's fees should be remanded to the trial court
for an award of Bert Thomas's reasonable attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals
should reverse the trial court's finding that Bert Thomas's income was $69,567 per
year and remand for recalculation of child support.

Dated this

/S>

day of September, 1998.

BRENT D. Y<
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANN ELIZABETH THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 934402503
BERT CHARLES THOMAS,
Defendant.

Judge Lynn W. Davis
Conwu Howard Maetani

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
commencing December 5, 1995, and following an adjournment
convening again February 26, 1996. The Honorable Judge Lynn
Davis presided.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were present in

person and represented by their attorneys, Frederick N. Green
appearing for the Plaintiff and Brent Young appearing for the
Defendant.

Each party presented evidence and testimony, and the

Court entertained the testimony of the parties and witnesses.
Counsel argued the following contested issues: 1) division of
personal property; 2) division of real property and value of real
property and marital versus premarital property; 3) child custody
and visitation; 4) child support; 5) alimony; 6) pension,
retirement issues, business assets; and 7) miscellaneous issues.
Final argument was heard by the Court on April 1, 1996, and a
MW»fUT-WrMM»ll. MO

final hearing was held on November 8, 1996 to resolve remaining
issues.

The Court, having reviewed the file, the exhibits, and

the arguments of counsel based thereon and good cause otherwise
appearing, the Court now maJces and enters its,
FINDINGS OF PACTS

1.

The parties were married on July 17, 1983.

2.

Each of the parties resided in Utah County for more

than three (3) months prior to the filing of the Complaint.
3.

The parties have two (2) minor children of the

marriage: Joseph, born July 12, 1986, age ten (10); and
Katherine, "Katie", born July 8, 1989, age seven (7).
4.

The parties separated and began to live separate and

apart on March 21, 1993.
5.

The Plaintiff is thirty-eight (38) years old and has

earned a Bachelor of Science degree, prior to her marriage to the
Defendant, from the University of Utah.
6.

The Plaintiff presently teaches special education for

the Alpine School District.
7.

The parties1 children also go to school in the Alpine

School District at the same school in which the Plaintiff
teaches.
8.

The Defendant is a self-employed contractor and builder

licensed as such in the Stare of Utah.

He is a high school

graduate with some plans to continue his education.
9.

During the marriage, the parties have acquired personal

property and improved real property.

PERSOMAL PROPERTY
10.

The general purpose of property division is to allocate

property "in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties
and best permits them to pursue their separate lives.11 The
overriding consideration in property division is "that the
ultimate division be equitable — that property be fairly divided
between the parties given their contributions during the marriage
and their circumstances at the time of the divorce." Burt v.
Burt/ 799 P.2d 1166, 1171.
11.

For the purposes of asset consideration this Court

accepts the following definition:
Marital property is all property acquired
during marriage except property acquired by
gift or inheritance and it "encompasses all
of the assets of every nature possessed by
the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived." Dunn v. Dunnr 802
P.2d 1314, 1317 - 1318.
12.

It is clear that statutory law confers broad discretion

upon the trial Court in the division of property, real and
personal, regardless of its source or time of acquisition.
13.

During the course of the marriage, and prior thereto,

the Plaintiff received annual gifts, principally from her
grandfather.
14.

These gifts were always in cash or in kind and, when in

the form cf stock, were conveyed to the Plaintiff individually
and not the Defendant as well.
15.

The practice continued through the marriage and existed

among Mrs. Thomas1 siblings likewise.
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16.

Since the separation of the parties, gifts have been

made in trust for the benefit of the parties' minor children.
17.

All of these gifts have always been maintained in

separate accounts or in separate stock accounts or certificates,
and have not been augmented, supplemented, added to, protected or
enhanced by the Defendant or from earnings from either party
during the marriage.
18.

As such, they are classic cases of separate property

which have maintained their separate identity and should be
awarded to the Plaintiff, except for those funds, which have been
designated in trust for the children which should be maintained
by the Plaintiff, in trust for the children and made available to
them consistent with the intent of the donor.
19.

Subsequent to separation, the Defendant prepared a

document entitled "Personal Property Settlement Between Ann
Thomas and Bert Thomas," dated February 5, 1994.
20.

The Court finds the parties discussed the final

resolution of the division of personal property and tools.
Thomas drafted an agreement.
agreement and signed it.

Mr.

Mrs. Thomas made changes to that

Property was delivered and accepted

pursuant to the agreement.

No discussion was had about that

agreement for a period of approximately one year.

Based upon the

authority of the agreement:, Mrs. Thomas even sold a vehicle.
21.

Upon review, and based upon the testimony of the

parties, the Court finds that the "Settlement" is ambiguous
because it does not state whether it is a settlement of all

property rights or only temporary property rights.
22.

Furthermore, the agreement was executed without the

benefit of counsel, and its enforcement would result in a
potentially significant and substantial inequity between the
parties.

Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the

agreement and its consideration are heavily disputed.
23.

Rather the Court relied upon Exhibit 24 of the

Plaintiff which lists, in detail, the personal property in each
party's possession, what property would constitute gifts to
either party and the relative values of the property.
24.

Therefore, it would be reasonable for the parties to be

awarded the personal property presently in their possession and,
in addition and not withstanding that, that the Plaintiff be
awarded the following items of personal property:
(a)

Kachina doll;

(b)

Twig outdoor furniture (five (5) pieces) or the

Adirondack outdoor furniture (four (4) pieces) , at the
election of the Defendant;
(c)

One (1) of the Bearnaise Mountain Dog puppies, or

the financial equivalent;
(d)

The oriental rug;

(e)

The antique toy trucks given to the Plaintiff by

her father;

25.

(f)

The wooden bowl;

(g)

One (1) copy of the home videos.

Plaintiff requests that the Court place a monetary
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value on Defendant's tools and then factor that value into the
equitable division of the personal property.

This Court

carefully considered the agreement/stipulation of the parties,
rejected it in part, and fashioned an equitable division of the
personalty under the circumstances.

Weighing all factors, the

Court believes it to be equitable and fair.
26.

In this regard, the Court makes a few observations.

First, this Court finds that Plaintiff has minimized the value of
some of her items and exaggerated the value of some of
Defendant's items.

Some tools were purchased prior to the

marriage and some after.

Those acquired during the marriage are

generally worn out or in disrepair.

This Court awarded Mr.

Thomas those tools, calculating the values of the assets of both
parties to be nearly equal, fair and equitable.
27.

Absolute mathematical precision is impossible.

For

example, some items given to the Plaintiff, such as the Oriental
rug, maintain value over time much better than tools which become
worn out by day to day use in the construction industry.
DISSIPATION OF ASSETS
28.

Plaintiff claims that at the time of the separation,

Defendant had approximately $40,000 on account in the Bert
Thomas, Inc.'s Savings Account and that she is entitled to onehalf as a marital asset.

Plaintiff further argues that the

account was depleted to approximately $7,000 at the time of the
trial, and that the Defendant was the sole beneficiary (i.e. he
used the funds to live on and meet his obligations under the
7
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temporary order).
29.

Defendant argues that the subject account was an

operating fund for the company and the amount in the account
fluctuated significantly from month-to-month; the amount of money
in an operating business account at any particular time has no
particular significance,
30.

These parties set up a complex financial system to

operate the Bert Thomas Construction, Inc. business. The best
this Court can glean, the flow of money in and out of the company
is represented in the flow chart attached (Exhibit No. 37).
31.

Defendant is accurate that the amount in a

corporate savings account on a given date is not controlling.

To

determine the value of the marital asset, once must determine the
value of the company.

There was insufficient evidence presented

at trial to arrive at the value of Bert Thomas Construction, Inc.
and therefore there was an insufficient basis to award Plaintiff
assets to assess financial obligations.

This Court did not make

a finding of value of Bert Thomas Construction Inc. and cannot
make such a determination by looking solely at a savings account
as of a given date.
RSftL PROPERTY
a.
32.

Marital Versus Separate Property

Utah's appellate courts have long held that once a

trial court has determined marital property, the court may
distribute it equitably, regardless of which party's name appears
on the title.
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Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986).
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"The

trial court is empowered to make such distributions as are just
and equitable, and may compel such conveyance as are necessary to
that end."

Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340 - 41 (Utah

1980) .
33.

The Court finds that Mr. Thomas, solely and

exclusively, owned real estate in Sundance, Utah before the
parties were married.

He owned the real estate free from any

type of encumbrance. (The subject property is described in
Plaintiff's Exhibit 23.)

The Court finds that Mr. Thomas

commenced construction of a home on the property, and that it was
framed up and many of the materials had been purchased before the
parties were married.

In addition, it is important to note that

a lengthy access road had been constructed and power and sewer
utilities had been placed on the premises. The Court finds Mr.
Thomas continued to work on the home after the marriage, using
materials previously obtained.

This property ultimately became

the parties1 marital residence. Approximately one to one and
one-half years after they were married, the parties obtained
$27,000 from Mrs. Thomas' grandfather.

This note was secured by

a mortgage which had been reduced to approximately $17,000 at the
time of trial (Exhibit 23).
34.

The note was signed by both parties, as was the

ncrtrrace. Title w^s transferred tc facilitate the securitv of
the note payable to Mrs. Thomas' grandfather.

The evidence is

clear that Mr. Thomas did not make a gift of the home to Mrs.
Thomas.

35.

Mr. Thomas had a significant asset before the marriage

and was able to use assets previously acquired to help complete
the home for at least a year.

Therefore, it would be inequitable

for the Court to divide the equity in the home equally, and
permit Mrs. Thomas to have all of her stocks and bonds.

It would

not be equitable or consistent for the Court to award Mrs. Thomas
all of her premarital property and her gifts and inheritance and
award her one-half of Mr. Thomas1 premarital property.

That

approach may force Mr. Thomas to sell his home, which would be
much to the disadvantage of the children, and it would ignore the
simple fact that he had a substantial asset for which he had
worked for many years before the marriage and acquired before the
marriage.

It would also have a significant adverse effect upon

his employment opportunities at Sundance for the following
reasons:
a.

Mr. Thomas has lived in Sundance since five years

before the marriage, although not continuously until the
home was habitable;
b.

Since the fall of 1983, he has lived there

continuously and is very much involved in the social and
political activities there. For example, he is the Fire
Chief, member of the North Fork Special Services District,
and Vice-chairman for three years. He is a past president
of the Homeowners1 Association, Chairman of the
Architectural Committee, and he drafted the Architectural
Covenants of the SCAPO subdivision.
10
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c.

Mr. Thomas earns his livelihood and established

his business at Sundance, and has earned his livelihood
almost exclusively in that community since 1977.
d.

Given his income, it is not probable that he could

acquire other accommodations in that community.
e.

It would prove far more difficult for him to

maintain his maintenance contracts if he were to leave the
area.
36.

Commencing sometime during the period of cohabitation

and thereafter, the Plaintiff made some modest contribution to
the construction of the home including her own manual labor, the
acquisition of building materials, the building of retaining
walls, and generally assisting the Defendant who acted as the
general contractor for the building of the home.
37.

As stated above, generally, parties should retain their

separate property that they brought into the marriage or that
they might inherit during the marriage.
38.

The ownership of the premises and the state of

improvement of the lot prior to marriage is not significantly
disputed.

The value of the asset prior to marriage can be

established.

It would be inequitable to grant Plaintiff an

interest for which she never worked for, nor contributed to.
39.

The building lot had been conveyed to Mr. Thomas and

significant improvements had been made prior to any contribution
by Mrs. Thomas.

This Court may always adjust property

distribution to achieve an equitable result.
11

The Court values Mr. Thomas1 premarital asset at

40.
$150,000.

The Court specifically rejects Mr. Free's claim that

the 1982 value could not be ascertained because of the
credibility problems listed below.

That consists of the building

lot and its improvements including the foundation for the home,
the partially framed house, the lengthy access road which was
constructed and other improvements such as sewer, power, partial
retaining walls, and the stockpiled supplies.
41.

Beyond that interest, Mrs. Thomas is then entitled to

an equitable share because of her maintenance and contributions.
This appears to be a fair, just and equitable result because Mr.
Thomas retains his clearly premarital interest, and Mrs. Thomas
retains an equitable interest based on her efforts. This
equitable determination rejects both the position of Plaintiff
(commingling) and the position of Defendant (exclusive ownership
together with all appreciation).
b.
42.

Valuation of the Real Property

Trial courts are provided considerable discretion in

establishing the value of real property.

Such valuations are

presumed valid and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of
discretion.

Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

As stated in Morgan at 691, the trial court "is entitled to give
conflicting opinions whatever weight it deems appropriate."
There are conflicting opinions on this case.

The Court

establishes the value of the Sundance property as of the date of
the trial.

c:N«m**A\nM*?>ir>-*3\rxMSMU.»u
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43.

The Plaintiff introduced evidence based upon the real

property appraisal conducted by Gary Free and Associates which is
based upon the "comparable sales approach" and concludes that the
home has a current fair market value of $500,000.
44.

The Defendant introduced evidence based upon an

appraisal conducted by Jud Harward who concluded that the home
had a current fair market value of $355,000.
45.

The Court is disinclined to accept the appraisal of the

home at Sundance by Mr. Free, Plaintiff • s expert, for the
following reasons:
a.

Plaintiff's expert was uncertain of the

comparables and some of the pictures of the "comparables"
did not even correspond to the comparables which were relied
upon.

While this does not constitute a dispositive defect,

it does reflect upon the accuracy of the appraisal and the
credibility and integrity of the report.
On this issue, the Court agrees with Mr. Thomas.

The

Court is not impressed with the idea that the photos of the
comparables are not required and therefore of little
importance.

In the Court's view, an appraisal is a

comparison of properties.
the real property.

The photograph is a "snapshot" of

If it is wrong, the appraisal could be

misleading.
b.

The comparables were not visited.

c.

The quality of the materials and quality of

workmanship in the comparables were considerably different

ci \«N*tAVtMfct« irr-*3\rtmiaea. rto

the area.

He testified concerning the significant differences in

the quality of those properties compared to the Thomas cabin.
47.

Next, the Court turns to the appraisal of Jud Harward.

It is clear that Mr. Harward had considerable experience of
appraising in Utah County area and in appraising property in
Sundance.
48.

The Court accepts Mr. Harward's appraisal based upon

such experience and observations in appraising real estate in
Sundance.

Accordingly, the Court accepts the value of the cabin

at $355,000.
49.

The Court must consider costs associated with sale.

It

is undisputed that there are problems with the cabin before it
could be marketable, including boundary line problems.
also are costs of repair.

There

A real estate commissioner would be

approximately six percent (6%), plus closing costs (.06 x
$355,000 = $21,300).

Mr. Thomas testified that the sales cost

would be approximately $31,900. The mortgage of approximately
$17,000 would have to be paid.
$355,000

Sale Price

$ 17,000

Mortgage

S 31,900

Commission and Realtor Fees

$306,100
50.

The value of Mr. Thomas1 interest at the time of

marriage was $150,000.

The Court has already addressed the issue

of natural growth/appreciation.

A fair division of the equity

forces the Court to reject the appreciation factor given the

c:\<iM«tA\ffMavf-in-*s%rtMsaet. n »
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than those used by Mr. Thomas.

It is undisputed,

specifically, that the materials to construct the Thomas
cabin had been previously us££l. The materials in the
comparables were new.

For example, the kitchen cabinets in

the Thomas cabin are made of plywood.
d.

Comparison of the garages were not accurate, as

well as other items such as number of fireplaces, concern
for avalanche danger, and degree of exposure to sun.
e.

The Thomas home is not complete.

It requires

maintenance and repairs to make it marketable.

The "Free"

appraisal did not give sufficient weight to the true
condition of the Thomas cabin.
f.

Mr. Free and his associates had considerable

difficulty in even locating the correct properties.
g.

Of significant concern to this Court was Mr.

Free's failure to address the extant property line and
easement problems associated with the property.

Such

problems can significantly delay the sale of a property and
the Court is aware that title problems not only affect the
marketability of a property, but also affect its value.
h.

The "Free" appraisal also failed to address the

difficulty of accessibility to the subject property and the
significance of view.
46.

Mr. Thomas testified of his personal knowledge of

Plaintiff's comparables because he was acquainted with each, and
had performed work in many of the comparables and other cabins in
14
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contributions of the parties during their marriage and their
circumstances at the time of the divorce. Nevmeyer v. Newmeyer,
745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987).

Accordingly, Mrs. Thomas1

equity is calculated as follows ($306,100 - $150,000 /2).
51.

Therefore, the Court awards Mrs. Thomas an interest in

the home at the value of $78,050.
52.

The Court grants the Defendant the option to either

purchase the Plaintiff's interest in the cabin or sell the cabin
and divide the proceeds consistent with the above findings of
fact.
53.

The election to purchase the cabin should be exercised

within 120 days from date hereon.

Upon expiration, the cabin

should be placed on the market for sale, with the parties
cooperating in its listing, showing, selling and closing.

et>afOMA\fMRt-ir>-tt\rxMiaM n o
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the area.

He testified concerning the significant differences in

the quality of those properties compared to the Thomas cabin.
47.

Next, the Court turns to the appraisal of Jud Harvard.

It is clear that Mr. Harward had considerable experience of
appraising in Utah County area and in appraising property in
Sundance.
48.

The Court accepts Mr. Harvard's appraisal based upon

such experience and observations in appraising real estate in
Sundance.

Accordingly, the Court accepts the value of the cabin

at $355,000.
49.

The Court must consider costs associated with sale.

It

is undisputed that there are problems with the cabin before it
could be marketable, including boundary line problems. There
also are costs of repair.

A real estate commissioner would be

approximately six percent (6%), plus closing costs (.06 x
$355,000 = $21,300).

Mr. Thomas testified that the sales cost

would be approximately $31,900. The mortgage of approximately
$17,000 would have to be paid.
$355,000

Sale Price

$ 17,000

Mortgage

S 31.900

Commission and Realtor Fees

$306,100
50.

The value of Mr. Thomas1 interest at the time of

marriage was $150,000. The Court has already addressed the issue
of natural growth/appreciation.

A fair division of the equity

forces the Court to reject the appreciation factor given the
15
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III.
CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
54.

As indicted above, the parties have two minor children:

Joseph and Katie.

This Court is charged with the duty respecting

the future care and custody of Joseph and Katie as it deems
appropriate.
55.

This trial court is given broad discretion in making

child custody awards.
Ct. App. 1992) .

Sukin v. Sukinr 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah

This Court has had the opportunity to witness

the parties, to hear all of the evidence, to visit with the minor
children and to judge the personal and individual circumstances
of this case.
56.

As provided by statute, "in awarding custody, the Court

shall consider, among other factors the Court finds relevant,
which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
[children], including allowing the child frequent and continuing
contact with the noncustodial parent as the Court finds
appropriate."

§30-3-10(2) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

In

determining custody, the Court is to consider the best interests
of the child and the past conducts and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties. §30-3-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended).
57.

This Court shall consider the "best interests of the

child" as an important factor, but will also consider past
conduct and moral standards of the parties and which parent will
act in the child's best interest and other relevant factors such
17
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as keeping the siblings together, and each childfs bond with each
parent.
58.

It is apparent that Joseph and Katie get along well,

participate in activities together, and are a mutual support of
each other.

As noted in Dr. Stewart's report, there is a firm

sibling bond.

Accordingly, it is in their best interests not to

be separated.

This Court did not inquire as to the preference of

Joseph or Katie because neither child is sufficiently mature of
age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent
preference regarding legal custody.
59.

Both parents truly have a sincere desire for custody.

This Court has carefully examined a custody evaluation report of
Dr. Jay P. Jensen, a clinical psychologist, dated March 21, 1995.
He, by stipulation, was appointed friend of the Court. In
addition, the Court carefully examined the custody evaluation
report of Dr. Elizabeth B. Stewart, also a clinical psychologist,
dated December 1, 1995. Both of these fine professionals
testified at trial. Dr. Stewart had the benefit of Dr. Jensen's
report when making her report and adopted/supported some of his
findings and conclusions and criticized others.

This Court would

have favored an analysis which did not rely upon or disparage
that of the parties' stipulated friend of the Court. The Court
has relied in part on both evaluations for guidance, but the
Court does not accept either in total.
60.

The two custody evaluations performed in this case

appear to agree on a number of important points and disagree on
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some critical issues.

Dr. Jensen recommended that custody be

given to the father or, in the alternative, a modified joint
custody arrangement be worked out.

Dr. Stewart recommends that

custody be awarded to Mrs. Thomas.
61.
answers.

This is a complicated case with no easy, clear-cut
Both of these parents seek custody, are competent and

definitely love their children.

Both have personal, professional

lives which somewhat complicate custodial arrangements. The
children have been isolated in their Orem neighborhood because
they attend a non-neighborhood school, Orchard Elementary, where
their mother teaches.

In addition, they have been somewhat

isolated in their Sundance neighborhood because of the paucity of
playmates and distance between cabins, etc.
62.

Ann Thomas was the primary caretaker for the children

prior to the parties1 separation.
63.

Prior to the parties1 separation and since, Ann Thomas

has performed well as the mother of the children.
64.

The Defendant has also acknowledged that Ann Thomas is

a competent, caring mother who has indeed been the primary care
giver for the children throughout their lives.
65.

As the primary care giver of the children, Mr. Thomas

has seen to their day to day needs, typically been the parent who
has been home when they return from school, assisted the children
with their school work, made sure the children received
appropriate medical and dental care, typically transported the
children when such was necessary, entertained the children,
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disciplined the children, and so forth.

Mr. Thomas has also

contributed and been involved in these activities.

The Court

finds Mr. Thomas has been involved with the children's schooling,
health care, religious training, and day to day activities.

He

has attended parent/teacher conferences, he has taken the
children to doctors, dentists and other activities.
66.

The children interact with Ann Thomas as their primary

care provider and have established confidence in her as their
primary care provider.
67.
1993,

The parties have, since their separation in March of

entered into an arrangement of shared custody.

The Court

finds the arrangement which has been heretofore set forth in
prior Court orders has provided that the time the children spent
with each parent has been approximately equal.

The Court finds

that for approximately half of the life of the youngest and onethird of the life of the oldest child, that they both have
enjoyed a relationship with both of their parents wherein they
have shared approximately equal time.

The arrangement has worked

somewhat well as these arrangements go, but the children have
suffered from some instability and moving back and forth.
68.

The Court finds that Mr. Thomas had been involved with

the children on a daily basis until the separation.

Mr. Thomas

conducts business out of his home which has permitted him to be
involved in the children's daily activities since they were born.
Since the parties1 separation, the children have also had an
opportunity to rely upon their father for meeting their needs to
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a greater extent than existed prior to separation.

The children

have flourished in the relationship they have with Mr. Thomas.
69.

The children's social needs are being principally met

thought their associations at school.
70.

The Defendant's residence in Sundance, Utah County,

does not afford a substantial amount of peer interaction for the
children, but they have close friends there.

In addition, the

children have not established close friendships in their mother's
neighborhood.
71.

The appearance of Senor Pedro Sauer in an emotional and

sexual relationship with Ann Thomas during this marriage is a
very complicating factor.
72.

Mr. and Mrs. Thomas separated in March of 1993. Mrs.

Thomas, unbeknownst to Mr. Thomas, had commenced a relationship
with Pedro in October or November of 1992. Mr. Pedro Sauer was
then, and was at the time of trial, a married man.
73.

From all the trial testimony and reports of the

evaluators, what facts to do we glean about Pedro?
a.

He is not a citizen of the United States of

America.
b.

He is Brazilian and has entered the United States

by virtue of a work permit.
c.

He is a marrial arts instructor in Ju Jitsu at a

health club.
d.

He is married, and his wife and small children

live in Orem, Utah.

He has several small children.
21

e.

It is somewhat unclear when Pedro entered into a

sexually intimate relationship with Mrs. Thomas, but the
romantic relationship commenced in 1992. Mrs. Thomas
reported to Dr. Jensen that she met Pedro in October and had
a relationship by November of 1992. Mr. Thomas believed the
relationship had started as early as June of 1992.
f.

During the pendency of this action, Pedro fathered

a child during a time of reconciliation with his wife, while
still maintaining an intimate relationship with Mrs. Thomas.
g.

After commencing a relationship with Mrs. Thomas,

Pedro was charged with domestic violence with this wife.
h.

Pedro, a non-citizen of the United States, was

charged with possession of a firearm/revolver at Lake Powell
in the company of Mrs. Thomas.

This may have also violated

his work permit status in the United States.
i.

Pedro, in his young marriage and with several

young children, has participated in other adulterous
affairs.
j.

He now has a divorce pending in the Fourth

District Court which is set for September of 1996.
k.

His wife enjoyed entry into the United States

because of the work status of Pedro.

A divorce will result

in her deportation from the United States and her re-entry
is in question.

The future custodial status of their

children is unknown.

This could significantly affect the

Pedro/Mrs. Thomas dynamics if some or all of the children
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remain here, particularly any child born in the United
States and who would automatically enjoy citizenship.
1.

Mrs. Thomas reported to Dr. Jensen that her

relationship with Pedro "had a dramatic effect" on the
ultimate breakup of the Thomas family.
m.

Mrs. Thomas perceives Pedro as "a very positive

male role model. . ." (Report of Dr. Jensen, p. 10.)
74.

The Pedro/Ann Thomas relationship has continued for

several years and while no one can predict the future, it appears
to this Court that it is their intention to marry when they are
legally able.

As mentioned above, his divorce trial is scheduled

for September of 1996.
75.

This Court had hoped Mr. Sauer's divorce would have

been completed earlier in order to evaluate his true motives, and
then to have evaluators thoroughly and fully consider his
relationship to these minor children, his commitment to Mrs.
Thomas, his relationships with any other women, and his
obligations to his children and his ex-wife.
76.

The Court has entertained the testimony of Pedro Sauer

and his wife.

He represented himself as a responsible

individual, but is not.

He has undertaken activity which would

be considered detrimental to the Thomas children.
77.

Based upon the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Sauer and

others, the Court does find a "link" or connection that would
suggest that the relationship between the Plaintiff and Mr. Sauer
has negatively impacted the children, or will negatively impact
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the children in the future.
78.

The evaluators can make no "objective" link between the

"affair" and its impact upon the children.

The fact of the

matter is that they are young and my not appreciate the
consequences of a fairly discreet sexual affair, but the
relationship has affected the family:
a.

The affair has impacted the family financially.

The testimony is that Mr. Sauer has not contributed
financially to the family despite the frequency of his
overnight stays.

In addition, scarce resources have been

expended on Pedro for gifts and travel.
b.

The affair eventually resulted in a confrontation

at the children's home with Mrs. Sauer.

That exposure,

albeit brief, is not positive for the children.
c.

Mrs. Thomas's affair with a convicted criminal is

of concern to this Court.

His spousal abuse charge during

this time is of concern to this Court as is his illegal
possession of a weapon.

The weapon was possessed in the

company of Mrs. Thomas on a trip to Lake Powell and was
attempted to be retrieved at a time of confrontation.

Such

activity always places the children's mother at risk and
such illegal choices can potentially, negatively affect the
family.
d.

Mr. Sauer "had a dramatic effect" on the ultimate

breakup of the Thomas family.

That breakup has affected

these children significantly, dramatically and in a myriad
24

of ways,
79.

The reason this case is so troubling is because of

Pedro Sauer and his negative influence on the family.

Absent his

entry, and his influence, it is clearly in the best interests of
the children to be awarded to Ann Thomas. With Pedro in the
picture, which he is and intends to be, it is not in the best
interests of the children to be in the home and subjected to the
negative influence and example of Pedro.
80.

This Court is profoundly concerned with Mrs. Thomas1

observation that Pedro is "a very positive role model."

She has

been duped by his suave, debonair and romantic influences and has
overlooked his less than desirable characteristics: immorality,
social irresponsibility, his womanizing and infidelity, his
criminal activity and his spousal abuse.

This Court cannot

conceive how Pedro is a positive role model for little Joseph.
To that extent Ann Thomas does not have the best interests of the
children at heart.
81.
children.

Mr. Thomas offers a more stable environment to the
On the issue of stability, the Court concurs with Dr.

Jensen that:
a.

Mr. Thomas is a greater source of stability in the

childrenfs lives (Exhibit 1 page 14, Conclusions and
Recommendations) .
b.

Mr. Thomas will not threaten the children's

integration into their present environment by a change in
residence.
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Mr. Thomas has indicated that he plans to remain
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in the area where his business is established.
area where the children were born.

It is the

He plans to continue to

rear the children in these familiar surroundings. At
earlier stages of the separation, Mrs. Thomas wished to move
from the area regardless of the separation of the children
from their father.
c.

Mr. Thomas has no plans to diminish Mrs. Thomas1

role in the children's lives.
d.

Mr. Thomas was not unfaithful in the marriage and

has set a better example in that regard.
e.

There is no indication that Mr. Thomas would

subject the children to the deleterious effects of a
relationship as Mrs. Thomas has done.
f.

Mr. Thomas has maintained the proper orientation

to his family and is more interested in the children having
a meaningful relationship with both parents.
82.

Based upon the above, the Court believes it is in the

long term best interests of the children to award their custody
to Mr. Thomas subject to generous, liberal and frequent
visitation by Mrs. Thomas.

This award will allow the children

the stability of the home, which they have known from birth, will
allow them to continue in the same school and will allow them to
have daily contact with their morher there.

This arrangement

will provide Mrs. Thomas with sufficient recreational time, as
well as work time/discipline time with the children.
83.

This Court adopts the "minimum schedule for visitation"
26

found at Utah CQde, Annotated ("U.C.A") §30-3-35(2), modified as
follows:

Plaintiff shall enjoy visitation on alternating weeks

commencing Thursday evening following the release of the children
from school and concluding the following Monday morning when the
Plaintiff returns the children to school, which shall constitute
her alternating weekend visitation.

Additionally, the parties

have agreed that the Plaintiff shall enjoy midweek visits with
the children on Thursday evenings following the children's
dismissal from school until the following Friday morning when the
Plaintiff delivers the children to school.
84.

The parties shall divide the children's "vacation time"

between them.

Vacation time shall include "off-track" school

time when the children are in year-round schools.

This will

include summer off-track or vacation time provided that each
party will enjoy a two (2) week period of time that is
undisturbed by visitation with the other parent, which will allow
for family vacation time.
85.

This modification is made according to the "advisory

guidelines" of U.C.A. §30-3-33, particularly paragraph (2) ("the
visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity
and stability of the child's life").

Pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-

34(l),1 the Court finds that this modification serves three
important interests of the children.
First, it economized on the amount of required travel*
1

This

"If the p a r t i e s are unable to agree on a v i s i t a t i o n schedule, the court
may e s t a b l i s h a v i s i t a t i o n schedule consistent with the best i n t e r e s t s of the
c h i l d . " U.C.A. §30-3-34(1).
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should promote the safety of the children, increase the amount of
time available for meaningful activities with each parent, and
reduce the amount of money diverted to transportation costs.
Second, it avoids late-evening exchanges on week nights,
which could have ill effects upon the health of the children as
well as their performance in school.
Third, it reduces the number of times the children are
forced to make a change of dwelling, with all of the
inconvenience that may entail (in terms of packing and cleaning,
for example).
86.

For these reasons, the Court finds that this visitation

schedule will tend to "maximize the continuity and stability of
the child[ren]fs [lives]," U.C.A. §30-3-33(2), and therefore is
"consistent with the best interest of the child[ren]"
§30-3-34(1).

U.C.A.

Moreover, this arrangement is compatible with this

Court's prior order of "generous, liberal and frequent visitation
by [Plaintiff]," Ruling at 18, subject to the restriction to be
discussed presently.
87.

Moreover, in its ruling from the bench, this Court

places an important restriction upon Plaintiff with regard to her
periods of visitation.

This Court stated that during the

visitation periods set forth, "there should be no romantic
interaction between the Plaintiff and Pedro Sauer."

Minute Entry

- Order to Show Cause Hearing ("Minute Entry") at n.p.

Plaintiff

must use caution and sound judgment in her relations with Mr.
Sauer in the presence of the children.
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88.

Furthermore, there shall be no romantic

whatsoever

interaction

between Plaintiff and Mr. Pedro Sauer during the

children's martial arts instruction.
89.

However, despite the concerns expressed by the

Defendant, this Court declines to restrict the children's
participation in martial arts while visitation.

As the Court has

previously stated on the record:
The participation of the children in martial
arts is a separate issue and should be
addressed through mediation. If the children
are being injured, bruised or engaging in
activities which are foreign to the personal
philosoph[y] of [either] parent, then the
issue can be revisited.
Minute Entry at n.p.
90.

In addition, as to any extra-curricular activities,

including Ju Jitsu/martial arts, the parties shall consult with
one another with the intent to reach a resolution.

If they are

unable to do so, they shall mediate their differences. The
parties shall cooperate with each other in providing medical,
school and other records relating to the children.
91.

Each party is to assume its own costs and attorney's

fees associated with bringing and responding to the Order to Show
Cause.
IV.
CHILD SUPPORT
92.

Mr. Thomas is entitled to child support for the care

and custody of Katie and Joseph. Practically speaking, it is
difficult to assess the income of Mr. Thomas because of his self-
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employment status and the legal measures set up for financing his
business.

In addition, income generated from a construction

business is volatile from year to year and is sensitive to the
economy.

Likewise, it is also difficult to assess Mrs. Thomasfs

income because she historically enjoyed the benefit of an
inheritance of stocks and bonds exclusive to her.

There is

testimony that that source has been exhausted, but nonetheless
she had substantial income from the sale or stocks and bonds
during the tax year prior to trial.
93.

The Court finds Bert Thomas was self-employed, and had

numerous tools and two trucks at the time he married Mrs. Thomas.
He earns a living using his tools.
94.

The Court finds that Mr. Thomas owns a business known

as Bert Thomas Construction, Inc. (BTCI) . Mr. Thomas performs
the following tasks with respect to the business: he performs all
of the bidding, purchases all of the materials, answers the
telephone or otherwise handles all inquiries, pays all bills,
deals with all employees, and has so been involved for
approximately 20 years at Sundance.

He has periodically worked

with Dwight Hooker as an employee.
95.

Mr. Thomas has set up, pursuant to the advice of his

accountant, an investment company called Thomas Investments.
This accounting arrangement allows him to earn passive income
through the investment company without Social Security
contribution.
96.

The Court finds Mr. Thomas has confined virtually all
30

of his work to the Sundance area. He remodels and maintains
homes in this area. He has also built a few homes in the
Sundance area.
97.

The Court finds Mr. Thomas's income is derived from two

sources: (1) Bert Thomas Construction Company, a corporation; and
(2) Thomas Investments.

There is not anything irregular or

inappropriate with respect to his income from either the
construction company and investment company as verified by both
Ann's and Bert's accountants.
98.

The Court finds Mr. Thomas has income which comes from

the investment company.

The Court finds the arrangement has been

set up so that Mr. and Mrs. Thomas could receive passive income,
thus reducing their withholding to Social Security.

According to

Mrs. Thomas' expert there does not appear to be any inappropriate
expenditures, or any unaccounted for funds, or inappropriate
accounting conducted by Mr. Thomas.

Moreover, there does not

appear to be any significant benefits to Mr. Thomas from either
the construction company or the investment company.

While

employees of the construction company did minor work on the home,
part of the home is listed as an asset of the investment company
and is used as an office, shop, bathroom and storage area.
99.

Mr. Thomas has been a reasonably successful contractor

earning, typically during the years, just prior to separation,
approximately $70,000 per year.
100.

The Court relies upon the exhibits introduced in

connection with the testimony of Derk Rasmussen, CPA, consisting
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of Exhibits 7 through 19.
101.

Mr. Rasmussen conducted an in depth review of the

parties' savings account and checking account activity in order
to determine the availability of cash to the family, the
expenditures of cash, the income of the Defendant and the
projected income of the Defendant.
102.

The Defendant has testified that his income and

business activity has been about normal during the pendency of
the case.
103.

The trend in Utah County residential construction has

been an increasing trend, and the Bert Thomas Construction
revenue trend has approximately kept pace with that increase, see
Exhibit 12.
104.

Inexplicably and contrary to the Defendant's own

testimony, the actual Bert Thomas Construction Company revenue
has declined sharply since separation regardless of the trend of
residential construction in Utah County and the previous Bert
Thomas Construction trend, see Exhibit 13.
105.

It would be appropriate to average the income of Mr.

Thomas to determine what his actual income earning capacity is.
However, it would be inappropriate to give the same weight to
post-separation years as to pre-separation years.
106.

Therefore, the Court adopts the average set forth in

Exhibit 16 for Mr. Thomas's income at $69,567 per year, gross and
before taxes, which is an average of the income from the years
1988 to 1992.
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107.

The Plaintiff's income from her sole employment is

$25,824 gross per year.
108.

Child support should be based upon the Child Support

Guidelines for the State of Utah attributing $5,797 per month as
gross income to the Defendant and $2,152 per month to the
Plaintiff.
109.

To arrive at the amount of child support required of

parents collectively, this Court must first determine the
"adjusted gross income" of each parent.

U.C.A. §78-45-7.4.

"Adjusted gross income" in this case simply means gross income.
See U.C.A. §78-45-7.6.

This Court previously found Defendant's

annual income to be $69,567 and Plaintiff's to be $25,824. These
figures are hereby found to represent the "gross income" and
hence the "adjusted gross income" of each party for purposes of
determining their respective child support obligations.
110.

According to U.C.A. §78-45-7.4 (2) (a) , the next step is

for this Court to
parents."

lf

[c]ombine the adjusted gross incomes of the

This yields a sum of $95,391 annually.

Next, the

Court must "recalculate []. . . to determine the average
[adjusted] gross monthly

income" of each of the parties

separately and of both together."
emphasis added.

U.C.A. §78-45-7.5 (5)(a) ,

The result is a finding that the Defendant

receives $5,797.25 per month, while Plaintiff receives $2,152 per
month.

Together, their monthly income amounts to $7,949.25.

111.

With this last figure in hand, the Court is in a

position to "determine the base combined child support obligation
33
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using the base combined child support obligation table" found at
U.C.A. §78-45-7.14. U.C.A. §78-45-7.7(2)(a). According to that
table, where the monthly combined adjusted gross income ("monthly
combined income") is between $7,901 and $8,000, and there are two
children of the marriage, the base combined child support
obligation is $1,23 6 per month.
112.

This amount ($1,236) must be apportioned between the

parties according to their respective contributions to the
monthly combined income.

As it happens, Defendant contributes

72.9% of the income while Plaintiff contributes 27.1% of it.
Therefore, Defendant is liable for $901.39 ($1,236 x 72.9%) per
month in child support, while Plaintiff is liable for $334*61
($1,236 x 27.1%) per month.
113.

Because Defendant is the custodial parent, he is

entitled to receive $334.61 per month from Plaintiff for the
purpose of child support.
114.

Based upon the foregoing, child support should enter

consistent with the guidelines in the amount of $334.61 per
month.

Total child care paid by Mr. Thomas from February 1994,

through March, 1996 was $2,080. His actual responsibility for
payment of child care was $438. He is therefore entitled to a
credit of $1,642.00
V.
ALIMONY
115.
parties.

Alimony is largely a function of the income of the
U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(a)(i)(iii). Defendant contends that
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this Court erred in determining his income. His contention may
or may not be correct.

In any event, it is best left for the

appellate courts to revisit the complex financial arrangements of
the parties.

Accordingly, this Court declines the invitation to

disturb its prior determination of the Defendant's income.
B.
116.

There are a considerable number of factors in

determining the necessity, amount and duration of alimony
obligations.
listed at id.
(i)

At a minimum, the Court must consider the factors
These include:
the financial condition and needs of the recipient

spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and ,
(iv) the length of the marriage.
Id.

In addition, "[t]he court may consider the fault of the

parties. . ."
117.

U.C.A. §30-3-5(7) (b) .

The aim of alimony generally is to maintain, as much

as possible, a certain standard of living for each of the parties
to a divorce.

Thus,

[a]s a general rule, the court should look to
the standard of living, existing at the time
of separation, in determining alimony . . .
However, the court shall consider all
relevant facts and equitable principles and
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time
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of trial. . . U.C.A §30-3-5(&)(c).
Additionally, "[t]he court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 respective
standards of living-"
118.

U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(d).

These are the statutory statements which guide the

analysis which follows.
C.
119.

Defendant in this case seeks a retroactive award of

temporary support.

He was ordered to make payments of $700 per

month at a preliminary order at the earliest stages of these
proceedings.

Defendant argues that amount was established based

upon a faulty and inflated determination of his income. He
argues further that an initial faulty determination has been
perpetrated through this entire case to the harsh detriment of
the Defendant.
120.

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's personal

expenses have been highly exaggerated, that she has sufficient
income to meet her needs and that she will receive a significant
amount of the proceeds (approximately $78,000) from the equity in
the home.

Further, he argues that during the pendency of this

action, she has had access to large amounts of money derived from
the sale of stocks and bonds and from personal savings (sometimes
in excess of $120,000).

Next, he argues that yearly gifts of

stocks and bonds, in light of the divorce, have now simply been
conveyed to their minor children as a subterfuge until after the
divorce.
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121.

Next, he argues that the accounts of the children can

be utilized to purchase a home, etc. and reduce any need for
alimony.

The Court finds this argument to be interesting, but

unconvincing.

Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's

affidavit of personal expenses is exaggerated, and that she has
sufficient income to meet her personal needs.
122.

Counsel for Plaintiff argues that Defendant should pay

alimony pursuant to the Temporary Order and that Plaintiff should
not pay child support simply because she cannot afford it even
accounting for the alimony she will receive.

Plaintiff argues

that her present personal expenses exceed her income.
123.

The purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving

spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage.

Noble v. Noblef 761 P.2d 1369, 1372

(Utah 1988).
The 1995 amendment to §30-3-5(7)(a) codified
Jones which had established a three factor
approach in setting alimony. In setting an
award of alimony, a trial court must consider
the following three factors: (1) the
financial condition and needs of the
receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income
for him or herself, and (3) the ability of
the payor spouse to provide support.
However, "alimony may not be automatically
awarded whenever there is disparity between
the parties' incomes"???
124.

Additionally, the Court has weighed the following

three factors.
1.

Earnings and Expenses

This Court has previously determined the income of each

e: \ ••«A»A\ fMov t- I«T- n\ raoxma. no

37

party.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's expenses are exaggerated

and that the expenses of Defendant will necessarily increase
somewhat because of this Court's award of custody to Defendant.
In addition, it is apparent that during this litigation that
Plaintiff has had access to sums of money derived principally
from the sale of gifted stock and bonds.
2.

Education, Health, Etc.

Both parties are employed and are healthy.

Plaintiff is a

college graduate and has pursued an advanced degree.

She is

employed as a teacher and has steady, stable employment.
Defendant is a high school graduate with no college degree and no
substantive advanced training.

He runs a one-man-managed

construction company, employing others as the seasons allow.

He

has expressed some desire to change careers and seek a more
stable, long-term employment with benefits and retirement.
3.

Ability to Pay

Defendant argues that he cannot afford alimony because he is
now saddled with a refinance of the home in order to pay out the
equity to Defendant.

Further, he again argues that the Court's

determination of income is in error and that Plaintiff's take
home income exceeds his.
125.

This Court previously held that the character of

Defendant's source of income requires that he remain in the
Sundance home.

His construction business relies exclusively upon

word-of-mouth referrals in the Sundance area.
126.

Clearly, there are limited funds to meet the demands
38
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of two households.

It is impossible to absolutely equalize

standards of Living.

This Court must order alimony in an attempt

to provide the minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries
essential to maintain customary or proper status or
circumstances.
127.

Defendant has some ability to pay alimony.

Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff three years (36 months)
of alimony at the rate of $700.00 per month.

Defendant may have

credit for amounts paid pursuant to the Temporary Order of the
Court.

This award shall automatically terminate upon Plaintiff's

remarriage or cohabitation with another person.
VI.
PENSION, RETIREMENT BENEFITS, MISCELLANEOUS, ETC.
128.

Health care insurance and health care costs. The

children should be maintained on Mrs. Thomas1 health care plan.
Each party should pay one-half of any unreimbursed routine health
care costs. Any non-routine medical, dental or orthodontic care
costs must be agreed upon by the parties before any such cost is
incurred.

The Court finds Mrs. Thomas terminated Mr. Thomas from

her health insurance.

Although the insurance coverage was

reinstated, as a result, Mr. Thomas incurred and paid health care
costs in the amount of $1,944, which should have been paid by her
insurance.

Mr, Thomas is entitled to a credit in that amount

against her interest in the home (See Exhibit 53) .

If Mrs.

Thomas is able to obtain a result from the insurance company, she
may have it.
39
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129.

It is clear that Plaintiff improperly canceled health

care benefits, and it was necessary for the Court to order
reinstatement.

Defendant argues that he is entitled to medical

expenses he incurred because of the improper cancellation.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not comply with insurance
company policies.

It appears that these problems arose because

of Plaintiff's improper cancellation of coverage.

She is

chargeable, but is also entitled to the insurance reimbursement
payments once the bill has been presented and her payment to
Defendant has been verified.
13 0.

Cost of custody evaluation.

to Dr. Jensen as a friend of the Court.

These parties stipulated
When Plaintiff found his

recommendations to be unfavorable, adverse or objectionable, she
moved to have another evaluator appointed.

Regardless of the

language of this Court's decision, it was the intent of the Court
that the parties should share the costs of Dr. Jensen equally.
Plaintiff should bear all costs associated with the report and
appearance of Dr. Stewart.
131.

Tax Deductions.

Each party is entitled to claim one

of the children as a dependent for tax purposes.
132.

Debts. Mr. Thomas shall be responsible for his debts

and obligations including those of the corporation.

Mrs. Thomas

shall be responsible for her own debts and obligations.
133.

Costs of litigation.

Each party shall be responsible

of his or her own costs of litigation, which include attorney's
fees, costs, costs of appraisals and expert witnesses.
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134.

Retirement,

Mr. Thomas is entitled to a qualified

domestic relations order.
1992.

The date of the marriage is July 17,

The date of the divorce is August 13, 1996.

Mr. Thomas is

entitled to be paid his interest in the retirement pursuant to
the terms and conditions of the plan.

The ratio which he is

entitled to receive is as follows:
.5 x total # of years married during which Mrs. Thomas

was teaching
total # of years Mrs. Thomas will have taught at
retirement.
Mr. Thomas is entitled to be designated as a fifty percent (50%)
survivor.
135.

The Court finds Mr. Thomas is also entitled to one-

half of the school bus credit to which he was entitled by virtue
of paying taxes on the home in Sundance. Mrs. Thomas collected
this credit in the amount of $400.
13 6. The parties are ordered to cooperate in the
effectuation of these terms and conditions.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters its,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate this

matter.
2.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, the

same to become final upon signing and entry.
3.

That the Plaintiff should be awarded the annual gifts

of cash and stock Plaintiff has received during the marriage,
41

except for those funds which have been designated in trust for
the children which should be maintained by the Plaintiff in trust
for the children and made available to them consistent with the
intent of the donor.
4.

Each party should be awarded the personal property

presently in their possession and, in addition and not
withstanding that, that the Plaintiff should be awarded the
following items of personal property:
(a)

Kachina doll;

(b)

Twig outdoor furniture (five (5) pieces) or the

Adirondack outdoor furniture (four (4) pieces), at the
election of the Defendant;
(c)

One (1) of the Bearnaise Mountain Dog puppies, or

financial equivalent;
(d)

The oriental rug;

(e)

The antique toy trucks given to the Plaintiff by

her father;

5.

(f)

The wooden bowl;

(g)

One (1) copy of the home videos.

The Defendant should be awarded the home and real

property located in Sundance, Utah and the Plaintiff should be
awarded an interest in the home in the amount of $78,050.

The

Defendant should either purchase the Plaintiff's interest in the
cabin or sell the cabin and divide the proceeds consistent with
the Decree.

The Defendant's election to purchase the cabin

should be exercised within 120 days from date hereon.
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Upon

expiration, the cabin should be placed on the market for sale,
and the parties should cooperate in its listing, showing, selling
and closing.
6.

The Defendant should be awarded the sole care, custody

and control of the minor children of the parties subject to
generous, liberal and frequent visitation rights in the
Plaintiff.
7•

The Plaintiff is awarded reasonable and liberal

visitation rights which consist of those set forth in §3 0-3-35
Utah Code Ann.. amended as follows:

Plaintiff shall enjoy

visitation on alternating weeks commencing Thursday evening
following the release of the children from school and concluding
the following Monday morning when the Plaintiff returns the
children to school, which shall constitute her alternating
weekend visitation.

Additionally, the parties agree that the

Plaintiff shall enjoy midweek visits with the children on
Thursday evenings following the children's dismissal from school
until the following Friday morning when the Plaintiff delivers
the children to school.
8.

The parties shall divide the children's "vacation time"

between them.

Vacation time shall include "off-track" school

time when the children are in year-round schools.

This will

include summer off-track or vacation time provided that each
party will enjoy a two (2) week period of time that is
undisturbed by visitation with the other parent, which will allow
for family vacation time.
43
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9.

The Court adopts the advisory guidelines contained in

§30-3-33 Utah Code Ann10.

The Defendant should be awarded child support from the

Plaintiff in the amount of $334.96 per month consistent with the
Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
11.

The Defendant should be awarded a credit in the amount

of $1,642.00 for overpayment of child care.
12.

The Plaintiff is awarded alimony from the Defendant in

the amount of $700.00 per month for a period of three (3) years
commencing with the entry of the Temporary Order herein.

Alimony

shall automatically terminate upon the Plaintiff's remarriage or
cohabitation with another person.
13.

The children should be maintained on Plaintiff's health

care plan.

Each party should pay one-half of any unreimbursed

routine health care costs.

Any non-routine medical, dental or

orthodontic care costs must be agreed upon by the parties before
any such cost is incurred.
14.

Defendant should be entitled to a credit in the amount

of $1,944 against Plaintiff's interest in the home for medical
expenses incurred by the Defendant which would have been covered
on Plaintiff's medical insurance had Plaintiff not canceled
Defendant's coverage.

If Plaintiff is able to obtain a result

from the insurance company, she should have that.
15.

The parties should share equally in the costs of the

Dr. Jay Jensen child custody evaluation.
16.

Each party should be entitled to claim one of the
44

children as a dependent for tax purposes.
17.

The Defendant should pay and assume his own debts and

obligations, including those of the corporation, and hold the
Plaintiff harmless thereon.

Plaintiff should pay and assume her

debt and obligations and hold the Defendant harmless thereon.
18.

Each party should pay their own costs of litigation,

which include attorneyfs fees, costs, costs of appraisals and
expert witnesses.
19.

The Defendant should be entitled to a qualified

domestic relations order.
1992.

The date of the marriage is July 17,

The date of the divorce is August 13, 1996.

Defendant

should be paid his interest in the retirement pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the plan.

The ratio which Defendant

should be entitled to receive is as follows:

.5 x total # of years married during which Mrst Thomas
was teaching
total # of years Mrs. Thomas will have taught at
retirement.
Defendant should be designated as a fifty percent (50%) survivor.
20.

The Defendant is awarded one-half (%) of the school bus

credit in the amount of $400.00 which Plaintiff previously
collected.
21.

The parties should cooperate in the effectuation of

these terms and conditions.
DATED THIS

7

day of Mayf 1997
BY THE COURT:
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W. DAVIS
JUDGE
Approved as to Form:

a

BRENT YOUNG
Attorney for "Defendant
Approved as to Form:

^FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANN ELIZABETH THOMAS,
DECREE OP DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil MO. 934402503

BERT CHARLES THOMAS,

Judge Lynn W. Davis
Comm. Howard Maetani

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
commencing December 5, 1995, and following an adjournment
convening again February 26, 1996. The Honorable Judge Lynn
Davis presided.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were present in

person and represented by their attorneys, Frederick N. Green
appearing for the Plaintiff and Brent Young appearing for the
Defendant.

Each party presented evidence and testimony, and the

Court entertained the testimony of the parties and witnesses.
Counsel argued the following contested issues: 1) division of
personal property; 2) division of real property and value of real
property and marital versus premarital property; 3) child custody
and visitation; 4) child support; 5) alimony; 6) pension,
retirement issues, business assets; and 7) miscellaneous issues.
Final argument was heard by the Court on April 1, 1996 and a
MiNkv-in-tnuooi. a

final hearing was held on November 8, 1996 to resolve remaining
issues.

The Court, having reviewed the file, the exhibits, and

the arguments of counsel based thereon the Court having made and
entered herein its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from

the Defendant, the same to become final upon the signing and
entry hereof.
2.

That the Plaintiff is awarded the annual gifts of cash

and stock Plaintiff has received during the marriage, except for
those funds which have been designated in trust for the children
which shall be maintained by the Plaintiff in trust for the
children and made available to them consistent with the intent of
the donor.
3.

That each party is awarded the personal property

presently in their possession and, in addition and not
withstanding that, that the Plaintiff is awarded the following
items of personal property:
(a)

Kachina doll;

(b)

Twig outdoor furniture (five (5) pieces) or the

Adirondack outdoor furniture (four (4) pieces), at the
election of the Defendant;
(c)

One (1) of the Bearnaise Mountain Dog puppies or

the financial equivalent;
(d)

The oriental rug;

(e)

The antique toy trucks given to the Plaintiff by

her father;

4.

(f)

The wooden bowl;

(g)

One (1) copy of the home videos.

That the Defendant is awarded the home and real

property located in Sundance, Utah and the Plaintiff is awarded
an interest in the home in the amount of $78,050.

The Defendant

shall either purchase the Plaintiff's interest in the cabin or
sell the cabin and divide the proceeds consistent with this
Decree.

The Defendant's election to purchase the cabin shall be

exercised within 120 days from date hereon.

Upon expiration, the

cabin shall be placed on the market for sale, and the parties
shall cooperate in its listing, showing, selling and closing.
5.

That the Defendant is awarded the sole care, custody

and control of the minor children of the parties subject to
generous, liberal and frequent visitation rights in the
Plaintiff.
6.

That the Plaintiff is awarded reasonable and liberal

visitation rights which consist of those set forth in §30-3-35
Utah Code Ann. r amended as follows:

Plaintiff shall enjoy

visitation on alternating weeks commencing Thursday evening
following the release of the children from school and concluding
the following Monday morning when the Plaintiff returns the
children to school, which shall constitute her alternating
weekend visitation.

Additionally, the parties agree that the

Plaintiff shall enjoy midweek visits with the children on
3
Cn.N*»A\fM«%T-l«T>»)>MC*SS2.3

Thursday evenings following the childrenfs dismissal from school
until the following Friday morning when the Plaintiff delivers
the children to school.
7.

That the parties shall divide the children's "vacation

time11 between them.

Vacation time shall include "off-track"

school time when the children are in year-round schools.

This

will include summer off-track or vacation time provided that each
party will enjoy a two (2) week period of time that is
undisturbed by visitation with the other parent, which will allow
for family vacation time.
8.

That the Court adopts the advisory guidelines contained

in §30-3-33, Utah Code Ann,

9.

That the Defendant is awarded child support from the

Plaintiff in the amount of $334.96 per month consistent with the
Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
10.

That the Defendant is awarded a credit in the amount of

$1,642.00 for overpayment of child care.
11.

That the Plaintiff is awarded alimony from the

Defendant in the amount of $700.00 per month for a period of
three (3) years commencing with the entry of the Temporary Order
herein.

Alimony shall automatically terminate upon the

Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation with another person.
12.

That the children shall be maintained on Plaintiff's

health care plan.

Each party shall pay one-half (%) of any

unreimbursed routine health care costs. Any non-routine medical,
dental or orthodontic care costs must be agreed upon by the
4

parties before any such cost is incurred*
13.

That Defendant shall receive a credit in the amount of

$1,944 against Plaintiff's interest in the home for medical
expenses incurred by the Defendant which would have been covered
on Plaintiff's medical insurance had Plaintiff not canceled
Defendant's coverage.

If Plaintiff is able to obtain a result

from the insurance company, she shall have that.
14.

That the parties shall share equally in the costs of

the Dr. Jay Jensen child custody evaluation.
15.

That each party is entitled to claim one of the

children as a dependent for tax purposes.
16.

That the Defendant shall pay and assume his own debts

and obligations, including those of the corporation, and hold the
Plaintiff harmless thereon.

Plaintiff shall pay and assume her

debt and obligations and hold the Defendant harmless thereon.
17.

That each party shall pay their own costs of

litigation, which include attorney's fees, costs, costs of
appraisals and expert witnesses.
18.

That the Defendant is entitled to a qualified domestic

relations order.

The date of the marriage is July 17, 1992.

date of the divorce is August 13, 1996.

Defendant shall be paid

his interest in the retirement pursuant to the terms and
conditions of the plan.

The ratio which Defendant .shall be

entitled to receive is as follows:

.5 x total # of years married during which Mrs f Thomas
was teaching
5
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The

total # of years Mrs. Thomas will have taught at
retirement.
Defendant shall be designated as a fifty percent (50%) survivor.
19.

That the Defendant is awarded one-half (%) of the

school bus credit in the amount of $400.00 which Plaintiff
previously collected.
20.

That the parties shall cooperate in the effectuation of

these terms and conditions.
DATED THIS

3

day of Jfey^ 1997.

,x. ^ .

BY THE SOTfastjS^
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANN ELIZABETH THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON ALL OUTSTANDING
MOTIONS AND ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE
CASE NO. 934402503

vs.

DATE: JANUARY 14, 1997
BERT CHARLES THOMAS,
Defendant.

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
CLERK: SGJ

On August 19, 1996, following trial on a number of contested issues, this Court
entered a ruling ("Ruling"). The Ruling disposed of many, but not all, of the issues then
pending in this case. Some issues were reserved by the Court
Thus Plaintiff Ann Elizabeth Thomas ("Plaintiff*) subsequently filed a Motion for
Ruling on "issues which have not been addressed in the Court's Ruling and are pivotal to
issues which have been reserved by the Court." Motion for Ruling at 1. The Motion was
dated August 29, 1996 but was filed in this Court on September 3, 1996.
Plaintiff next filed a Notice to Submit for Decision ("Notice") on September 26, 1996.
This Notice simply informed the Court and the Defendant that the only motion then "at issue
and ready for decision of the court [sicY was the Motion for Ruling.
Shortly thereafter, on October 4, 1996, Defendant Bert Charles Thomas ("Defendant")
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to Mrs. Thomas' [sic] Motion for Ruling and
Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings, referring to Plaintiffs Motion for Ruling. This
motion, which asked that Defendant be given until October 9, 1996 to reply, was granted
On October 10, 1996, Defendant filed his Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Ruling and
Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings. The following day, October 11, 1996, Defendant
filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause. This Motion was accompanied by the Affidavit of
Defendant, Bert Thomas[,] in Support o[f] Order to Show Cause to Implement Visitation.

This Court granted Defendant's motion and issued an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") on
October 17, 1996.
On November 4, 1996, Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of "Motion for
Ruling" [sic] was filed. Four days later, on November 8, 1996, a hearing on the OSC and
other motions was held. Present at the hearing were both of the parties as well as their
respective counsel: Frederick N. Green for Plaintiff and Brent D. Young for Defendant.
This Court, having carefully reviewed the file, with particular attention to the recent
memoranda of counsel and transcript of the hearing, now enters the following:

L
VISITATION
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
At the November 8 hearing on the OSC, this Court ruled from the bench as to the
matter of visitation. For purposes of clarification, the visitation order is set for* as follows.
This Court adopts the "minimum schedule for visitation" found at Utah Code
Annotated ("U.C.A.") § 30-3-35(2), modified as follows. Plaintiff, as noncustodial parent,
shall have visitation rights on alternating weeks* beginning on Thursday evening at 5:30 p.m.
and concluding on Stnrday evening at JJtiQjp.m. This shall constitute her regular weekday
and weekend visitation.
This modification is made according to the "advisory guidelines" of U.C.A. § 30-3-33,
particularly paragraph (2) ("the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity
and stability of the child's life"). Pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-34(l),] the Court finds that this
modification serves three important interests of the children.

"If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may establish a visitation schedule
consistent with the best interests of the child." U.C.A. § 30-3-34(1).
Ruling
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First, it economizes on the amount of required travel. This should promote the safety
of the children, increase the amount of time available for meaningful activities with each
parent, and reduce the amount of money diverted to transportation costs.
Second, it avoids late-evening exchanges on week nights, which could have ill effects
upon the health of the children as well as their performance in school. Third, it reduces the
number of times the children are forced to make a change of dwelling, with all of the
inconvenience that may entail (in terms of packing and cleaning, for example).
For these reasons, the Court finds that this visitation schedule will tend to "maximize
the continuity and stability of the child[ren]'s [lives]," U.C.A. § 30-3-33(2), and therefore is
"consistent with the best interests of the children]" U.C.A. 30-3-34(1). Moreover, this
arrangement is compatible with this Court's prior order of "generous, liberal and frequent
visitation by [Plaintiff]," Ruling at 18, subject to the restriction to be discussed presently.
Moreover, in its ruling from the bench, this Court placed an important restriction upoi?
Plaintiff with regard to her periods of visitation. This Court stated that during the visitation
periods set forth, "there should be no romantic interaction between the Plaintiff and Pedro
Sauer." Minute Entry - Order to Show Cause Hearing ("Minute Entry") at n.p. Plaintiff must
use caution and sound judgment in her relations with Mr. Sauer in the presence of the
children.
Furthermore, there shall be no romantic interaction whatsoever between Plaintiff and
Mr. Pedro Sauer during the children's martial arts instruction.
However, despite the concerns expressed by the Defendant, this Court declines to
restrict the children's participation in martial arts while on visitation. As the Court has
previously stated on the record:
The participation of the children in martial arts is a separate issue and should
be addressed through mediation. If the children are being injured, bruised or
engaging in activities which are foreign to the personal philosoph[y] of [either]
parent, then the issue can be revisited.
Minute Entry at n.p.
Ruling
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In addition, as to any extra-curricular activities, including jujitsu/martial arts, the
parties shall consult with one another with the intent to reach a resolution. If they are unable
to do so, they shall mediate their differences. The parties shall cooperate with each other in
providing medical, school and other records relating to their children.
Each party is to assume its own costs and attorneys' fees associated with bringing and
responding to the Order to Show Cause.
Any additional issues concerning visitation are reserved until further notice.

EL
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Plaintiff requests that the Court place a monetary value on Defendant's tools and then
factor that value into the equitable division of the personal property. This Court carefully
considered the agreement/stipulation of the parties, rejected it in part, and fashioned an
equitable division of the personalty under the circumstances. Weighing all factors, the Court
believes it to be equitable and fair.
In this regard, the Court makes a few observations. First, this Court finds that
Plaintiff has minimized the value of some of her items and exaggerated the value of some of
Defendant's items.

Some tools were purchased prior to the marriage and some after. Those

acquired during the marriage are generally worn out or in disrepair. This Court awarded Mr.
Thomas those tools, calculating the values of the assets of both parties to be nearly equal, fair
and equitable.
Absolute mathematical precision is impossible. For example, some items given to the
Plaintiff, such as the Oriental rug, maintain value over time much better than tools which
become worn out by day-to-day use in the construction industry.

Ruling
Page 4 of 12

These are the statutory statements which guide the analysis which follows.

C
Defendant in this case seeks a retroactive award of overpayment of temporary support
He was ordered to make payments of $700 per month at a preliminary order at the earliest
stages of these proceedings. Defendant argues that that amount was established based upon a
faulty and inflated determination of his income. He argues further that an initial faulty
determination has been perpetrated throughout this entire case to the harsh detriment of
Defendant.
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs personal expenses have been highly
exaggerated, that she has sufficient income to meet her needs and that she will receive a
significant amount of the proceeds (approximately $78,000). Further, he argues that during
the pendency of this action, she has had access to large amounts of money derived from the
sale of stocks and bonds and from personal savings (something in excess of $120,000). Next,
he argues that yearly gifts of stocks and bonds, in light of the divorce, have now simply been
conveyed to their minor children as a subterfuge until after the divorce.
Next, he argues that the accounts of the children can be utilized to purchase a home,
etc. and reduce any need for alimony. The Court finds this argument to be interesting, but
unconvincing. Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs affidavit of personal expenses is
exaggerated, and that she has sufficient income to meet her personal needs.
Counsel for Plaintiff argues that Defendant should pay alimony pursuant to the
temporary order and that Plaintiff should not pay child support simply because she cannot
afford it even accounting for the alimony she will receive. Plaintiff argues that her present
personal expenses exceed her income.
The purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,
1372 (Utah 1988).
Ruling
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The 1995 amendment to § 30-3-5(7)(a) codified Jones which had established a
three factor approach in setting alimony. In setting an award of alimony, a trial
court must consider the following three factors: (1) the financial condition and
needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce
sufficient income for him or herself, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support However, "alimony may not be automatically awarded
whenever there is disparity between the parties' incomes."???

Additionally, the Court has weighed the following three factors.
1. Earnings and Expenses
This Court has previously determined the income of each party. The Court finds that
Plaintiffs expenses are exaggerated and that the expenses of Defendant will necessarily
increase somewhat because of this Court's award of custody to Defendant In addition, it is
apparent that during this litigation that Plaintiff has had access to sums of money derived
principally from the sale of gifted stocks and bonds.

2. Education, Health, Etc.
Both parties are employed and are healthy. Plaintiff is a college graduate and has
pursued an advanced degree. She is employed as a teacher and has steady, stable
employment Defendant is a high school graduate with no college degree and no substantive
advanced training.. He runs a one-man-managed construction company, employing others as
the seasons allow. He has expressed some desire to change careers and seek a more stable,
long-term employment with benefits and retirement.

3. Ability to Pay
Defendant argues that he cannot afford alimony because he is now saddled with a
refinance of the home in order to pay out the equity to Defendant Further, he again argues

Ruling
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that the Court's determination of income is in error and that Plaintiffs take-home income
exceeds his.
This Court previously held that the character of Defendant's source of income requires
that he remain in the Sundance home. His construction business relies exclusively upon
word-of-mouth referrals in the Sundance area.
Clearly there are limited funds to meet the demands of two households. It is
impossible to absolutely equalize standards of living. This Court must order alimony in an
attempt to provide the minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries essential to maintain
customary or proper status or circumstance.
This Court concludes that even with the refinance, Defendant has some ability to pay
alimony. Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff four years (36 months) of alimony at the
rate of $700 per month. Defendant may have credit for amounts paid pursuant to the
temporary order of the Court. This award shall automatically terminate upon Plaintiffs
remarriage or cohabitation with another person.

IV.
CHILD SUPPORT
To arrive at the amount of child support required of parents collectively, this Court
must first determine the "adjusted gross income" of each parent U.C.A. § 78-45-7.4.
"Adjusted gross income" in this case simply means gross income. See U.C.A. § 78-45-7.6.
This Court previously found Defendant's annual income to be $69,567 and Plaintiffs to be
$25,824. These figures are hereby found to represent the "gross income" and hence the
"adjusted gross income" of each party for purposes of determining their respective child
support obligations.
According to U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7(2)(a), the next step is for this Court to "[c]ombine
the adjusted gross incomes of the parents." This yields a sum of $95,391 annually. Next, the
Court must "recalculatefl . . . to determine the average [adjusted] gross monthly income" of
Ruling
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each of the parties separately and of both together. U.C.A. § 78-45-7.5(5)(a), emphasis
added The result is a finding that the Defendant receives $5,797.25 per month, while
Plaintiff receives $2,152.00 per month. Together, their monthly income amounts to
$7,949.25.
With this last figure in hand, the Court is in a position to "determine the base
combined child support obligation using the base combined child support obligation table"
found at U.C.A. § 78-45-7.14. U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7(2)(a). According to that table, where the
monthly combined adjusted gross income ("monthly combined income") is between $7,901
and $8,000, and there are two children of the marriage, the base combined child support
obligation is $1,236 per month.
This amount ($1,236) must be apportioned between the parents according to their
respective contributions to the monthly combined income. As it happens, Defendant
contributes 72.9% of the income while Plaintiff contributes 27.1% of it Therefore, Defendant
is liable for $901.39 ($1,236 x 72.9%) per month in child support, while Plaintiff is liable for
$334.61 ($1,236 x 27.1%) per month.
Because Defendant is the custodial parent, he is entitled to receive $334.61 per month
from Plaintiff for the purpose of child support.

V.
DISSIPATION OF ASSETS
Plaintiff claims that at the time of the separation, Defendant had approximately
$40,000 on account in the Bert Thomas, Inc.'s Savings Account and that she is entitled to
one-half as a marital asset Plaintiff further argues that the account was depleted to
approximately $7,000 at the time of the trial and that the Defendant was the sole
beneficiary—i.e., he used the funds to live on and meet his obligations under the temporary
order.
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Defendant argues that the subject account was an operating fund for the company and
the amount in the account fluctuated significantly from month-to-month; the amount of money
in an operating business account at any particular time has no particular significance.
These parties set up a complex financial system to operate the Bert Thomas
Construction Inc. business. The best this Court can glean, the flow of money in and out of
the company is represented in the flow chart attached (Exhibit No. 37).
Defendant is accurate that the amount in a corporate savings account on a given date
is not controlling. To determine the value of the marital asset, one must determine the value
of the company. There was insufficient presented evidence at trial to arrive at the value of
Bert Thomas construction Inc. and therefore there was an insufficient basis to award Plaintiff
assets or assess financial obligations. This Court did not make a finding of value of Bert
Thomas Construction Inc. and cannot make such a determination by looking solely at a
savings account as of a given date.

VL
MEDICAL COSTS AND COSTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS
A. Medical Costs
It is clear that Plaintiff improperly cancelled health care benefits, and it was necessary
for the Court to order reinstatement. Defendant argues that he is entitled to medical expenses
he incurred because of the improper cancellation. Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not
comply with insurance company policies. It appears that these problems arose because of
Plaintiffs improper cancellation of coverage. She is chargeable, but is also entitled to the
insurance reimbursement payments once the bill has been presented and her payment to
Defendant has been verified

B. Psychological Reports
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These parties stipulated to the use of Dr. Jensen as a friend of the Court When
Plaintiff found his recommendations to be unfavorable, adverse or objectionable, she moved
to have another evaluator appointed. Regardless of the language of this Court's decision, it
was the intent of the Court that the parties should share the costs of Dr. Jensen equally.
Plaintiff should bear all costs associated with the report and appearance of Dr. Stewart.

vn.
FINDINGS PREPARATION
Two drafts of proposed findings were submitted to this Court after the initial decision.
The draft proposed by Mr. Green more closely tracks this Court's decision.

RULING
Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings is granted in part and denied in part
consistent with the discussion above. Counsel for Plaintiff is instructed to supplement
previously submitted pleadings to include the provisions of this decision and to submit the
same to Mr. Young for approval as to form.

Ruling
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Defendant's Order to Show Cause is resolved pursuant to this ruling. Counsel for
Defendant is instructed to prepare an Order consistent with this Court's^ decision and submit
the same for approval as to form to Mr. Green.

Dated this /3

day of January, 1997.

BY THE COURT

LYNN W. DAVlOxJDGE

cc:

Brent D. Young, Esq.
Frederick N. Green, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING

ANN ELIZABETH THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 934402503
DATE: AUGUST 19, 1996

vs.

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
BERT CHARLES THOMAS,

CLERK: SGJ

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial commencing September 5,
1995, and, following an adjournment, convening again February 26, 1996. The Honorable
Judge Lynn Davis presided. The plaintiff and the defendant were present in person and
represented by their attorneys, Frederick N. Green appearing for the plaintiff and Brent Young
appearing for the defendant. Each party presented evidence and testimony, and the Court
entertained the testimony of the parties and witnesses. Counsel argued the following
contested issues: 1) division of personal property; 2) division of real property and value of
real property and marital versus premarital property; 3) child custody and visitation; 4) child
support; 5) alimony; 6) pension, retirement issues, business assets; and 7) miscellaneous
issues. Final argument was heard by the Court on April 1, 1996. The Court, having
reviewed the file, the exhibits, and the arguments of counsel based thereon and good cause
otherwise appearing, the Court now makes and enteis its
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

The parties were married on July 17, 1982.

2.

Each of the parties resided in Utah County for more than three (3) months prior

to the filing of the Complaint.
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3.

The parties have two (2) minor children of the marriage: Joseph, born July 12,

1986, age ten (10); and Katherine, "Katie," bom July 8, 1989, age seven (7).
4.

The parties separated and began to live separate and apart on March 21, 1993.

5.

The plaintiff is thirty-eight (38) years old and has earned a Bachelor of Science

degree, prior to her marriage to the defendant, from the University of Utah.
6.

The plaintiff presently teaches special education for the Alpine School District

7.

The parties' children also go to school in the Alpine School District at the same

school in which the plaintiff teaches.
8.

The defendant is a self-employed contractor and builder licensed as such in the

State of Utah. He is a high school graduate with some plans to continue his education.
9.

During the marriage, the parties have acquired personal property and improved

real property.
L
PERSONAL PROPERTY
10. The general purpose of property division is to allocate property "in a manner
which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate
lives." The overriding consideration in property division is "that the ultimate division be
equitable—that property be fairly divided between the parties given their contributions during
the marriage and their circumstances at the time of the divorce." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,
1171.
11. For the purposes of asset consideration this Court accepts the following
definition:
Marital property is all property acquired during marriage except property acquired
by gift or inheritance and it "encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed
by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived." Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318.
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12. It is clear that statutory law confers broad discretion upon the trial court in the
division of property, real and personal, regardless of its source or time of acquisition.
13. During the course of the marriage, and prior thereto, the plaintiff received
annual gifts, principally from her grandfather.
14. These gifts were always in cash or in kind and, when in the form of stock,
were conveyed to the plaintiff individually and not to the defendant as well.
15. This practice continued through the marriage and existed among Mrs. Thomas'
siblings, likewise.
16. Since the separation of the parties, gifts have been made in trust for the benefit
of the parties1 minor children.
17. All of these gifts have always been maintained in separate accounts or in
separate stock accounts or certificates, and have not been augmented, supplemented, added to,
protected or enhanced by the defendant or from earnings from either party during the
marriage.
18. As such, they are classic cases of separate property which have maintained
their separate identity and should be awarded to the plaintiff, except for those funds which
have been designated in trust for the children which should be maintained by the plaintiff, in
trust, for the children and made available to them consistent with the intent of the donor.
19. Subsequent to separation, the defendant prepared a document entitled "Personal
Property Settlement Between Ann Thomas and Bert Thomas" dated February 5, 1994.
The Court finds the parties discussed the final resolution of the division of personal
property and tools. Mr. Thomas drafted an agreement. Mrs. Thomas made changes to that
agreement and signed it. Property was delivered and accepted pursuant to the agreement. No
discussion was had about that agreement for a period of approximately one year. Based upon
the authority of the agreement, Mrs. Thomas even sold a vehicle.
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20. Upon review, and based upon the testimony of the parties, the Court finds that
the "Settlement" is ambiguous because it does not state whether it is a settlement of all
property rights or only temporary property rights.
21. Furthermore, the agreement was executed without the benefit of counsel, and
its enforcement would result in a potentially significant and substantial inequity between the
parties. Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the agreement and its consideration are
heavily disputed.
21. Rather, the Court relies upon Exhibit 25 of the plaintiff which lists, in detail,
the personal property in each party's possession, what property would constitute gifts to either
party, and the relative values of the property.
22. Therefore, it would be reasonable for the parties to be awarded the personal
property presently in their possession and, in addition and not withstanding that, that the
plaintiff be awarded the following items of personal property:
a)

Large Indian rugs given to the plaintiff by the defendant.

b)

Kachina doll.

c)

Twig outdoor furniture (five (5) pieces) or the Adirondack outdoor

furniture (four (4) pieces), at the election of the defendant.
d)

One (1) of the Bernease Mountain Dog puppies, or financial equivalent

e)

The oriental rug.

f)

The antique toy trucks given to the plaintiff by her father.

g)

The wooden bowl.

h)

One (1) copy of the home videos.
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REAL PROPERTY
a. Marital Versus Separate Property
24. Utah's appellate courts have long held that once a trial court has determined
marital property, the Court may distribute it equitably, regardless of which party's name
appears on the title. Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986). "The trial court is
empowered to make such distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel such
conveyance as are necessary to that end." Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah
1980).
25. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas, solely and exclusively, owned real estate in
Sundance, Utah, before the parties were married. He owned the real estate free from any type
of encumbrance. (The subject property is described in plaintiffs Exhibit 23.) The Court finds
that Mr. Thomas commenced construction of a home on the property, and that it was framed
up and many of the materials had been purchased before the parties were married. In
addition, it is important to note that a lengthy access road had been constructed and power
and sewer utilities have been placed on the premises. The Court finds Mr. Thomas continued
to work on the home after the marriage, using materials previously obtained. This property
ultimately became the parties' martial residence. Approximately one to one and one-half
years after they were married, the parties obtained $27,000 from Mrs. Thomas's grandfather.
This note was secured by a mortgage which had been reduced to approximately $17,000 at
the time of trial (Exhibit 23).
26. The note was signed by both parties, as was the mortgage. Title was
transferred to facilitate the security of the note payable to Mrs. Thomas's grandfather. The
evidence is clear that Mr. Thomas did not make a gift of the home to Mrs. Thomas.
27. Mr. Thomas had a significant asset before the marriage and was able to use
assets previously acquired to help complete the home for at least a year. Therefore, it would
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be inequitable for the Court to divide the equity in the home equally, and permit Mrs. Thomas
to have all of her stocks and bonds. It would not be equitable or consistent for the Court to
award Mrs. Thomas all of her premarital property and her gifts and inheritance and award her
one-half of Mr. Thomas's premarital property. That approach may force Mr. Thomas to sell
his home, which would be much to the disadvantage of the children, and it would ignore the
simple fact that he had a substantial asset for which he had worked for many years before the
marriage and acquired before the marriage. It would also have a significant adverse effect
upon his employment opportunities at Sundance for the following reasons:
a.

Mr. Thomas has lived in Sundance since five years before the marriage,

although not continuously until the home was habitable.
b.

Since the Fall of 1983 he has lived there continuously and is very much

involved in the social and political activities there. For example, he is the Fire
Chief, member of the North Fork Special Services District, and Vice-Chairman
for three years. He is a past president of the Homeowners Association,
Chairman of the Architectural Committee, and he drafted the Architectural
Covenants for the SCAPO subdivision.
c.

Mr. Thomas earns his livelihood and established his business at Sundance,

and has earned his livelihood almost exclusively in that community since 1977.
d.

Given his income, it is not probable that he could acquire other

accommodations in that community.
e.

It would prove far more difficult for him to maintain his maintenance

contracts if he were to leave the area.
28. Commencing sometime during the period of cohabitation and thereafter, the
plaintiff made some modest contribution to the construction of the home including her own
manual labor, the acquisition of building materials, the building of retaining walls, and
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generally assisting the defendant who acted as the general contractor for the building of the
home.
29. As stated above, generally, parties should retain their separate property that
they brought into the marriage or that they might inherit during the marriage.
30. The ownership of the premises and the stage of improvement of the lot prior to
marriage is not significantly disputed. The value of the asset prior to marriage can be
established. It would be inequitable to grant plaintiff an interest for which she never worked
for, nor contributed to.
31. The building lot had been conveyed to Mr. Thomas and significant
improvements had been made prior to any contribution by Mrs. Thomas. This Court may
always adjust property distribution to achieve an equitable result.
32. The Court values Mr. Thomas* premarital asset at $150,000. The Court
specifically rejects Mr. Free's claim that the 1982 value could not be ascertained because of
the credibility problems listed below. That consists of the building lot and its improvements
including the foundation for the home, the partially framed home, the lengthy access road
which was constructed and other improvements such as sewer, power, partial retaining walls,
and the stockpiled supplies.
33. Beyond that interest, Mrs. Thomas is then entitled to an equitable share
because of her maintenance and contributions. This appears to be a fair, just and equitable
result because Mr. Thomas retains his clearly premarital interest, and Mrs. Thomas retains an
equitable interest based upon her efforts. This equitable determination rejects both the
position of plaintiff (commingling) and the position of defendant (exclusive ownership
together with all appreciation).
b. Valuation of the Real Property
34. Trial courts are provided considerable discretion in establishing the value of
real property. Such valuations are presumed valid and will not be overturned absent a clear
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abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 691 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As stated
in Morgan at 691, the trial court "is entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever weight it
deems appropriate." There are conflicting opinions in this case. The Court establishes the
value of the Sundance property as of the date of trial.
35. The plaintiff introduced evidence based upon the real property appraisal
conducted by Gary Free and Associates which is based upon the "comparable sales approach"
and concludes that the home has a current fair market value of $500,000.
36. The defendant introduced evidence based upon an appraisal conducted by Jud
Harward who concluded that the home had a current fair market value of $355,000.
37. The Court is disinclined to accept the appraisal of the home at Sundance by
Mr. Free, plaintiffs expert, for the following reasons:
a.

Plaintiffs expert was uncertain of the comparables and some of the

pictures of the "comparables" did not even correspond to the comparables
which were relied upon. While this does not constitute a dispositive defect, it
does reflect upon the accuracy of the appraisal and the credibility and integrity
of the report.
On this issue, the Court agrees with Mr. Thomas. The Court is not
impressed with the idea that the photos of the comparables are not required and
therefore of little importance. In the Court's view, an appraisal is a comparison
of properties. The photograph is a "snapshot" of the real property. If it is
wrong, the appraisal could be misleading.
b.

The comparables were not visited.

c.

The quality of the materials and quality of workmanship in the

comparables were considerably different than those used by Mr. Thomas. It is
undisputed, specifically, that the materials to construct the Thomas cabin had
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been previously used. The materials in the comparables were new. For
example, the kitchen cabinets in the Thomas cabin are made of plywood.
d.

Comparison of the garages were not accurate, as well as other items such

as number of fire places, concern for avalanche danger, and degree of exposure
to sun.
e.

The Thomas home is not complete. It requires maintenance and repairs to

make it marketable. The "Free" appraisal did not give sufficient weight to the
true condition of the Thomas cabin.
f.

Mr. Free and his associates had considerable difficulty in even locating the

correct properties.
g.

Of significant concerns to this Court was Mr. Free's failure to address the

extant property line and easement problems associated with the property. Such
problems can significantly delay the sale of a property and the Court is aware
that title problems not only affect the marketability of a property, but also
affect its value.
h.

The "Free" appraisal also failed to address the difficulty of accessibility to

the subject property and the significance of view.
38. Mr. Thomas testified of his personal knowledge of plaintiffs comparables
because he was acquainted with each, and had performed work in many of the comparables
and other cabins in the area. He testified concerning the significant differences in the quality
of those properties compared to the Thomas cabin.
39. Next, the Court turns to the appraisal of Mr. Jud Harward. It is clear that Mr.
Harward has considerable experience of appraising in Utah County area and in appraising
property in Sundance.
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40. The Court accepts Mr. Harward!s appraisal based upon his experience and
observations in appraising real estate in Sundance. Accordingly, the Court accepts the value
of the cabin at $355,000.
41. The Court must consider costs associated with sale. It is undisputed that there
are problems with the cabin before it could be marketable, including boundary line problems.
There also are costs of repair. A real estate commission would be approximately 6%, plus
closing costs (.06 x $355,000 = $21,300). Mr. Thomas testified that the sales costs would be
approximately $31,900. The mortgage of approximately $17,000 would have to be paid.
$355,000

Sale Price

$ 17,000

Mortgage

$ 31,900

Commission and Realtor Fees

$306,100

Total Equity

42. The value of Mr. Thomas's interest at the time of marriage was $150,000. The
Court has already addressed the issue of natural growth/appreciation. A fair division of the
equity forces the Court to reject the appreciation factor given the contributions of the parties
during their marriage and their circumstances at the time of the divorce. Newmever v.
Newmever. 745 P.2d 1276, 12178 (Utah, 1987). Accordingly, Mrs. Thomas's equity is
calculated as follows ($306,100 - $150,000 12).
43. Therefore, the Court awards Mrs. Thomas an interest in the home at the value
of $78,050.
44. The Court grants the defendant the option to either purchase the plaintiffs
interest in the cabin or sell the cabin and divide the proceeds consistent with the above
findings of fact.
45. The election to purchase the cabin should be exercised within 120 days from
date hereon. Upon expiration, the cabin should be placed on the market for sale, with the
parties cooperating in its listing, showing and selling and closing.
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m.
CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
46. As indicated above, the parties have two minor children: Joseph and Katie.
This Court is charged with the duty respecting the future care and custody of Joseph and
Katie as it deems appropriate.
This trial court is given broad discretion in making child custody awards. Sukin v.
Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This Court has had the opportunity to
witness the parties, to hear all of the evidence, to visit with the minor children and to judge
the personal and individual circumstances of this case.
As provided by statute, "in awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other
factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
(children), including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial
parent as the court finds appropriate." 30-3-10(2) U.C.A., 1953 as amended. In determining
custody, the Court is to consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties.

30-3-10 U.C.A., 1953 as amended.

47. This Court shall consider the "best interests of the child" as an important
factor, but will also consider past conduct and moral standards of the parties and which parent
will act in the child's best interest and other relevant factors such as keeping the siblings
together, and each child's bond with each parent.
48. It is apparent that Joseph and Katie get along well, participate in activities
together, and are a mutual support of each other. As noted in Dr. Stewart's report, there is a
firm sibling bond. Accordingly, it is in their best interests not to be separated. This Court
did not inquire as to the preference of Joseph or Katie because neither child is sufficiently
mature of age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference regarding legal
custody.
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49. Both parents truely have a sincere desire for custody. This Court has carefully
examined a custody evaluation report of Dr. Jay P. Jensen, a clinical psychologist, dated
March 21, 1995. He, by stipulation, was appointed friend of the Court. In addition, the
Court carefully examined the custody evaluation report of Dr. Elizabeth B. Stewart, also a
clinical psychologist, dated December 1, 1995. Both of these fine professionals testified at
trial. Dr. Stewart had the benefit of Dr. Jensen's report when making her report and
adopted/supported some of his findings and conclusions and criticized others. This Court
would have favored an analysis which did not rely upon or disparage that of the partystipulated friend of the Court. The Court has relied, in part, on both evaluations for guidance,
but the Court does not accept either in total.
The two custody evaluations performed in this case appear to agree on a number of
important points and disagree on some critical issues. Dr. Jensen recommended that custody
be given to the father or, in the alternative, a modified joint custody arrangement be worked
out. Dr. Stewart recommends that custody be awarded to Mrs. Thomas.
50. This is a complicated case with no easy/ clear-cut answers. Both of these
parents seek custody, are competent and definitely love their children. Both have personal,
professional lives which somewhat complicate custodial arrangements. The children have
been isolated in their Orem neighborhood because they attend a non-neighborhood school,
Orchard Elementary, where their mother teaches. In addition, they have been somewhat
isolated in their Sundance neighborhood because of the paucity of playmates and distance
between cabins, etc.
51. Ann Thomas was the primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties'
separation.
52. Prior to the parties1 separation, and since, Ann Thomas has performed well as
the mother of the children.
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53. The defendant has also acknowledged that Ann Thomas is a competent, caring
mother who has indeed been the primary care giver for the children throughout their lives.
54. As the primary care giver of the children, Mrs. Thomas has seen to their dayto-day needs, typically been the parent who has been home when they return from school,
assisted the children with their school work, made sure the children received appropriate
medical and dental care, typically transported the children when such was necessary,
entertained the children, disciplined the children, and so forth. Mr. Thomas has also
contributed and been involved in these activities. The Court finds Mr. Thomas has been
involved with the children's schooling, health care, religious training, and day-to-day
activities. He has attended parent/teacher conferences, he has taken the children to doctors,
dentists, and other activities.
55. The children interact with Ann Thomas as their primary care provider and have
established confidence in her as their primary care provider.
56. The parties have, since their separation in March of 1993, entered into an
arrangement of shared custody. The Court finds the arrangement which was been heretofore
set forth in prior court orders has provided that the time the children spent with each parent
has been approximately equal. The Court finds that for approximately half of the life of the
youngest and one-third of the life of the oldest child, that they both have enjoyed a
relationship with both of their parents wherein they have shared approximately equal time.
The arrangement has worked somewhat well as these arrangements go. But the children have
suffered from some instability and moving back and forth.
57. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas has been involved with the children on a
daily basis until the separation. Mr. Thomas conducts business out of his home which has
permitted him to be involved in the children's daily activities since they were bora. Since the
parties' separation, the children have also had an opportunity to rely upon their father for
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meeting their needs to a greater extent than existed prior to separation. The children have
flourished in the relationship they have with Mr. Thomas.
58. The children's social needs are being principally met through their associations
at school.
59. The defendant's residence in Sundance, Utah County, does not afford a
substantial amount of peer interaction for the children, but they have close friends there. In
addition, the children have not established close friendships in their mother's neighborhood.
This Court would prefer some type of modified shared joint custody arrangement.
But Dr. Stewart has made a compelling argument that a shared custody arrangement is not in
the best interests of the children and is not workable in the long term. Thus, this Court will
focus on custody by the mother, or by the father.
60. The appearance of Senor Pedro Sauer in an emotional and sexual relationship
with Ann Thomas during this marriage is a very complicating factor.
61. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas separated in March of 1993. Mrs. Thomas, unbeknownst
to Mr. Thomas, had commenced a relationship with Pedro in October or November of 1992.
Mr. Pedro Sauer was then, and was at the time of trial, a married man.
62. From all the trial testimony and reports of the evaluators, what facts do we
glean about Pedro?
a.

He is not a citizen of the United State of America.

b.

He is Brazilian and has entered the United States by virtue of a work

permit.
c.

He is a martial arts instructor in Jiu Jitsu at a health club.

d.

He is married, and his wife and small children live in Orem, Utah. He has

several small children.
e.

It is somewhat unclear when Pedro entered into a sexually intimate

relationship with Mrs. Thomas, but the romantic relationship commenced in
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1992. Mrs. Thomas reported to Dr. Jensen that she met Pedro in October and
had a relationship by November of 1992. Mr. Thomas believed the relationship
had started as early as June of 1992.
f.

During the pendency of this action, Pedro fathered a child during a time of

reconciliation with his wife, while still maintaining an intimate relationship
with Mrs. Thomas.
g.

After commencing a relationship with Mrs. Thomas, Pedro was charged

with domestic violence with his wife.
h.

Pedro, a non-citizen of the United States, was charged with possession of a

firearm/revolver at Lake Powell in the company of Mrs. Thomas. This may
have also violated his work permit status in the United States.
i.

Pedro, in his young marriage and with several young children, has

participated in other adulterous affairs.
j.

He now has a divorce pending in the Fourth District Court which is set for

September of 1996.
k.

His wife enjoys entry into the United States because of the work status of

Pedro. A divorce will result in her deportation from the United States and her
re-entry is in question. The future custodial status of their children is
unknown. This could significantly affect the Pedro/Mrs. Thomas dynamics if
some or all of the children remain here, particularly any child bom in the
United States and who would automatically enjoy citizenship.
1.

Mrs. Thomas reported to Dr. Jensen that her relationship with Pedro "had a

dramatic effect" on the ultimate breakup of the Thomas family.
m. Mrs. Thomas perceives Pedro as "a very positive male role model. . ."
(Report of Dr. Jensen, p. 10).
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63. The Pedro/Ann Thomas relationship has continued for several years and while
no one can predict the future, it appears to this Court that it is their intention to many when
they are legally able. As mentioned above, his divorce trial is scheduled for September of
1996.
64. This Court had hoped Mr. Sauer's divorce would have been completed earlier
in order to evaluate his true motives, and then to have evaluators thoroughly and fully
consider his relationship to these minor children, his commitment to Mrs. Thomas, his
relationships with any other women and his obligations to his children and his ex wife.
65. The Court has entertained the testimony of Pedro Sauer and his wife. He
represented himself as a responsible individual, but is not. He has undertaken activity which
would be considered detrimental to the Thomas children.
66. Based upon the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Sauer and others, the Court does find
a "link" or connection that would suggest that the relationship between the plaintiff and Mr.
Sauer has negatively impacted the children, or will negatively impact the children in the
future.
67. The evaluators can make no "objective" link between the "affair" and its impact
upon the children. The fact of the matter is that they are young and may not appreciate the
consequences of a fairly discreet sexual affair. But the relationship has affected the family.
a.

The affair has impacted the family financially. The testimony is that Mr.

Sauer has not contributed financially to the family despite the frequency of his
overnight stays. In addition, scarce resources have been expended on Pedro for
gifts and travel;
b.

The affair eventually resulted in a confrontation at the children's home

with Mrs. Sauer. That exposure, albeit brief, is not positive for the children;
c.

Mrs. Thomas's affair with a convicted criminal is of concern to this Court.

His spousal abuse charge during this time is of concern to this Court as is his
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illegal possession of a weapon. The weapon was possessed in the company of
Mrs. Thomas on a trip to Lake Powell and was attempted to be retrieved at a
time of confrontation. Such activity always places the children's mother at risk
and such illegal choices can potentially, negatively affect the family,
d.

Mr. Sauer "had a dramatic effect" on the ultimate breakup of the Thomas

family. That breakup has affected these children significantly, dramatically and
in a myriad of ways.
68. The reason this case is so troubling is because of Pedro Sauer and his negative
influence on the family. Absent his entry, and his influence, it is clearly in the best interests
of the children to be awarded to Ann Thomas. With Pedro in the picture, which he is and
intends to be, it is not in the best interests of the children to be in the home and subjected to
the negative influences and example of Pedro.
69. This Court is profoundly concerned with Mrs. Thomas's observation that Pedro
is "a very positive role model." She has been duped by his suave, debonair and romantic
influences and has overlooked his less than desirable characteristics; immorality, social
irresponsibility, his womanizing and infidelity, his criminal activity and his spousal abuse.
This Court cannot conceive how Pedro is a positive role model for little Joseph. To that
extent Ann Thomas does not have the best interests of her children at heart.
70. Mr. Thomas offers a more stable environment to the children. On the issue of
stability, the Court concurs with Dr. Jensen that:
a.

Mr. Thomas is a greater source of stability in the children's lives (Exhibit

1 page 15, Conclusions and Recommendations).
b.

Mr. Thomas will not threaten the children's integration into their present

environment by a change in residence. Mr. Thomas has indicated that he plans
to remain in this area where his business is established. It is the area where
the children were born. He plans to continue to rear the children in these
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familiar surroundings. At earlier stages of the separation, Mrs. Thomas wished
to move from the area regardless of the separation of the children from their
father.
c.

Mr. Thomas has no plans to diminish Mrs. Thomas's role in the children's

lives.
d.

Mr. Thomas was not unfaithful in the marriage and has set a better

example in this regard.
e.

There is no indication that Mr. Thomas would subject the children to the

deleterious effects of a relationship such as Mrs. Thomas has done.
f.

Mr. Thomas has maintained the proper orientation to his family and is

more interested in the children having a meaningful relationship with both
parents.
71. Based upon the above, the Court believes it is in the long term best interests of
the children to award their custody to Mr. Thomas subject to generous, liberal and frequent
visitation by Mrs. Thomas. This award will allow the children the stability of the home,
which they have known from birth, will allow them to continue in the same school and will
allow them to have daily contact with their mother there. This arrangement will provide Mrs.
Thomas with sufficient recreational time, as well as work time/discipline time with the
children.
IV. CHILD SUPPORT
72.

Mr. Thomas is entitled to child support for the care and custody of Katie and

Joseph. Practically speaking it is difficult to assess the income of Mr. Thomas because of his
self-employment status and the legal measures set up for financing his business. In addition
income generated from a construction business is volatile from year to year and is sensitive to
the economy. Likewise it is also difficult to assess Mrs. Thomas's income because she
historically enjoyed the benefit of an inheritance of stocks and bonds exclusive to her. There
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is testimony that that source has been exhausted, but nonetheless she had substantial income
from the sale of stocks and bonds during the tax year prior to trial.
73. The Court finds Bert Thomas was self-employed, and had numerous tools and
two trucks at the time he married Mrs. Thomas. He earns a living using his tools.
74. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas owns a business known as Bert Thomas
Construction, Inc. (BTCI). Mr. Thomas performs the following tasks with respect to the
business: he performs all of the bidding, purchases all of the materials, answers the telephone
or otherwise handles all inquiries, pays all bills, deals with all employees, and has so been
involved for approximately twenty years at Sundance. He has periodically worked with
Dwight Hooker as an employee.
75. Mr. Thomas has set up, pursuant to the advice of his accountant, an investment
company called Thomas Investments. This accounting arrangement allows him to earn
passive income through the investment company without Social Security contribution.
76. The Court finds Mr. Thomas has confined virtually all of his work to the
Sundance area. He remodels and maintains homes in this area. He has also built a few
homes in the Sundance area.
77. The Court finds Mr. Thomas's income is derived from two sources: (1) Bert
Thomas Construction Company, a corporation, and (2) Thomas Investment. There is not
anything irregular or inappropriate with respect to his income from either the construction
company and investment companies as verified by both Ann and Bert's accountants.
78. The Court finds Mr. Thomas has income which comes from the investment
company. The Court finds the arrangement has been set up so that Mr. and Mrs. Thomas
could receive passive income, thus reducing their withholding to Social Security. According
to Mrs. Thomas's expert there does not appear to be any inappropriate expenditures, or any
unaccounted for funds, or inappropriate accounting conducted by Thomas. Moreover, there
does not appear to be any significant benefits to Mr. Thomas, from either the construction
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company or the investment company. While employees of the construction company did
minor work on the home, part of the home is listed as an asset of the investment company
and is used as an office, shop, bathroom and storage area.
79. Mr. Thomas has been a reasonably successful contractor earning, typically
during the years just prior to separation, approximately $70,000 per year.
80. The Court relies upon the exhibits introduced in connection with the testimony
of Derk Rasmussen, CPA, consisting of Exhibits 7 through 19.
81. Mr. Rasmussen conducted an in depth review of the parties' savings account
and checking account activity in order to determine the availability of cash to the family, the
expenditures of cash, the income of the defendant and the projected income of the defendant.
82. The defendant has testified that his income and business activity has been
about normal during the pendency of the case.
83. The trend in Utah County residential construction has been an increasing trend,
and the Bert Thomas Construction revenue trend has approximately kept pace with that
increase, see Exhibit 12.
84. Inexplicably and contrary to the defendant's own testimony, the actual Bert
Thomas Construction revenue has declined sharply since separation regardless of the trend of
residential construction in Utah County and the previous Bert Thomas Construction trend, see
Exhibit 13.
85. It would be appropriate to average the income of Mr. Thomas to determine
what his actual income earning capacity is. However, it would be inappropriate to give the
same weigm :o post-separation years as to pre-separation years.
86. Therefore, the Court adopts the average set forth in Exhibit 16 for Mr.
Thomas's income at $69,567 per year, gross and before taxes, which is an average of the
income from the years 1988 to 1992.
87. The plaintiffs income from her sole employment is $25,824 gross per year.
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88. Child support should be based upon the Child Support Guidelines for the State
of Utah attributing $5,797 per month as gross income to the defendant and $2,152 per month
to the plaintiff.
89. Based upon the foregoing, child support should enter consistent with the
Guidelines. Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare the necessary Child Support
Obligation Worksheet Total child care paid by Mr. Thomas from February, 1994 through
March, 1996 was $2,080. His actual responsibility for payment of child care was $438. He
is therefore entitled to a credit of $1,642.
V.
ALIMONY
90. The issue of alimony is reserved It is necessary to resubmit financial
statements which now reflect the award of custody. An alimony award is highly fact specific
and the previous financial statement of plaintiff mixed the financial needs of the children with
her own. The custody award will affect the financial condition and needs of the receiving
spouse and may also affect the payor's ability to provide support. In addition, defendant's
claim respecting overpayment is reserved.
VL
PENSION, RETIREMENT BENEFITS, MISCELLANEOUS, ETC
91. Health care insurance and health care costs. The children should be maintained
on Mrs. Thomas's health care plan. Each party should pay one-half of any unreimbursed
routine health care costs. Any non-routine medical, dental, or orthodontic care costs must be
agreed upon by the parties before any such cost is incurred. The Court finds Mrs. Thomas
terminated Mr. Thomas from her health insurance. Although the insurance coverage was
reinstated, as a result, Mr. Thomas incurred and paid health care costs in the amount of
$1,944, which should have been paid by her insurance. Mr. Thomas is entitled to a credit in
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that amount against her interest in the home (See Exhibit 53). If Mrs. Thomas is able to
obtain a refund from the insurance company, she may have it.
92. Costs of custody evaluation. Mr. Thomas should be reimbursed for the costs of
the friend of the court's custody evaluation performed by Dr. Jay Jensen.
93. Tax deductions. Each party is entitled to claim one of the children as a
dependent for tax purposes.
94. Debts. Mr. Thomas shall be responsible for his debts and obligations including
those of the corporation. Mrs. Thomas shall be responsible for her own debts and obligations.
95. Costs of litigation. Each party shall be responsible for his or her own costs of
litigation, which includes attorney fees, costs, cost of appraisals and expert witnesses.
96. Retirement. Mr. Thomas is entitled to a qualified domestic relations order.
The date of the marriage is July 17, 1982. The date of the divorce is August 13, 1996. Mr.
Thomas is entitled to be paid his interest in the retirement pursuant to the terms and
conditions of the plan. The ratio which he is entitled to receive is as follows:
.5 x total # of years married during which Mrs. Thomas was teaching
total # of years Mrs. Thomas will have taught at retirement
Mr. Thomas is entitled to be designated as a fifty percent (50%) survivor.
97. The Court finds Mr. Thomas is also entitled to one-half of a school bus credit to
which he was entitled by virtue of paying taxes on the home in Sundance. Mrs. Thomas
collected this credit in the amount of $400.

vn.
98. The parties are ordered to cooperate in the effectuation of these terms and
conditions. Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of
law and a decree consistent with this decision.
Dated this / /

day of August, 1996.
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cc:

Frederick Green, Esq.
Brent Young, Esq.
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Bert Thomas Construction. Inc.
Income Statements
For Years Ending December 31st

1988
Total Revenues
Cost of Goods Sold

$

Gross Pro Hi
Costs and Expenses
Hank Charges
Contributions
Dues and Subscriptions
Employee Benefits
Entertainment & Meats
Gas/Auto
Insurance
Interest Expense
Legal & Accounting
Lease Expense
Misc. Expense
Office Supplies
Outside Services
Payroll Taxes
Penalties
Repair/Maintenance
Payroll
Officers' Compensation
Thomas Home Payroll
Supplies
Taxes and Licenses
Utilities and Telephone
Total Costs and Expenses

100% $
46%

1990

381.518
187,744

100% $
49%

1992

1991

242.097
113,361

100% $
47%

201,965
91,507

100% $
45%

1993

814,458
490,136

100% $
60%

1994

367,915
166,427

100%
45%

228,760
51,035

100%
22%

164,648

54%

193,774

51%

128,736

53%

110,458

55%

324,322

40%

201,487

55%

177,725

78%

256

0%

342

0%

0

0%

102

0%

113

0%

186

0%

29
175

0%

125
611

0%
0%

148
811

0%
0%

140
926

0%
0%

77
719

0%
0%

43
1,050

0%
0%

1,109
0

or.
or.

1,823
1,470

1%
0%

2,744
2,724

1%
1%

961
1.413

0%
1%

2,857
2,848

1%
1%

3,506
2,907

0%
0%

6,587
7,813

2%
2%

2.394
19,116
473
2.874

1%
6%
0%
1%
0%
4%

1,890
19,273
45
526
100
17,672

0%
5%
0%
0%
0%
5%

2.150
19.116
558
285
165
10,450

1%
8%
0%
0%
0%
4%

1,737
0
279
1,072
0
17,427

1%
0%
0%
1%
0%
9%

2,715
15,000
1,178
485
0
33,790

0%
2%
0%
0%
0%
4%

2.348
15.116
933
1,555
636
27,902

1%
4%
0%
0%
0%
8%

76
62,173
75.017
4.610
1.140
14.821
1,459
205,570

0%
16%
20%
1%
0%
4%
0%
54%

0%
30%
18%

514
142,458
36,000

0%
17%
4%

1,694
131.614
35,400

0%
36%
10%

38,833
0
155,159

0%
15%
12%
6%
0%
16%
0%
64%

0
61,466
36,000

6,408
203
1,051
117,769

0%
16%
6%
0%
2%
0%
0%
39%

24,944
131
3,067
71.873
36,000

293
1,970
0
126,847

0%
1%
0%
63%

3,000
15,873
35
258,667

0%
2%
0%
32%

2.022
4.813
1,840
241,568

in
1%
i%
66%

563
500
934
170,125

0%
0%
0%
74%

$46,879

15%

($11,797)

-3%

($26,423)

-11%

($16,389)

-8%

$65.655

8%

($40,081)

-11%

7,600

3%

12,547
513
50,104
17,800

come
Adjustments to Net Income:
Officer's Compensation
Personal Cost of Goods Sold
Lease Expense
Personal Payroll Expense

1989

305.362
140.714

S

17.800

$

19,116
0
83,795

$

—

75,017
851
19.273
4,610
87,954

37,117
28,372
14,673

$

X

39,000
1.091
19,116
7,037
39,821

0%
0%
212
6,125
4,955
55
2.928
14.000
3,634

3%
2%
1%
6%
0%
2%
0%
11%
1%
31%
16%

-

$

T

36,000
0
0
19,611

$

JL

36,000
15,000
0
116,655

$

35.400

T"

15.116
0
10,435

$

36,000

-y

14.000
0
57,600

[
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Bert Thomas Historical Income
Year

Income

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

$ 83,795
87,954
39,821
19,611
116,655
10,435
57,600

Average S 59,410
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Bert Thomas Historical Income
Prior to Separation
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

Income
$ 83,795
87,954
39,821
19,611
116,655

Average $ 69,567
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on his own motion, recused himself due to
the colorable claim of prejudice.
Pursuant to our holding regarding section 77-29-1, the convictions are reversed
and the charges are dismissed with prejudice.
HOWE, A.C.J., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

Mary M. THRONSON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Charles H. THRONSON, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 890547-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 25, 1991.
Rehearing Denied May 21, 1991.
In a divorce action, the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, David S. Young,
J., entered a divorce decree and awarded
joint legal custody of the parties' child,
child support, alimony and property division. Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) amendments to child custody statute deleting rebuttable presumption favoring joint legal
custody was a substantial and substantive
amendment and thus could not be applied
retroactively; (2) court abused discretion in
imposing joint legal custody on parents
without statutorily required parental
agreement; (3) findings were inadequate to
support child custody award; (4) child support award had to be reconsidered including income from nonearned sources and
husband's current earnings in making calculations; and (5) wife was entitled to alimony of $800 per month on a permanent
basis, rather than for only one year.

Remanded in part, modified in part and
otherwise affirmed.

1. Parent and Child <s=>3.3(l)
Amendments to child custody statute
deleting rebuttable presumption favoring
joint legal custody was a substantial and
substantive amendment and thus could not
be applied retroactively. U.C.A.1953, 303-10.2.
2. Divorce <s=>299
Trial court abused its discretion in imposing order of joint legal custody on parents and child without statutorily required
parental agreement and in the face of parental opposition. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.1 to
30-3-10.4.
3. Divorce <3=>301
Findings were inadequate to support
child custody award where court utilized
best interest factors related to joint legal
custody, not those related to child custody,
findings were in conflict as to whether
court or parents should determine visitation rights, findings did not support award
of any physical custody, and custody was
awarded on the basis of court imposed visitation time allocation. U.C.A.1953, 30-310, 30-3-10.2(3).
4. Divorce <s=>306
In determining appropriate child support award, parental income had to include
consideration of income from nonearned
sources, as well as current earnings of
husband, rather than average of husband's
earned income over several years. U.C.A.
1953, 78-45-7.4, 78-45-7.5, 78-45-7.5(l)(a),
(5)(b), 78-45-7.5 to 78-45-7.7.
5. Divorce <3=>240(2)
Award of $800 alimony to wife on a
permanent basis, rather than for only one
year, was warranted based on consideration of wife's earning capacity as a fulltime pharmacist and her necessary monthly
living expenses, and husband's current
gross capacity and his actual and necessary
monthly living expenses.
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Paul H. Liapis (argued), Helen E. Christian, Kim M. Luhn, Gustin, Green, Stegall
& Liapis, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Clark W. Sessions (argued), Dean C. Andreasen, Campbell, Maack & Sessions, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellee.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a
divorce decree and separate order awarding joint legal custody of a child, child
support, alimony, and property. We remand for further proceedings regarding
child custody and support. We modify the
alimony award and affirm the remainder of
the decree.
FACTS
The parties were married on September
30, 1978. Their marriage was the first for
both. She was a full-time pharmacist and
he a full-time attorney. A son was born to
them on September 11, 1981. She became
the child's primary caretaker and a parttime pharmacist. He became a shareholder
in his law firm. She filed a complaint for
divorce. He filed a counterclaim for divorce. They were divorced by a decree
entered June 23, 1989. A separate order of
joint legal custody was also entered. Fur1. Custody terminology: Many legislators, judges
and writers have been loose with their "joint"
custody language. Early articles identified this
vexing problem as follows:
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided, split,
joint] following divorce and the terms which
describe them are vague and overlapping.
The lack of standard definitions and the
courts' tendency to use certain terms interchangeably have created confusion.
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children
Following Divorce, 12 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 523, 525
(1979).
Often, when referring to one of these custody
arrangements, courts use vague language or
inadequately defined terms.
Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky.LJ. 271, 283 (197879).

ther relevant facts will be set forth below
in our treatment of the respective issues.
CHILD CUSTODY AWARD
Ms. Thronson challenges the joint legal
custody decree and order on two grounds:
(1) She did not agree to the order of joint
legal custody and Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-10.2 (1989) required the agreement
of both parents at the time of this decree
and order. (2) The provision for an automatic award of sole custody to one parent
when the other moves from the state was
error.
CHILD CUSTODY IN UTAH
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute
expressly authorizing an award of "joint
legal custody" l of a child. Our divorce
statutes have contained various child custody provisions since 1903. For many years
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989) has authorized district courts to include in divorce
decrees "equitable orders relating to the
children, property and parties." Further,
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 has contained
various specific provisions regarding
factors to be considered in awarding sole
custody of a child. See Lembach v. Cox,
639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981); 1 Utah L.Rev.
363 (1989) (historical development of child
custody factors and preferences in Utah).
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically
added to the sole custody statute in 1988,
and designated as § 30-3-10.1 to -10.4.
We emphasize that this is a joint "legal"
custody statute and not a joint "physical"
One author points out that considerable semantic confusion has resulted possibly because
the "term" joint custody predates the "concept"
or joini cubtody as it is known today. He states:
"I have encountered at least fifteen terms used
to refer to various alternatives to sole custody:
joint legal custody, joint physical custody, divided custody, separate custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing conservatorship,
possessory conservatorship, equal custody,
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given
to neither party to the exclusion of the other,'
temporary custody, shifting custody, and concurrent custody." Miller, Joint Custody, 13(3)
Fam.L.Q. 345, 360 n. 79 (1979).
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custody statute. In the 1988 Utah legislative session, Senator Hillyard stated: "This
is not joint physical custody. The child
obviously can't live in two homes. But it's
joint legal custody which would give the
non-custodial parent more involvement in
the decisions of child raising." Floor Debate, (Feb. 3, 1988) Sen. Recording No. 42,
side 2. In section 10.1 the legislature provided its definition of joint legal custody:
In this chapter, "joint legal custody"
(1) means the sharing of the rights,
privileges, duties, and powers of a parent
by both parents, where specified;
(2) may include an award of exclusive
authority by the court to one parent to
make specific decisions;
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as specified in the
order of joint legal custody;
(4) is not based on awarding equal or
nearly equal periods of physical custody
of and access to the child to each of the
parents, as the best interest of the child
often requires that a primary physical
residence for the child be designated;
and
(5) does not prohibit the court from
specifying one parent as the primary
caretaker and one home as the primary
residence of the child.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 (1989). Subsections (1) and (2) define joint legal custody: both parents share the authority and
responsibility to make basic decisions regarding their child's welfare. Subsections
(3), (4) and (5) tell us what joint legal custody is not—it is not joint physical custody.
We note that this statute does not contain a
definition of nor a provision for "joint physics! custody."
Subsection 10.2(1) created a "rebuttable
presumption" that joint legal custody is in
the best interest of a child. But, that presumption was made subject to subsection
(2) which provided:
The court may order joint legal custody
if it determines that:
(a) both parents agree to an order of
joint legal custody;
(b) joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child; and

(c) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989).
The order remains discretionary with the
court, not mandatory, even when all three
conditions are satisfied, i.e., (1) parental
agreement, (2) best interests, and (3) parents capable of implementation. Further
sections of the statute emphasize its "parental agreement" posture. We note that
section 10.3—terms of joint legal custody
order—contains two further subsections
dealing with parental agreement:
(2) The court shall, where possible, include in the order the terms agreed to
between the parties; ...
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute
resolution procedure the parties agree to
use
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Moreover, the termination provisions, section
10.4, confer upon one parent the right to
unilaterally terminate the order of joint
legal custody. The order can be terminated simply by filing and serving a motion.
Once the motion is filed, the court is required to replace the order "with an order
of sole legal custody under Section 30-310." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (1989).
This provision emphasizes the parental
agreement stance of the statute as initially
adopted and in force at the time of this
divorce.
We return to section 10.2(3) to point out
that the legislature created a list of factors
the court shall consider in determining the
best interest of a child in the context of
joint legal custody (not joint physical custody). Those factors are:
(a) whether the physical, psychological,
and emotional needs and development of
the child will benefit from joint legal
custody;
(b) the ability of the parents to give first
priority to the welfare of the child and
reach shared decisions in the child's best
interest;
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relationship between the child and the other
parent;
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(d) whether both parents participated in
raising the child before the filing of the
suit;
(e) the geographical proximity of the
homes of the parents;
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older,
any preference of the child for or against
joint legal custody; and
(g) any other factors the court finds relevant.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(3) (1989). On
the other hand, the legislature did not offer
any guidance to trial courts to assist in
determining the "capability" of the parents. The term is not defined. Section
10.4 contains provisions for (1) modification
of a joint legal custody order, (2) termination of the order discussed above, and (3)
attorney's fees based on frivolous pleadings and harassment. Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-10.4 (1989). The modification provisions appear to be a codification of the
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982)
bifurcated procedure used in sole custody
modifications. Prior to adoption of this
statute in 1988, the only reported Utah
case dealing directly with an initial award
of "joint custody" was Lembach v. Cox,
supra. There, the court stated "a custody
arrangement, joint or otherwise, is within
the broad equitable powers of the court."
Further, the court said "[t]he fact that the
father and the mother could not negotiate a
joint custody arrangement demonstrates
2. Other Utah reported cases involving joint custody are: Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507 (Utah
1985) (modification hearing of an initial award
of joint custody); Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608
(Utah 1984) (on modification hearing, it was
noted that trial court considered joint custody
but did not order it in initial decree).
3. The child custody reform of the eighties
gained impetus from ongoing no-fault divorce
legislative reform. Utah added "irreconcilable
differences" to its list of nine fault-based
grounds in
1987.
Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-l(3)(a) (1987). "Both reforms took
place with no public commitment or private
initiative for the systematic assessment of the
legal changes on patterns of custody or on child
welfare. As fashions change and new interest
groups emerge, family law is at risk of becoming a series of experiments that never report
results in ways that can help inform the legislative nmrMs." Zimrine. Foreword to Sugarman

the inappropriateness of ordering joint custody/' 639 P.2d at 200.2
Prior to 1980, a handful of states including California had adopted various forms of
"joint custody" statutes. During the
1980's "joint custody" was in vogue and a
second wave of states adopted "joint custody" statutes. Utah became the thirty-second state (and apparently the last) caught
up in this wave. 2 Family Law and Practice, § 32.04 (A. Rutkin ed. 1990 & Supp.)
(hereinafter "Fam. Law").3
California, the acknowledged pioneer of
no-fault divorce and joint custody, retrenched in 1988 regarding joint custody.
California's 1979 statute contained a "presumption ... that joint custody is in the
best interests of a minor child where the
parents have agreed to an award of joint
custody." Cal.Civ.Code § 4600.5(a) (West
1979). In 1983, California amended its
joint custody statute to include a specific
definition of both "physical" custody and
"legal" custody. The California Legislature recognized the need to be more specific when in 1983 it defined joint legal custody to mean "both parents shall share the
right and responsibility to make decisions
relating to the health, education and welfare of the child," Cal.Civ.Code § 4600.5(d),
and defined joint physical custody as
"each of the parents ... [have] significant
periods of physical custody." Cal.Civ.Code
§ 4600.5(d)(5) (West 1988). A team of
Stanford professionals proposed the need
& Kay, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, at viii
(1990). As no-fault made divorce virtually automatic, fathers' groups began to protest a promother bias in child custody decisions. At the
same time, feminist groups began attacking legal standards which were gender-specific as inherently discriminatory. Then, fathers' groups
turned the idea of gender-neutrality to their
advantage in the child custody arena. These
opposing forces set the stage for "joint custody"
statutes based on the rationale of "equality"
rather than "equity" and children end up taking
a back seat to the drivers, i.e., their divorcing
parents. One writer succinctly summed up the
result: 'This modern trend illustrates a move
backward toward the more explicit treatment of
children as property—only this time the property is to be divided equally." Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change In Child Custody Decisionmaking,
101 Harv.L.Rev. 727, 739-40 (1988).
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to consider "joint custody" as having a thtf presumption. Due to the paucity of
third form—the actual residential arrange- pre-statute and absence of post-statute
ment for the child.4 Later, a California joint custody reported decisions in Utah,
Task Force recommended that existing plus the fact that Utah's statute is not like
joint custody provisions be clarified to indi- that of any other state, we are left to
cate that no statutory presumption exists decide an issue of first impression with
in favor of joint custody. In response, little useful precedent. Mr. Thronson argues that we should apply the 1990 version
subsection (d) was added:
This section establishes neither a prefer- of the joint legal custody statute, i.e., apply
ence nor a presumption for or against the amendments retroactively. We decline
joint legal custody, joint physical custo- to do so. The 1990 amendments did not
dy, or sole custody, but allows the courts make a mere procedural change or simply
and the family the widest discretion to clarify how the 1988 statute should have
choose a parenting plan which is in the been understood originally, The amendbest interests of the child or children. ments were substantial and substantive,
thus retroactive application is not appropriCal.Civ.Code § 4600(d) (West Supp.1989).
ate.
See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 n.
[1] Coincidentally, while this appeal
4
(Utah
1982).
was pending, the 1990 Utah Legislature
substantially amended its two year-old joint
ANALYSIS OF JOINT LEGAL
legal custody statute deletmg the "rebutCUSTODY AWARD UNDER §
table presumption" favoring joint legal cus30-3-10.1 to -10.4
tody. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2
(1989 & Supp.1990). However, the legislaAs noted above, the majority of states
ture retained its initial definition of *'joint have adopted statutes expressly authorizlegal custody/' section 30-3-10.1, and the ing some form of "joint custody,, award.
list of seven factors courts are required to Those statutes come in four basic forms:
consider in determining the best interests
1. joint custody as an option only where
of the child in the context of joint legal
the parties petition or agree;
custody. Section 30-3-10.2(3)(a-g). Also
2. joint custody as an option;
retained in the statute is some language
3. joint custody as a presumption or
regarding parental agreement: "The court
preference;
shall, where possible, include in the order
4. joint custody split into joint legal cus[joint legal custody order] the terms agreed
tody and joint physical custody.
to between the parties [parents]/'
§ 30-3-10.3(2) (emphasis added), and, "The Fam.Law, § 32.06[2]. Initially, Utah comagreement may contain a dispute resolu- bined forms 1 and 3. Now, Utah is form 2,
tion procedure the parties agree to but only as to joint "legal" custody. Here,
use..,:1
§ 30-3-10,3(5) (emphasis added). the trial court faced Utah's initial statute
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Our with a favorable presumption on one hand
legislature's change of position on the "re- and the requirement of parencs' agreement
buttable presumption" in favor of joint le- on the other. Ms. Thronson opposed a joint
gal custody and the necessity of parental custody order. The trial court failed to
agreement creates confusion concerning meet the parental agreement requirement
the public policy basis for the joint legal head-on. Instead, the court found "there
custody statute. Utah and California ap- exists substantial difficulty between the
pear to be the first and only states to parties" and "it is in the best interests of
retrench from a presumption in favor of the child for the parties to be awarded
joint (legal) custody after having adopted joint legal custody." The court failed to
4. 'There are actually three aspects of joint custody: the legal custody agreement, the physical
custody agreement and the actual residential
arrangement for the child. It is important to
investigate the three forms of joint custody sepa-

rately to understand the implications of each
for the functioning of the post-divorce family."
Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, Does Joint Legal
Custody Matter?, StanX. & Pol'y Rev. 167, 168
(1990).
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find whether the parents agreed or disagreed as to an order of joint legal custody.
At the time the court ruled, the statute
stated:
The court may order joint legal custody
if it determines that:
(a) both parents agree to an order of
joint legal custody . . . Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989).
The form of the statute required a
threshold finding of parental "agreement."
The trial court implicitly found "disagreement" but proceeded with the order.
Moreover, the record reveals opposition to
the order, i.e., no agreement. Several
states have adopted the "parental agreement" form of joint custody statute, including Colorado, Texas and Kansas.5 The Colorado statute, for example, requires that
any motion for joint custody be filed by
both parties, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-10-124(5)
(1973), and that any plan for joint custody
must be jointly agreed to by the parties,
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-10-124.5(5) (1973). In
Colorado, a trial court ordered joint custody over the objection of the mother. The
appellate court ruled that the award in the
absence of agreement of the parties was an
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of
Posinoff, 683 P.2d 377, 378 (Colo.Ct.App.
1984). See also Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 672
S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Ct.App.1984) (court has no
authority to award joint custody without
agreement); Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan.
App.2d 284, 615 P.2d 806 (1980) (without
agreement, joint custody award unauthorized).
[2] We hold that the trial court abused
its discretion by Imposing the order of joint
legal custody on the parents and child,
the statute required parental agreement.
Here, there was parental opposition. See
lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 (Utah
1981) (inappropriate to order joint custody
Where parents not in agreement). Thus,
We vacate the order of joint legal custody.
t>ue to our ruling and remand, we need not
^each Ms. Thronson's challenge to the pros' Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin
have also adopted similar statutes. Fam.Law

vision for automatic change of custody
when one parent moves from the state.
ANALYSIS OF CHILD CUSTODY
UNDER § 30-3-10
Our vacating of the order of joint legal
custody is not necessarily dispositive of the
issues of child custody, including legal custody, i.e., decision-making, and physical
custody, i.e., caregiving and visitation
rights. The trial court's findings might
support a "best interests" custody award
under § 30-3-10, although an award of
joint legal custody was improper. However, both the court's memorandum decision and formal findings specify the court's
reliance on the legislature's list of best
interest factors in the joint legal custody
statute § 30-3-10.2(3) enumerated above.
On the other hand, § 30-3-10 provides:
In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child
and the past conduct and demonstrated
moral standards of each of the parties.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1989) (emphasis
add^d).
Our Supreme court has developed the
best interest factors to be considered under
this provision.
We believe that the choice in competing child custody claims should instead
be based on function-related factors.
Prominent among these, though not exclusive, is the identity of the primary
caretaker during the marriage. Other
factors should include the identity of the
parent with greater flexibility to provide
personal care for the child and the identity of the parent with whom the child has
spent most of his or her time pending
custody determination if that period has
been lengthy. Another important factor
should be the stability of the environment provided by each parent.
Pussy v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah
1986) (emphasis added). See also Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
1982); Rule 4-903(3) Utah Code of Jud.Ad§ 32.06[2] at n. 45.
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min. (1989) (requiring custody evaluators to
consider and respond to a list of factors).
[3] Our comparison of the two lists of
factors reveals that they are not identical,
although some similarities appear. Moreover, the context of the respective factors
point the thrust of the trial court's inquiry
in two different directions. As a result,
the findings herein will not support an ultimate finding under § 30-3-10 that child
custody should be placed with one parent
or the other. Further, the findings contain
internal disagreement. The memorandum
decision states "the court desires the parties to arrange between themselves for reasonable and liberal visitation which they
determine." To the same effect is formal
finding number 61: "[i]t is in the best
interests of the parties and their minor
child to attempt to arrange between themselves reasonable and liberal visitation
If the parties are unable to do so, the court
will set a specific schedule." But, the
court in formal finding number 65 took
that promised privilege away from the parties stating—"[i]n light of an appropriate
reasonable and liberal visitation schedule, it
is reasonable that the parties' minor child
will spend 57% of his time with plaintiff,
who has primary physical custody, and 43%
of his time with the defendant." The
"57%" visitation award to the mother provides the basis for the "primary physical
custody" statement. This was the only
time the trial court mentioned physical custody. This specification of visitation time
surreptitiously imposed an award of joint
physical custody upon the parties without
proper consideration of the best interest
factors under § 30-3-10. We hold the findings to be inadequate to support any award
of child custody because:
(1) The trial court utilized best interest
factors related to joint legal custody
§ 30-3-10.2(3) and not the factors related
to child custody § 30-3-10;
(2) The findings are in conflict as to the
determination of visitation rights, i.e., by
the court or the parents;
(3) The findings do not support any
award of physical custody; and
(4) Custody was awarded on the basis of
a court irrmnQpH vici+o+i/vn +ir«« oii~~«4.:—

Our task is to act in the best interests of
the child. We must vacate and remand the
custody and visitation award. We do not
remand simply for revision of the findings
or with directions to modify the decree
regarding these matters. During the interim, the facts regarding the parents and
their child and their relationships might
have been dramatically changed. Further,
the joint legal custody statute has been
substantially amended. The current factual and legal circumstances should be examined before this matter is finalized. Thus,
we remand for further fact finding and a
new legal determination, utilizing whatever
procedures and hearings the trial court
deems necessary—consistent with this
opinion.
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
[4] Child support will have to be reconsidered in connection with the above remand. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.4 (Supp.
1990) reveals that the support obligation is
intended to be a shared obligation of both
parents. This obligation must be allocated
in proportion to the parties' adjusted gross
income pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.5 to -7.7. Subsection 7.5 lists
the items of income to be included in gross
income. It also lists two items to be subtracted from gross income to calculate adjusted gross income: alimony previously
ordered and paid and child support previously ordered. Neither of those items is
applicable here. Thus, gross income is the
same as adjusted gross income in this case.
But, the trial court failed to include income
from nonearned sources as required by
§ 78-45-7.5(l)(a). Moreover, the trial court
averaged Mr. Thronson's earned income for
several years rather than using "current
earnings." Section 78-45-7.5(5)(b) indicates that current earnings are to be used.
On remand, child support calculations
should properly account for these items
pursuant to the statutory requirements.
ALIMONY AWARD
The trial court awarded Ms. Thronson
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Three factors must be considered by the
trial court in making an alimony award:
1. the financial condition and needs of
the party seeking alimony;
2. that party's ability to produce sufficient income for him or herself; and
3. the ability of the other party to provide support.
Saranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147
(Utah Ct.App.1988) (citing English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977)).
"Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in light of these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah
1986)). As long as the trial court exercises
its discretion within the bounds and under
the standards we have set and has supported its decision with adequate findings
and conclusions, we wjJJ not disturb its
rulings. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649
(Utah 1988).
[5] Here, the trial court considered each
of the alimony factors and entered findings. Ms. Thronson's actual and necessary
monthly living expenses were found to be
$3,700. She presented a higher figure, but
the court heard evidence challenging certain items and found them to be overstated.
Ms. Thronson's current earning capacity,
as a full-time pharmacist, was found to be
$35,000 a year gross. This finding was
based on competent evidence and represents the midpoint of an annual gross salary range of $31,000 to $39,000. The final
factor, Mr. Thronson's ability to provide
support, i.e., his earning capacity, was considered by the trial court. He submitted a
thirteen-year summary of his income. The
trial court used an average of the last eight
years, after excluding some contingent fee
income in three of those years. Thus, the
court found Mr. Thronson's average gross
income to be $71,376 annually. This calculation and finding was in error. Mr. Thronson's schedule showed his current gross
earning capacity to be $94,476 annually.
Nevertheless, we cannot say that an award
of $800 per month in alimony is an abuse of
discretion given the above factors and other financial circumstances of the parties.
But, we do hold that the trial court abused

its discretion in making the alimony nonpermanent, i.e., for one year.
The trial court found that "an annual
income of $35,000 should be imputed" to
Ms. Thronson, i.e., she could earn that
amount, assuming she was employed on a
full-time basis. But, the court found her
needs to be $3,700 per month, i.e., $44,400
annually. Accordingly, she is not capable
of meeting her needs, she requires $9,400
annually to meet her needs, even when
employed on a full-time basis. Thus, she
will require the $800 per month ($9,600
annually) alimony for the forseeable future. Otherwise, she will face a substantial income shortfall compared to her
needs. Further, the trial court found Mr.
Thronson's actual and necessary monthly
living expenses to be $4,300 per month, i.e.,
$51,600 annually. This leaves him with
some discretionary income. These findings
warrant an award of permanent alimony.
The trial court abused its discretion in limiting the alimony award to one year. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335
(Utah Ct.App.1988). We remand for modification of the alimony award to be permanent alimony of $800 per month.
OTHER FINANCIAL AND
PROPERTY AWARDS
There is no fixed formula upon which to
determine a division of property in a divorce action. The trial court has considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled
to a presumption of validity. See Naranjo,
751 P.2d at 1146. Ms. Thronson claims the
trial court erred by failing to restore to her
inheritance monies expended by her while
the parties were separated prior to divorce;
by failing to replace certain furniture removed by Mr. Thronson; and by failing to
restore certain funds spent by Mr. Thronson after they separated. We have examined these items and find no abuse of trial
court discretion. This court will not disturb a determination of financial and property interests unless it is clearly unjust or a
clear abuse of discretion. Rasband, 752
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P.2d at 1335. Thus, we affirm the rulings
on these matters.
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur.

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF
Aundrae HIGLEY, a minor.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, Appellee,
v.
Dennis J. HIGLEY,
conservator, Appellant.
No. 900236-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 10, 1991.
After recipient of state medical assistance payments settled his claim against the
insurer of the owner of the automobile
which caused his accident, State brought
action against recipient under the Medical
Benefits Recovery Act to recover medical
assistance payments provided for recipient.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David S. Young, J., entered summary judgment for State, and recipient appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held
that: (1) 1989 amendments to the Act applied retroactively, and (2) because recipient settled the claim without state's consent, state was entitled to recover the medical assistance payments.
Affirmed.
1. Social Security and Public Welfare
e=*241
1989 amendment to Medical Benefits
Recovery Act, which previously prohibited
filing of claim without State consent and,
as amended, included settlement, compromise, release, or waiver of claim as well,
was not substantive, and thus, could be

applied retroactively.
7(D(a).

U.C.A.1953, 26-19-

2. Social Security and Public Welfare
<3=>241
State was entitled to recover from recipients medical assistance payments advanced in his behalf, as recipient settled his
claim with insurer without state's consent.
U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a).
3. Social Security and Public Welfare
<3=>241
Because recipient of state medical assistance payments settled claim with insurer without state's consent, state was entitled to recover those medical assistance
payments, even though insurer's written
offer to settle for policy limits predated
both recipient's application for State assistance and state's acceptance; recipient's
claim was not fully and legally settled until
several months after state became obligated. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a).
4. Social Security and Public Welfare
<s=>241
Where recipient of state medical assistance payments had claim for recovery
against insurer of owners and driver of
automobile which caused recipient's injuries, and recipient pursued that claim without state's consent, state's claim against
recipient under Medical Benefits Recovery
Act included "any proceeds" payable by
third party to extent of State medical assistance provided to him. U.C.A.1953, 2619-5, 26-19-7(l)(a).
Victor Lawrence (argued), Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and
Douglas W. Springmeyer, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(argued), Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Before BENCH, JACKSON and
RUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant ("the conservator") appeals
from a summary judgment based on the
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we have recognized the practical fact that
in deciding whether to return a particular
verdict, a jury may take into account the
real or imagined consequences of that verdict and should be given all verdict choices
reasonably supported by the evidence.
See, e.g., Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424; Baker,
671 P.2d at 156-57. Implicit in that line of
cases is an assumption that the jury will
have some understanding of the relative
consequences of the verdicts available to it.
When faced with a choice between verdicts
of guilty and mentally ill or not guilty by
reason of insanity, however, the jury can
only guess at the consequences of one versus the other. Therefore, they should be
given some guidance.

Hermona Jane MORTENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Kay Sherman MORTENSEN,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 19328.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 16, 1988.
Husband appealed from order of the
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J.
Robert Bullock, J., dividing parties' property in divorce action. The Supreme Court,
Howe, Associate CJ., held that: (1) trial
court making "equitable" property division
pursuant to divorce statute should generally award property acquired by one spouse
by gift and inheritance during marriage to
that spouse, and (2) awarding husband all
of stock that he acquired from his parents
during marriage, then dividing remaining
property by giving two-thirds to wife and
one-third to husband was not inequitable.
Affirmed.

Zimmerman, J., filed concurring opinion in which Durham, J., concurred.
1. Divorce ®=>252.3(3)
In Utah, trial court making "equitable"
property division pursuant to divorce statute should generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during marriage, or property acquired in exchange thereof, to that spouse,
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless other spouse has
by his or her efforts or expense contributed
to enhancement, maintenance, or protection
of that property, thereby acquiring equitable interest in it, or property has been
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or when acquiring
spouse has made gift of interest therein to
other spouse. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
2. Divorce <s=»252.3(l,3)
Exception to rule awarding property
acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during marriage to that spouse is
where part of or all of gift and inheritance
is awarded to nondonee or nonheir spouse
in lieu of alimony; remaining property
should be divided equitably between parties
as in other divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict mathematical equality. U.C.
A.1953, 30-3-5.
3. Divorce e=>252.3(3)
In making equitable property division
when one spouse has acquired property by
gift and inheritance during marriage, donee
or heir spouse should not lose benefits of
his or her gift or inheritance by trial
court's automatically or arbitrarily awarding other spouse equal amount of remaining property which was acquired by their
joint efforts to offset gifts or inheritance;
any significant disparity in division of remaining property should be based on equitable rational other than on sole fact that
one spouse is awarded his or her gifts or
inheritance. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
4. Divorce <3=>240(2)
Fact that one spouse has inherited or
donated property, particularly if it is income-producing, may properly be considered as eliminating or rpHnninor naoH fm-
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alimony by that spouse or his source of
income for payment of child support or
alimony, where awarded, by that spouse;
such property might also be utilized to
provide housing for minor children or utilized in other extraordinary situations
where equity so demands. U.C.A.1953, 303-5.
5. Divorce <s=»252.3(l, 3)
Awarding husband all of stock that he
acquired from his parents during marriage,
then dividing remaining property by giving
two-thirds to wife and one-third to husband, was not inequitable, even if value of
stock awarded to husband was not considered; parties did not have equal earning
power, and wife had waived all right to
alimony,, U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
Richard B. Johnson, Provo, for defendant
and appellant
Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for plaintiff
and appellee.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
This case presents for determination the
question of what disposition should be
made in a divorce decree of property given
to one of the parties to the marriage by his
or her family during the course of the
marriage.
Plaintiff Hermona Jane Mortensen and
defendant Kay Sherman Mortensen were
married on June 18, 1959, when they were
eighteen and nineteen years of age, respectively. Neither brought any substantial assets into the marriage. In 1969, defendant's parents, who owned a farm, organized a corporation to which they conveyed
the farm. They issued 50 percent of the
stock to themselves and the remaining 50
percent to their five children in equal
shares. A certificate of stock bearing defendant's name alone was issued to him for
his 10 percent of the outstanding shares.
Plaintiff has had no involvement with the
corporation except that she served as its
secretary for six months, during which
time she performed some nominal secretarial work.

Plaintiff brought this action for divorce.
At the end of the trial, the court granted
her a divorce, but suggested to counsel for
both parties that they attempt to agree on
a division of the property and on the
amount of child support and alimony, if
any. Counsel agreed to do so, but requested that the court first guide them by deciding whether the shares of stock given to
defendant by his parents should be considered by them in their negotiation. The
court took the question under advisement
and, after reading trial memoranda provided by counsel, ruled that the stock "is
property of the marriage and should be
taken into consideration by the court in
dividing all marital property on a fair and
equitable basis/' Thereafter, the parties
stipulated to a division of their property
which gave all of the shares of stock to
defendant, but gave about two-thirds in
value of the remaining property to plaintiff, including their major asset, their house
and lot which had been fully paid for.
They also stipulated to amounts of child
support for the three minor children and
that plaintiff should be awarded no alimony. The stipulation was made subject to
the right of defendant to appeal to this
Court the trial court's ruling quoted above
concerning the shares of stock. The court
accepted and approved the stipulation,
which was incorporated into a decree of
divorce.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984, Supp.
1988) tersely provides: "When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties." "Property"
is nowhere defined in our divorce code. In
Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442
P.2d 928 (1968), we rejected the contention
of the defendant husband that shares of
stock which had been given to him by his
father and sister should not have been
treated by the trial court as part of the
marital estate and divided between him and
his plaintiff wife. We did so without any
analysis of the issue and based our decision
on the oft-repeated rule that under section
30-3-5, there is no fixed rule or formula
for the division of property, the trial court
has wide discretion in property division,
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and its judgment will not be disturbed on
appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be
demonstrated. In that case, however, the
wife was awarded no alimony and was directed to pay her own attorney fees and
costs, even though she was totally disabled.
More recently in Bushell v. Bushell, 649
P.2d 85 (Utah 1982), the defendant husband's father had given him fourteen acres
of land during the marriage. In a divorce
action brought by the plaintiff wife, we
affirmed the trial court's division of property which awarded her one acre of that land
upon which the parties placed a mobile
home in which they lived. She was also
given the right to use the remaining thirteen acres for farming and for her livestock for seven and one-half years to assist
in providing support for the minor children
and herself. Similarly, in Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 (1973),
we were unable to find any abuse of discretion in the division of a marital estate totalling $588,581 which awarded to the plaintiff wife 60 percent thereof, even though
"the greater part of the nucleus of this
estate was the result of investment and
reinvestment of gifts from the plaintiffs
relatives." The defendant husband had appealed the division because the trial court
had not taken into consideration that the
wife was a beneficiary of the estate of her
uncle who died after the divorce action was
filed but before trial. This Court made no
specific comment on that issue and affirmed the property division but reversed
the award of alimony made by the trial
court, since the wife could maintain herself
on the income from the property awarded
her.
In contrast to the above cases, we have
on a number of occasions affirmed a division of property made by the trial court
which awarded to one spouse property
which he or she inherited during the marriage. For example in Preston v. Preston,
646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982), we affirmed
a divorce decree awarding to each party, in
general, the real and personal property he
or she brought to the marriage or inherited
during the marriage. We there said:
Following the principle we have approved
in cases like Georgedes v. Georgedes,

Utah, 627 P.2d 44 (1981); Jesperson v.
Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 (1980);
and Humphreys v. Humphreys, Utah,
520 P.2d 193 (1974), the district court
concluded that each party should, in general, receive the real and personal property he or she brought to the marriage or
inherited during the marriage.
Again, in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133
(Utah 1987), the plaintiff wife, ten years
into the marriage, inherited from her mother's estate three and one-half acres of unimproved land then worth less than $5,000.
Although no improvements were made to
the property nor any effort was expended
by either party, the property had appreciated at the time of divorce to $35,000 per
acre. The trial court awarded the property
solely to the plaintiff wife, giving the defendant husband no part of the land's original value or appreciation during the marriage. This Court refused to disturb that
award. A few months later, we decided
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276
(Utah 1987), where the plaintiff invested in
houses money she had inherited early in
the marriage. During their twenty-year
marriage, the parties owned three houses
in succession. During the holding periods,
each house appreciated in value. Upon divorce, the plaintiff wife was credited with
the amount of her inheritances that went
into the houses, but the parties equally
shared the appreciation of the value of the
houses. We found no abuse of discretion
in that arrangement. See also Argyle v.
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984), where
the defendant husband was credited with
the amount of a gift of land received from
his mother during the marriage.
Some of the above cases in whicn gifts or
inheritances received by one of the parties
to the marriage were treated differently
can be reconciled because of the effort
made by the nondonee or nonheir spouse to
preserve or augment the asset, Dubois v.
Dubois, supra, or because of the lack of
such effort, Burke v. Burke, supra. Also,
in Weaver v. Weaver, supra, the award to
the wife of part of the assets given to the
husband during the marriage by his family
was in lieu of alimony and attorney fees.
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Significantly, no case has been found
where this Court has reversed a trial
court's disposition of gifts or inherited
property received by one party during the
marriage. In almost every case, we have
emphasized the wide discretion trial courts
have in property division and have refrained from laying down any general rules
for the disposition of gifts and inherited
property.
A review of the law in other jurisdictions
discloses that generally property acquired
by one spouse by gift or inheritance during
the marriage is awarded wholly to that
spouse upon divorce unless the other
spouse has contributed to the augmentation, improvement, or operation of the
property or has significantly cared for, protected, or preserved it, thereby acquiring
an equitable interest in the property. In
some states, this rule is aided by or based
on statute. Bailey v. Bailey, 250 Ga. 15,
295 S.E.2d 304 (1982); Klingberg v. Klingberg, 68 Dl.App.3d 513, 25 IlLDec. 246, 386
N.E.2d 517 (1979); In re Marriage of Pitluck, 616 S.W.2d 861 (Mo.Ct.App.1981); In
re Marriage ofHerron, 186 Mont. 396, 608
P.2d 97 (1980); In the Matter of the Marriage of Pierson, 294 Or. 117, 653 P.2d
1258 (1982); Hussey v. Hussey, 280 S.C.
418, 312 S.E.2d 267 (CtApp.1984); Wierman v. Wierman, 130 Wis.2d 425, 387
N.W.2d 744 (1986). In other states, the
rule is founded on case law holding that
although trial courts have wide discretion
in the division of property, which discretion
will be disturbed on appeal only if it has
been abused, as a general rule an equitable
and fair distribution of property requires
that gifts and inheritances be retained 6y
the donee or heir spouse. Raupp v.
Eaupp, 3 Ea^.App. 602, 653 P,2d 329
(1983); Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, 212
Neb. 730, 325 N.W.2d 832 (1982). In Hussey v. Hussey, supra, the court noted that
a substantial majority of states exclude
inherited property from the marital estate
of the parties, citing Baxter, Marital Property § 41:8 (Supp.1983); see now Supp.
1987. It justified that policy on the ground
that "property which comes to either party
by avenues other than as a consequence of
their mutual efforts owes nothing to the

marriage and is not intended to be shared."
Hussey, 312 S.E.2d at 270. The same court
further observed:
Finally, we are mindful that the inclusion
of inherited property in the marital estate subjects it to being removed from
the natural line of succession, thus
thwarting the desire of the persons who
acquired it and passed it on to the spouse
in possession. At the same time, the
spouse who made no contribution toward
acquisition of the property benefits from
the windfall award.
Hussey, 312 S.E.2d at 270.
The rule that property acquired by gift
or inheritance by one spouse should be
awarded to that spouse on divorce unless
the other spouse has, by his or her efforts
with regard to the property, acquired an
equity in it does not apply when the property thus acquired is consumed, such as when
a gift or an inheritance of money is used
for family purposes, In re Marriage of
Metcalf, 183 Mont 266, 598 P.2d 1140
(1979); when the property completely loses
its identity and is not traceable because it
is commingled with other property (sometimes called transmuted), Wierman v. Wierman, supra; Klingberg v. Klingberg,
supra; Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862 (Okla.
Ct.App.1979); or when the acquiring
spouse places title in their joint names in
such a manner as to evidence an intent to
make it marital property. Hussey v. Hussey, supra. See also Van Newkirk v. Van
Newkirk, supra, where the court determined that shares in a mutual fund were
actually given to both husband and wife by
the wife's parents.
Some jurisdictions which award property
acquired by one spouse by gift or inheritance also award to him or her any appreciation of that property during marriage due
to inflation. Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, supra; In re Marriage of Komnick,
84 I11.2d 89, 49 IlLDec. 291, 417 N.E.2d
1305 (1981). Other jurisdictions do not always do so. See Mochida v. Mochida, 5
Haw.App. 348, 691 P.2d 771 (1984).
Once property acquired by gift or inheritance has been set over to the donee or heir
spouse in accordance with the rules just
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stated, the jurisdictions are in conflict as to
how the nondonated and noninherited property (hereinafter called remaining property)
should be divided. In Van Newkirk v.
Van Newkirk, supra, the court held that
the remaining property should be divided
equitably between the parties apparently
without regard to the fact that one party
had been awarded his or her property acquired by gift or inheritance. (The court
observed that generally the disparity in the
division of the remaining property should
not exceed two-thirds to one-third.) This
view that the award to one spouse of his or
her inheritances and gifts should not be a
factor in the division of the remaining property was taken by two dissenting justices
on the Oregon Supreme Court in In the
Matter of the Marriage ofPierson, supra.
Other courts, however, have taken the position that even though donated or inherited
property is not subject to equitable division, it may properly be considered as a
factor in determining what constitutes an
equitable division of the remaining property. Hussey v. Hussey, supra; In the Matter of the Marriage ofPierson, supra. In
the latter case, the remaining property was
not evenly divided. The wife, who was
awarded a farm she inherited during the
marriage valued at over $100,000, received
less than 50 percent of the remaining property in order to make the husband economically self-sufficient. The court observed:
Where a decree cannot achieve all the
objectives of a dissolution and at the
same time divide property exactly evenly,
the court should order a division of assets which is out of balance to the extent
required for the accomplishment of the
other purposes of the decree ..., as here,
to enable both parties to be^in post-marital life with a degree of economic selfsufficiency
Pierson, 653 P.2d at 1262.
[1-4] We conclude that in Utah, trial
courts making "equitable" property division pursuant to section 30-3-5 should, in
accordance with the rule prevailing in most
other jurisdictions and with the division
made in many of our own cases, generally
award property acquired by one spouse by
gift and inheritance during the marriage

(or property acquired in exchange thereof)
to that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1)
the other spouse has by his or her efforts
or expense contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest
in it, Dubois v. Dubois, supra, or (2) the
property has been consumed or its identity
lost through commingling or exchanges or
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift
of an interest therein to the other spouse.
Cf Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326
(Utah 1980). An exception to this rule
would be where part or all of the gift or
inheritance is awarded to the nondonee or
nonheir spouse in lieu of alimony as was
done in Weaver v. Weaver, supra. The
remaining property should be divided equitably between the parties as in other divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict
mathematical equality. Teece v. Teece, 715
P.2d 106 (Utah 1986). However, in making
that division, the donee or heir spouse
should not lose the benefit of his or her gift
or inheritance by the trial court's automatically or arbitrarily awarding the other
spouse an equal amount of the remaining
property which was acquired by their joint
efforts to offset the gifts or inheritance.
Any significant disparity in the division of
the remaining property should be based on
an equitable rationale other than on the
sole fact that one spouse is awarded his or
her gifts or inheritance. The fact that one
spouse has inherited or donated property,
particularly if it is income-producing, may
properly be considered as eliminating or
reducing the need for alimony by that
spouse or as a source of income for the
payment of child support or alimony (where
awarded) by that spouse. Such property
might also be utilized to provide housing
for minor children or utilized in other extraordinary situations where equity so demands. These rules will preserve and give
effect to the right that married persons
have always had in this state to separately
own and enjoy property. It also accords
with the normal intent of donors or deceased persons that their gifts and inheritances should be kept within their family
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and succession should not be diverted because of divorce.
[5] Turning now to the instant case,
based on the stipulation of the parties, defendant was awarded all of the stock. This
was entirely proper since plaintiff does not
claim that through any effort of hers, the
value of the stock was in any way enhanced. Indeed, there was no evidence
that the stock had appreciated in value.
Defendant complains, however, that even
though he was awarded the stock, because
of the trial court's ruling that the stock "is
property of the marriage and should be
taken into consideration by the court in
dividing all marital property on a fair and
equitable basis," he was compelled to stipulate to a division of the remaining property
which gave him less than he would have
otherwise been entitled to. Defendant apparently assumes that had the trial court
made the division of property, it would
have, in view of its ruling stated above,
given plaintiff an award of remaining property equal in amount to the value of the
stock before giving defendant any of the
remaining property.
We cannot agree with defendant's contention. We are not satisfied that by its
ruling the trial court intended the meaning
which defendant gives to it. In the first
place, even though the stock should have
been and was awarded to defendant, the
trial court was technically correct in ruling
that the stock was not without the purview
of the court since it was "property" under
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. Weaver v.
Weaver, supra. Secondly, the balance of
the court's ruling is couched in general
terms, leaving us without any way of
knowing the extent of consideration the
trial court in dividing the remaining property would have given to the fact that defendant was entitled to be awarded his
stock. We cannot assume that the trial
judge would have given improper consideration of, or too much weight to, that fact
Since the trial court did not actually make
the division of property here but only accepted the division made by the parties
themselves, we cannot presume that had

the court made the division, it would have
fallen into error.
We do point out that the division agreed
upon by the parties would have been an
equitable division had it been made by the
trial court, even though it gave plaintiff
approximately two-thirds of the property
and defendant one-third, exclusive of the
shares of stock. Thus, the trial court's
vague ruling did not mislead defendant into
stipulating to an inequitable division.
Here, the parties married at a young age.
The husband continued his education and
finally obtained a Ph.D. degree in metallurgy. He teaches at a private university and
earns a gross salary of approximately
$2,560 per month. The parties have four
children, one of whom had obtained his
majority at the time of trial but was still
living at home. After the birth of the last
child, plaintiff went back to school and
obtained a bachelor's degree with a teaching certificate. For five years prior to the
trial, she had been employed as a public
school teacher, earning approximately
$1,300 gross per month. Despite the disparity in their educational achievement and
their earnings, plaintiff waived all right to
alimony and agreed to the payment of
$150-per-month child support for each of
the three minor children in her custody.
Although there is scant evidence in the
record concerning the extent of retirement
benefits which the parties may later become entitled to, it would appear that defendant's retirement will be greater because of his higher salary and longer number of years in employment Plaintiff was
not awarded any part of defendant's retirement. In view of these factors, it would
not have been inequitable for the trial court
to award plaintiff two-thirds of the remaining property and defendant one-third, giving no weight at all to the fact that he
received his shares of stock.
Defendant raises one further issue, that
the decree signed by the trial court deviated from the oral stipulation the parties
entered into the record. We find that the
decree accurately reflected the intent of
the parties, and the deviation from the exact language of the stipulation was of no
consequence. In any event, the language
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of the stipulation is not necessarily binding
on the court. Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d
338 (Utah 1980); Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d
472 (Utah 1975); Johnson v. Johnson, 21
Utah 2d 23, 439 P.2d 843 (1968).
The decree of the trial court is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, J.,
concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring).
I concur in the majority opinion, at least
as I understand its scope. I write separately to explain that understanding. As I
read the majority opinion, the rules articulated today require only that in the usual
case not fitting within one of the exceptions spelled out by Justice Howe, property
acquired by one spouse during the marriage through gift or inheritance should be
awarded to that spouse upon divorce. I
take this to be nothing more than a variation on the analogous rule applicable to
property brought into the marriage by one
party: in the usual case, that property is
returned to that party at divorce, absent
exigent circumstances. Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982). I certainly do not read the majority opinion as
creating an exalted status for inherited or
donated property that would effectively entail it or its value beyond the reach of a
trial court fashioning a divorce decree.
The overarching general rule remains the
same in any divorce case: to provide adequate support for the children of the marriage, Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256
(Utah 1987), and to divide the economic
assets and income stream of the parties so
as to permit both to maintain themselves
after the marriage as nearly as possible at
the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage. See, e.g., Noble v. Noble, 761
P.2d 1369,1373 (Utah 1988). That standard
ultimately determines how property and income should be allocated by the trial court
in making property division, alimony, and
child support orders. Where possible, interests of parties in their separate property,
such as those described by Justice Howe,
should be honored. For this reason, the
rules articulated today, like those generally
applicable to separate pre-marital property,

may limit somewhat the trial court's initial
flexibility to allocate property of a marriage
in a fashion so as to provide an entirely
equitable portion to each party. But if, after an attempt is made to pay due deference
to each party's claim to particular pieces of
property by reason of their source, the
court finds that it is unable to fashion a division of assets and awards of alimony and
child support that will be just and equitable
for both parties and the children, then it is
free to ignore those claims in the greater interest in a just and equitable decree.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.

STATE of Utah, By and Through the DIVISION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, Jean A. Williams, Director,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v,
GAF CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 19836.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 18, 1988.

State Division of Consumer Protection
brought action against asphalt shingle
manufacturer. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J.,
granted summary judgment for manufacturer, and appeal was taken. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) Division
could sue for damages to consumer based
on complaint filed by consumer with Division, and (2) promotional materials provided
by manufacturer to retailer, which were
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Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah
App.1992).
[16] As a prerequisite to an attack on
findings of fact, the petitioner must marshal
all evidence in support of the findings and
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467,
470 (Utah 1989); see West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
App.1991) (discussing in detail what "onerous" marshaling burden entails for appellants). This marshaling requirement provides the appellate court the basis from
which to conduct a meaningful and expedient
review of facts challenged on appeal. See
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508,
512 n. 2 (Utah App.1990).
[17] In the present case, petitioner does
not meet his marshaling burden; rather, he
merely reargues the evidence most favorable
to him, leaving it to this court to sort out
what evidence actually supports the habeas
court's competency determination. Because
he has failed to meet this burden, we decline
to consider the merits of his argument on
appeal. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).6
CONCLUSION
The information known to the trial court at
the time of the plea hearing does not indicate
that the trial judge should have had a bona
fide doubt with respect to petitioner's competency to plead guilty. Furthermore, we refuse to consider petitioner's claim that the
tnal court erred in finding him competent at
the time he entered his guilty plea because
6.

However, our review of the record suggests the
likelihood that sufficient evidence supports the
habeas court's finding that petitioner was competent at the time he entered his guilty plea. Dr
Carlisle testified that although petitioner probably suffered from MPD at the time ot the shootings, he was nevertheless competent to have pied
guilty He further testified that petitioner would
have been able to think rationally, form a mental
state of intent to kill, understand the nature of
the proceedings and the nature of the crime,
comprehend the reasons for punishment, and
assist his attorney Dr Carlisle explained that
petitioner "would have the rational thought of
determining whether or not [pleading guilty] was

he has failed to meet his burden to marshal
the evidence. Nevertheless, there is an adequate evidentiary foundation for the habeas
court's determination that petitioner was
competent at the time he entered his guilty
pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus
petition.
DAVIS, J., and ORME, Associate P.J.,
concur.

Christa C. SCHAUMBERG,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Thomas J. SCHAUMBERG, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 920865-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 26, 1994.
Divorce action was brought. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy R.
Hanson, J., entered a final decree of divorce.
Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Davis, J., held that: (1) trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding wife $800
per month alimony; (2) finding that husband
spent loan, a marital debt, to maintain and
improve business building was not clearly
the choice he wanted to make at the time " Dr
Carlisle also testified that if the host personalis
had really been unaware of what the alternate
personality had done, he would have expected
more confusion and inability to remember in
petitioner's statements at the police station, and
that it was possible petitioner was blocking his
memory Furthermore, the tnal court s finding*
and conclusions clearly indicate the court applied the appropnate legal standard in finding
petitioner competent to plead guiltv, as required
by Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S 402, 80 S Ci
788, 4 L.Ed 2d 824 (1960) (per curiam) and Utah
Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1993).
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erroneous; (3) wife was entitled to one half
of appreciation of building; and (4) remand
was required for determination of whether
wife was entitled to attorney fees on appeal
and, if so, amount of fees.
Affirmed and remanded.
1. Divorce e=>239, 240(1)
Trial court made adequate finding regarding wife's need and, thus, did not abuse
its discretion in awarding wife $800 per
month alimony; wife presented uncontroverted testimony regarding her projected
needs and past standard of living and husband's ability to pay.
2. Divorce <3=>231
General purpose of alimony is to prevent
receiving spouse from becoming a public
charge and to maintain to the extent possible
the standard of living enjoyed during marriage.
3. Divorce e=>237
In determining whether to award alimony and in setting amount, trial court must
consider financial conditions and needs of
receiving spouse; ability of receiving spouse
to provide for him or herself; and ability of
payor spouse to provide support.
4. Divorce e=>240(2)
When payor spouse's resources are adequate, alimony need not be limited to provide
for only basic needs, but should also consider
recipient spouse's station in life.
5. Divorce c=>286(3.1), 287
When trial court has failed to make findings on financial conditions and needs of
receiving spouse, ability of receiving spouse
to provide for him or herself, and ability of
payor spouse to provide support, Court of
Appeals reverses award of alimony unless
pertinent facts in record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgment; so long as record is
clear that trial court has considered these
factors, Court of Appeals will not disturb
trial court's determination regarding alimony
unless trial court clearly abused its discretion.

6. Divorce <3=>286(2, 5)
Trial court has considerable discretion
concerning property distribution in divorce
proceedings; thus, its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.
7. Divorce <s=>252.3(3)
A trial court has discretion to award
inherited property in divorce action.
8. Divorce <£=>286(8)
Court of Appeals disturbs distribution of
property in divorce proceeding only when
there is misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law* resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest clear abuse of
discretion.
9. Divorce <s>252.3(3)
While trial court has discretion to award
inherited property in divorce proceeding, the
property, as well as its appreciated value, is
generally regarded as separate from marital
estate, and, hence, is left with receiving
spouse in property division incident to divorce.
10. Divorce <3>286(8)
In reviewing husband's claim that trial
court clearly erred in finding that he spent a
loan, admittedly a marital debt, to maintain
and improve a business building, Court of
Appeals had to give due regard to opportunity of trial court to judge credibility of witnesses, and Court would not set aside challenged finding except if it determined it to be
clearly erroneous. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
52(a).
11. Divorce <3>278.1
To challenge finding on property division, party must marshal all evidence supporting challenged finding and demonstrate
how marshaled evidence is insufficient to
support finding.
12. Divorce 0=>253(2)
Trial court's finding that husband spent
proceeds from a loan, a marital debt, to
maintain and improve a business building
was not clearly erroneous, for purposes of
determining property division; husband did
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not marshal evidence but merely reargued
evidence supporting his position and husband
caused inconsistencies in the record.
13. Divorce <3=>252.3(3)
There was no error in trial court's determination that wife was entitled to one-half of
appreciation of business building pursuant to
property division upon divorce; even though
husband used inherited funds to pay down
payment on building, he used substantial
marital funds to maintain and augment that
asset.
14. Divorce ®=>223, 226
Trial courts have discretion to award
attorney fees in domestic cases so long as
award is based on findings regarding need of
receiving spouse, ability of payor spouse to
pay, and reasonableness of fees. U.C.A.1953,
30-3-3.
15. Divorce <3=»287
When trial court has awarded attorney
fees in divorce proceeding based upon findings regarding need of receiving spouse, ability of payor spouse to pay, and reasonableness of fees, and when receiving spouse has
prevailed on appeal, Court of Appeals will
award attorney fees on appeal and remand
solely for trial court to make foregoing findings. U.CA1953, 30-3-3.
16. Divorce <3=>287
When Court of Appeals reverses partial
award of attorney fees in divorce proceeding
and remands for findings on attorney fees at
trial, Court of Appeals likewise remands to
determine attorney fees on appeal when party claiming fees on appeal substantially prevails. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3.
17. Divorce <3=>287
When party who prevails on appeal in
divorce action, yet was not awarded fees at
trial, claims attorney fees on appeal solely on
basis of new allegations of change in financial
condition and those allegations are not a
matter of record and have not been adjudicated by finder of fact, Court of Appeals
cannot evaluate claim; prevailing party's
claim for attorney fees on appeal based on
allegation of need must be addressed by trial
court to determine need of claiming spouse,

ability of other spouse to pay, reasonableness
of fees and amount, if any, to be paid.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3, 78-2a-3.
Frederick N. Green and Susan C. Bradford, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Kent T. Yano, Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Before DAVIS, GREEiWOOD and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
Appellant, Thomas J. Schaumberg (Husband), appeals from a final decree of divorce
from appellee, Christa C. Schaumberg
(Wife). We affirm and remand for determination of whether Wife is entitled to attorney
fees on appeal.
FACTS
At the time of their divorce, the parties
had been married for over twenty-five years,
and their two children had reached their
majority.
For sixteen years of the marriage, Husband was employed by the military. Thereafter, he became self-employed as a financial
consultant through a solely-owned corporate
entity.
During the marriage, Husband inherited
real property from his father's estate, the
sale of which resulted in net proceeds of
$33,933.87. Husband used $20,000 of these
funds as a down payment on a business
building. The court found that Husband
spent an additional $8000 of the inherited
funds to improve the building. Husband's
corporation, the sole tenant of the building,
paid Husband $1250 a month in rent. Husband used these funds to pay the $957
monthly mortgage payment on the property
and used the remainder for upkeep.
Over the years, Husband maintained and
improved the business property using corporate and other funds. Prior to trial, Husband responded to an interrogatory to the
effect that he used the proceeds of a $25,000
loan (the Armstrong loan) to improve the
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building. However at trial, Husband suggested that he spent the proceeds of the
Armstrong loan on family expenses. The
trial court found in its memorandum decision
that the Armstrong loan was used in part to
maintain and upgrade the building. At the
time of trial, the outstanding mortgage on
the building amounted to approximately $45,000, and the fair market value was $100,000,
leaving an equity of $55,000.
The court awarded Wife $800 per month
alimony. While the court made no findings
regarding need, Wife submitted the following
to establish her need and standard of living:
(1) at the time of filing, in September 1991,
she declared $3178 as her monthly living
expenses; (2) at pretrial, she declared $2849
as her monthly living expenses; and (3) at
trial, she submitted an exhibit projecting her
monthly living expenses as $2272.58. Wife
testified that the three amounts differed because of her changing understanding of her
finances and her changing circumstances as
she moved from a family household to a
single household. She also testified that the
last amount most nearly reflected her understanding of her projected needs and standard
of living in a single household.
Taking into account her skills and past
experience, the court imputed to Wife an
earning ability of $1000, and awarded her a
portion of Husband's military retainer
amounting to $589 per month. These
amounts, combined with Wife's alimony
award, amounted to a gross monthly income
of $2389.
At trial, Wife made no claim against Husband's original $28,000 investment in the
business property. However, she claimed
one-half of the equity in excess of Husband's
investment in the building. The court
agreed with this claim, determining Wife was
"entitled to share in the appreciation in the
value of the building in an amount equal to
S2T,000, which takes into account [Husband's] initial separate property contribution." The court based this determination on
the fact that "the rent paid by Husband's
corporation exceeded the mortgage payment,
[and that] Husband sought to categorize the
$25,000 Armstrong debt as a marital debt

and he used the funds from the loan to
improve the property."
On the last day of trial, the parties closed
on the sale of their marital house, the proceeds of which the court had not yet distributed. At trial, counsel for Wife claimed that
she feared Husband would keep all the money if the title company issued only one check
in both parties' names. Wife's counsel suggested that the title company issue checks to
each party for one-half of the sale proceeds,
pending the trial court's final distribution of
marital assets. Husband's counsel informally stipulated to that procedure.
Later, in its memorandum decision and in
its conclusions of law, the court awarded
Wife the entire net proceeds of the sale of
the house, which amount the court determined to be $61,730. Both parties agree that
Husband received one-half of the proceeds
but did not deliver those proceeds to Wife.
In making its property distribution, together with allocation of the Armstrong debt,
the court determined that each of tlfe parties'
distributions were equal within a few hundred dollars.
The court also found that each party
should pay their respective attorney fees.
The court based this determination in part
upon its findings that Wife received a greater
share of the liquid assets, that the parties
received a relatively equal distribution of the
marital assets, that the court had partially
resolved inequities in the parties' income via
alimony, and that Husband voluntarily
agreed to finance their daughter's education.
Husband appeals and Wife seeks attorney
fees on appeal.
ALIMONY
[1] Husband claims the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding Wife $800 per
month alimony because it failed to make a
finding regarding Wife's need.
[2] The general purpose of alimony is to
prevent the receiving spouse from becoming
a public charge and to maintain to the extent
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Howell v. Howell 806
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P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App.), cert denied, 817 debts, Wife's uncontroverted testimony regarding her projected needs and past stanP.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
dard of living, and Husband's ability to pay,
[3,4] In determining whether to award
we conclude that the court considered the
alimony and in setting the amount, the trial
necessary factors. Accordingly, the court
court must consider (1) the financial condidid not abuse its discretion in awarding her
tions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2)
$800 per month alimony.
the ability of the receiving spouse to provide
for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the
APPRECIATION
payor spouse to provide support. Chambers
v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App.
Husband claims the court erred in award1992). When "the payor spouse's resources ing Wife one-half of the appreciated value of
are adequate, alimony need not be limited to his business property.
provide for only basic needs, but should also
[6-8] A trial court has considerable disconsider the recipient spouse's 'station in
cretion
concerning property distribution in a
life/" Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212; accord
divorce
proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542
presumption
of validity. Watson v. Watson,
(Utah 1991).
837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1992). In fact, a
[5] When the trial court has failed to trial court has discretion to award inherited
make findings on the three factors listed property. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,
above, we reverse, unless pertinent facts in 1373 (Utah 1988). We disturb such a distrithe record are clear, ^incontroverted, and bution of property only when there is "a
capable of supporting only a finding in favor misunderstanding or misapplication of the
of the judgment. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d law resulting in substantial and prejudicial
1018, 1025 (Utah App.1993); Howell 806 error, the evidence clearly preponderates
P.2d at 1213. So long as the record is clear against the findings, or such a serious inequithat the trial court has considered these ty has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse
three factors, we will not disturb its determi- of discretion." Id.
nation regarding alimony unless it has clearly
[9] While a trial court has discretion to
abused its discretion. Chambers, 840 P.2d at
award
inherited property, such property, "as
843.
well as its appreciated value, is generally
We find no merit in Husband's claim that regarded as separate from the marital estate
the evidence of need is controverted. Wife and hence is left with the receiving spouse in
submitted documents reflecting her changing a property division incident to divorce."
circumstances as she moved from a family Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah
household to a single household. In addition, App.1990); accord Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d
she testified at trial that her stated needs 1018, 1022 (Utah App.1993). Courts have
amounted to $2272.58 per month. While considered inherited property as part of the
Husband's counsel vigorously cross-examined marital estate when "the other spouse has by
her on this issue, Husband offered no evi- his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or
dence controverting her evidence of this protected the inherited or donated property,
amount.
when the parties have inextricably comminHere, the court awarded Wife $800 per gled the property with marital property so
month alimony, imputed an earning ability of that it has lost its separate character, or
$1000.per month and awarded her a portion when the recipient spouse has contributed all
of Husband's military retainer amounting to or part of the property to the marital estate."
$589 per month. Thus, the court's award Id, However, even in cases when the inhercontemplated that Wife would receive a ited property has not lost its identity as such,
monthly income of $2389. That figure is the court may nevertheless award it to the
close to Wife's stated monthly need of non-heir spouse in lieu of alimony and in
$2272.58. In view of the trial court's equita- other extraordinary situations when equity
ble distribution of the marital assets and so demands. Id.
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[10] Husband claims the court clearly
erred in finding that he spent the $25,000
Armstrong loan, admittedly a marital debt,
to maintain and improve the business building. He essentially argues that the business
building is not marital property because he
never used marital funds to augment or
maintain it. Husband's argument challenges
the court's findings of fact. In reviewing
such a claim, we give due regard "to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses," and we do not
set aside a challenged finding except when
we determine it to be clearly erroneous.
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
[11,12] Moreover, to challenge a finding,
the party must marshal all evidence supporting the chaDenged finding and demonstrate
how the marshaled evidence is insufficient to
support the finding. Baker v. Baker, 866
P.2d 540, 543 (Utah App.1993). Here Husband has not marshaled the evidence, but has
merely reargued the evidence supporting his
position.

wise, we find no error in the court's determination that Wife was entitled to one-half of
the appreciation of the building.
APPROVED STIPULATION
Husband claims the trial court erred in
awarding Wife the entire equity from the
sale of the marital property. He claims the
parties stipulated that each party would receive one-half of the net proceeds of the sale
and that the court approved that stipulation.
Both parties agree that Husband has failed
to deliver to Wife the money he received
from the title company representing one-half
of the proceeds.
At trial, Wife's counsel claimed Wife
feared Husband would keep all the money if
the title company issued only one check in
both parties' names. Wife's counsel suggested that the title company issue checks to
each party for one-half of the sale proceeds,
pending the trial court's final distribution of
marital assets. The parties never agreed
that Husband could keep the funds notwithstanding a later court order.

Further, Husband caused the inconsistencies in the record. Husband prepared an
answer to Wife's interrogatory to the effect
that he spent the loan funds to improve the
business property. However at trial, he denied this and said he spent the funds on
family expenses. We therefore defer to the
trial court, which was in a superior position
to judge the credibility of the witnesses and
to weigh the evidence. Thus, Husband has
failed to demonstrate that the trial court's
finding that he spent the proceeds from the
Armstrong loan to maintain and improve the
building is clearly erroneous.

Moreover, the court determined that Wife
should receive all the net proceeds from the
sale of the marital home. The court made
this determination while aware that it had
earlier approved the parties' agreement for
temporary distribution of the sale proceeds.
We therefore affirm the trial court's determination that Wife should receive all the proceeds from the sale of the marital home.

[13] Even though Husband used inherited funds to pay the down payment on the
building, he used substantial marital funds to
maintain and augment that asset.: We find
no error in the court's determination that the
appreciated portion of the asset changed its
character from a personal asset to a marital
asset, See Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169. Like-

Based upon the foregoing, we hold that
Wife has substantially prevailed on appeal.
Notwithstanding the fact that she was not
awarded attorney fees at trial, Wife asks this
court to award attorney fees on appeal on the
basis of allegations in her brief that her
financial circumstances have changed since
the time of trial.

1. No evidence in the record suggests that Husband's corporation paid an excessive amount for
rent (which funds in turn were used to pay the
mortgage). Our affirmance of the court's distribution of the building's appreciation does not
turn on the fact that Husband's corporation was

the sole tenant of the building. Nor do we
suggest that payment of a legitimate business
expense related to the value or use of an inherited asset converts that asset or a portion of that
asset into a marital asset.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
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[14] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (Supp.
1993) grants courts discretion to award attorney fees in domestic cases. Trial courts have
discretion to award fees, so long as the award
is based on findings regarding the need of
the receiving spouse, the ability of the payor
spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the
fees. See Wells v. Wells. 235 Utah Adv.Rep.
43, 45 (Utah App.1994).

fees on appeal, and if so, the amount of fees
to be awarded.
Affirmed and remanded.
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.

(o
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[15] When a trial court has awarded fees
at trial based on such findings, and when the
receiving spouse has prevailed on appeal, we
will award attorney fees on appeal and remand solely for the trial court to make the
foregoing findings. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah App.1993); Allred
v.
v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974. 979 (Utah App.1992);
Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah
Michael Wayne PILLING, Defendant
and Appellant.
App.1992); Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 494
(Utah App.1991); Crcmse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d
No. 930577-CA.
836, 840 (Utah App.1991); Haumont v. Haumant, 793 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah App.1990).
Court of Appeals of Utah.
[16] Similarly, when we reverse a partial
award of attorney fees and remand for findings on attorney fees at trial, we likewise
remand to determine attorney fees on appeal
when the party claiming fees on appeal substantially prevails. See, e.g.. Potter v. Potter,
845 P.2d 272, 275 (Utah App.1993); Willey v.
Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 556 (Utah App.1993);
Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 742 (Utah App.
1992).
[17] When a party who prevails on appeal, yet was not awarded fees at trial, claims
attorney fees on appeal solely on the basis of
new allegations of a change in financial condition, and when those allegations are not a
matter of record and have not been acjjudicated by a finder of fact we cannot evaluate
that claim. Heltman v. Heltman> 29 Utah 2d
444, 511 P.2d 720, 721 (1973); see generally,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp.1993) (regarding appellate court jurisdiction). A prevailing party's claim for attorney fees on
appeal based on an allegation of need must
be addressed by the trial court to determine
the need of the claiming spouse, the ability of
the other spouse to pay, the reasonableness
of the fees and the amount, if any, to be paid.
We therefore remand this claim for determination of whether Wife is entitled to attorney

May 27, 1994.
Defendant was convicted in the Seventh
District Court, Carbon County, Bryce K.
Bryner, J., of assault by prisoner, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings,
P.J., held that: (1) defendant did not preserve for appeal contention that he was not a
prisoner at the time of the assault; (2) defendant did not marshal the evidence as required to challenge sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) evidence demonstrated that
defendant was a prisoner at the time of the
assault and sustained the conviction.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <2>1030(3)
Defendant who did not argue at trial
that he was not a prisoner because he was
not in custody at time of assault failed to
preserve the issue therefore precluding the
court's consideration of the issue on appeal.
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-102.5.
2. Criminal Law <s»1030(3)
Any error in convicting defendant of assault by prisoner could not have been obvi-
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other is a nullity." 86 Hl.Dec. at 746, 475
N.E.2d at 1125 (citing Culver u TiUe Guar.
& Trust Co., 269 AJD. 627, 58 N.Y.S.2d 116
(1945)).
In the instant case, the revocation language of the trust agreement speaks only in
the plural. The specific terms, "we reserve
unto ourselves" are identical to the terms the
Khan court construed. Additionally, the
trust states "disposition by us . . . of the
property . . . shall constitute . . . revocation."
(Emphasis added.) A literal reading of these
terms mandates a finding that the co-trustors
must mutually exercise the power to revoke
the trust. Therefore, Herschel West as the
surviving trustor/trustee could not unilaterally revoke the trust after the death of his cotrustor/trustee, and his quitclaim deed to
himself and appellee was a nullity. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court's grant of
summary judgment, determining Herschel
West had authority to unilaterally transfer
the trust property, was incorrect. The joint
trust, as the court originally held, has title to
the home transferred out of trust by Herschel West.
CONCLUSION
We hold that under the terms of the trust
agreement, the power to revoke was reserved in Herschel and Hazel West as cotrustors. Additionally, the trust terms require joint action to revoke the trust. Accordingly, the surviving trustor could not
unilaterally revoke the trust after the death
of the other co-trustor. We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment and remand for the entry of an
order restoring the property to the joint
trust and for such further proceedings the
trial court determines are necessary.
ORME, P.J., and BENCH, J., concur.

Sahndra K. MARSHALL, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Donald R. MARSHALL, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 950172-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 11, 1996.
Wife brought divorce proceeding. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Ray M.
Harding, J., entered default judgment
against husband striking his pleadings, and
subsequently granted divorce decree. Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Davis, Associate P.J., held that: (1) default
judgment was proper on basis of husband's
noncompliance with discovery orders; (2) trial court made inadequate findings with respect to alimony award; (3) husband did not
properly marshal evidence to challenge findings on value of marital estate; and (4) trial
court's findings and conclusions regarding
attorney fees were insufficient to allow meaningful review of award of such fees to wife.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
1. Motions <3=>56(2)
"Nunc pro tunc order" is used to correct
the court's omission or error; however, such
an order may not be used to address an issue
not previously before the court
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

2. Divorce <3=>181
Court of Appeals did not address propriety of bench warrant for husband's arrest
ordered at conclusion of divorce proceeding,
though husband stated in "Statement of the
Case" section of brief that the issue was on
appeal, where issue was not mentioned anywhere else in brief.
3. Divorce <3=>85,160
Trial court did not abuse discretion in
entering default judgment against husband
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and striking his pleadings in divorce proceeding, even if default was partially based on
improper ground of husband's failure to pay
support arrearages; default was supported
on basis of noncompliance with discovery orders, where husband secreted approximately
$180,000 in income while insisting to court
that he had insufficient income to pay an
additional $1,000 in support, where he never
presented required statements proving tax
payments which allegedly accounted for his
lack of funds, and where he failed to provide
documentation of several savings and investment accounts. Rules CiwProc, Rule
37(b)(2)(C).
4. Appeal and Error <s>961
Pretrial Procedure @=>44.1
Trial court has broad discretion to impose discovery sanctions upon a noncomplying party, and Court of Appeals will not
reverse trial judge's decision to impose such
sanctions absent an abuse of that discretion.
5. Pretrial Procedure @=>44.1
Discovery sanctions are intended to deter misconduct and require a showing of
willfulness, bad faith, or fault
6. Pretrial Procedure @=>44.1, 46
Striking of pleadings, entering of default, and rendering of judgment against a
disobedient party are the most severe of the
potential discovery sanctions that can be imposed upon a nonresponding party; because
of severity of this type of sanction, trial
court's range of discretion is more narrow
than when the court is imposing less severe
sanctions.
7. Divorce <§=»85
Judicial system is not to be manipulated
in divorce proceedings by one who actively
and aggressively misleads the court and the
opposing party.
8. Divorce <S=>287
Remand of alimony award for findings
°n each of the required factors was necessary, where Court of Appeals could not determine the basis of the award or whether
^ 1 court abused its discretion in the
amount of the award.

9. Divorce <S=>286(3.1)
Court of Appeals will not disturb alimony award absent a clear and prejudicial
abuse of the considerable discretion granted
the trial court in determining award.
10. Divorce ®=>235, 237,238
With respect to alimony award in divorce proceeding, trial court must consider
the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse, the ability of receiving spouse
to produce a sufficient income, and the ability
of supporting spouse to provide support; failure to consider those factors is abuse of
discretion.
11. Divorce <s=>243, 286(9)
In awarding alimony in divorce proceeding, trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each of the three prescribed factors to enable reviewing court to
ensure that trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon those
factors; if sufficient findings are not made,
reviewing court must reverse unless the record is clear and uncontroverted so as to allow
court to apply the factors as a matter of law.
12. Divorce ®=>278.1
Ex-husband did not properly marshal all
evidence in support of trial court's findings
regarding value of marital property and then
demonstrate insufficiency of evidence to support findings, as required when challenging
those findings on appeal, where he merely
recited the findings on point and then highlighted the evidence which he deemed contrary to the findings.
13. Appeal and Error <®=>757(3)
In order to challenge trial court's findings of facts on appeal, challenger must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence
is insufficient to support those findings;
Court of Appeals will uphold trial court's
findings of fact if appellant fails to appropriately marshal all of the evidence.
14. Divorce <§>253(3)
Where one party in divorce proceeding
has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or
otherwise acted obstructively, trial court
may, under its broad discretion, value the
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property at an earlier date, i.e., date of separation.
15. Divorce <3=>85, 253(3)
Trial court acted well within its discretion at divorce proceeding in valuing marital
property at time of parties' separation, as
opposed to valuing the property at the time
of trial, where husband failed to give accurate, verifiable accountings of his income and
assets.
16. Divorce ®=>221, 287
Trial court's findings and conclusions
with respect to award of attorney fees to wife
in divorce proceeding were insufficient to
allow a meaningful review of trial court's
ruling, though trial court found wife's attorney fees were "necessary," where it made no
finding regarding wife's need for such fees,
and where it also awarded substantial marital
assets to wife. U.CJU953, 30-3-3.
17. Divorce <s=>226, 286(9)
Decision to award attorney fees in divorce action must be based upon evidence of
the financial need of the receiving spouse, the
ability of other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees; failure to
consider any of those factors is grounds for
reversal on fee issue. U.CA1953, 30-3-3.
18. Divorce <3>287
Wife who prevailed on central issue ui
husband's appeal of divorce judgment would
be awarded attorney fees incurred as result
of appeal if trial court determined on remand, following consideration of the three
required factors, that she was entitled to
attorney fees for trial-level proceedings.
19. Divorce @=»194
Generally, when fees in divorce case are
granted to prevailing party at trial court, and
that party in turn prevails on appeal, then
fees will also be awarded on appeal.
20. Divorce <s>312.7
District court was required on remand
to incorporate into divorce decree the juvenile court's order regarding custody and visitation, where district court had certified
those issues to juvenile court, where parties
subsequently entered into stipulation on

those issues which was approved by juvenile
court, and where juvenile court order provided that it would be incorporated into divorce
decree and would be binding on the parties
as though entered in district court. U.C.A.
1953, 78-3a-17.
21. Divorce <3=>287
Court of Appeals declined to discuss
husband's claim that child support awarded
at divorce proceeding was incorrect, where
trial court was found not to have deviated
from child support guidelines. U.CA1953,
78-45-7.12.
22. Divorce @=»181
Court of Appeals rejected husband's request that trial judge in divorce proceeding
be recused from case where husband failed
to brief issue on appeal
Fourth District Utah County; The Honorable Ray M. Harding.
Helen E. Christian, Gustin & Christian,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Samuel King and David J. Friel, King,
Friel & Colton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before DAVIS, Associate P.J., and
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Donald R. Marshall appeals from a final
decree of divorce and related matters. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June of 1992, plaintiff filed for divorce.
An order to show cause was obtained by
plaintiff which, in pertinent part, addressed
temporary alimony and child support. A
hearing was held on the matter September 1,
1992. Defendant did not attend the hearing
and, although aware of the hearing date,
defendant's counsel was not present because
of a scheduling conflict In defendant's absence, the court entered an order which required that he pay $4122 per month in child
support and $3500 per month in alimony.
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Defendant objected to this order and requested a rehearing on the issues. The trial
court granted defendant's request, and another hearing was held on October 7, 1992.
This second hearing resulted in a reduction
of the child support to $3000 per month,1 but
the alimony remained at $3500. The support
payments were retroactive to August 1992.
Both parties were also ordered to refrain
from disbursing, disposing of, or encumbering any assets without the consent of the
other.
Shortly thereafter, on December 4, 1992,
plaintiff obtained an order to show cause
regarding defendant's contempt for his failure to pay the full amount of the courtordered support. Defendant paid plaintiff
only $5500 per month, instead of the required
$6500. In response, defendant filed a verified motion for relief requesting, among other things, that the alimony be reduced from
$3500 to $1500, retroactive to August 1992.
A hearing on those matters was held January
26, 1993. On February 1, 1993, the trial
court, by memorandum decision, found there
was sufficient evidence to sustain the temporary alimony award and also found defendant
in contempt for his failure to pay the additional $1000 per month. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration or,
in the alternative, a motion to set aside the
order, arguing the contempt order should be
reversed and the amount of alimony reduced.
On April 5, 1993, by memorandum decision,2
the court partially granted defendant's motion and vacated the finding of contempt
However, the court again upheld the alimony
amount and awarded judgment to plaintiff in
the amount of $6000, reflecting the amount of
the support arrearages.
Because there had been allegations of
abuse, the issues of child custody and visitation were certified by the district court to the
juvenile court on May 19, 1993. The parties
subsequently entered into a stipulation re1. Defendant had argued, however, that the child
support be reduced to $2000.
2. The record does not reflect that a hearing was
held on defendant's motion for reconsideration
or that an order was prepared and signed subsequent to the memorandum decision.

gdrdmg custody and visitation, which was
approved by the juvenile court on November
16, 1993. The custody and visitation order
provided, among other things, that plaintiff
and defendant were to have joint legal custody of the children. The order also provided
that it shall be "incorporated into the terms
of the decree of divorce, and shall be binding
on the parties to the divorce action as though
entered in the District Court, in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-17." The case
was then sent back to the district court for
resolution of the other pending issues.
On March 10,1994, plaintiff filed a "Motion
for Order to Show Cause," 3 which was based
upon several grounds, including defendant's
failure to comply with discovery, his failure
to pay the additional $1000 per month in
support, and his concealment of assets.
Plaintiffs memorandum in support of her
motion alleged numerous occasions on which
defendant had failed to comply with discovery. Plaintiff requested "that defendant be
ordered, within 30 days, to completely comply with all discovery requests," that defendant be defaulted, and that he be found in
contempt of court for his failure to pay the
court-ordered support payments. Defendant
responded by denying plaintiff's allegations
and requesting immediate relief from the
$3500 per month alimony award.4 After a
hearing, the trial court entered an order on
May 27,1994, which provided in part:
6. Both parties are to provide statements
of any and all assets sold, transferred,
hypothecated or otherwise handled or disposed of from the time the divorce was
filed up to the present time. The accountr
ing should be done strictly within the normal accounting procedures, and all foundation and background documents must be
3. Although plaintiff tides the "motion" an "order
to show cause," an order to show cause was
never signed by the trial court and it was treated
as a motion. This was also the case in subsequent "motions for an order to show cause."
4. Each time defendant requested a reduction in
the alimony amount, he claimed he did not have
the income to pay the court-ordered amount
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provided to show the amounts of the sale,
to whom, the distribution oi those funds
upon receipt and where they are presently
located. No further assets are to be sold
or transferred from this point on.
7. Defendant is to submit statements of
all accounts in which defendant has an
interest Plaintiff asserts she needs discovery of more accounts than defendant
has submitted

9. All financial records from each party
are to be submitted to the other by May
20, 1994, which should include credit card
records, bank statements, canceled checks,
etc.
The court also denied defendant's request to
lower the alimony award and granted plaintiff a judgment against defendant in the
amount of $21,9555 for defendant's support
arrearages.
In June of 1994, plaintiff began garnishing
defendant's wages in an attempt to collect
the judgment. Interrogatories were sent to
defendant's employer, Prudential Securities.
As a result of Prudential's answers to the
interrogatories, plaintiff discovered that although defendant had earlier disclosed that
he had a certain "Command Account" with
Prudential, he had failed to reveal that he
also had three others. Furthermore, while
defendant testified at his deposition that he
did not have any stocks with Prudential,
Prudential's interrogatory answers revealed
that he held "five groups of stock having a
face value of $58,000."
When plaintiff began garnishing defendant's wages, defendant made a partial payment \n July 1994, but then stopped making
the monthly $5500 payment.6 Thus, on August 19, 1994, plaintiff filed yet another motion for an order to show cause, seeking
another judgment for the support arrearages
and an order of contempt for defendant's
failure to comply with the support order, his
failure to comply with the May 27, 1994
5. This amount included the prior $6000 in arrearages which had been reduced to judgment on
April 5, 1993 and $955 interest thereon.

discovery order, and his intentional withholding of infoTmatfon regarding his accounts
with Prudential
On September 9, 1994, before the August
19 motion for an order to show cause was
heard, plaintiff filed a motion for "(1) Default
on Defendant and/or (2) Obtaining Legal
Fees to Continue Discovery and (3) Contempt" Plaintiff requested that defendant
be defaulted for his continued failure to comply with discovery or, in the alternative, an
order compelling defendant to pay plaintiff
$25,000 so that she could complete discovery.
Plaintiff also requested that defendant be
found in contempt for defying the orders of
the court. In plaintiffs supporting memoranda, thirteen instances of defendant's failure to provide discovery documents were
specifically outlined. Plaintiff also illustrated
how defendant had failed to comply with the
court's discovery orders.
Defendant responded to plaintiffs motions
on September 23, 1994. Accompanying defendant's response was "Defendant's Verified
Statement in Re: Expenses Paid With Defendant's 1994 Year-To-Date Income." This
document revealed that defendant had diverted $95,479.49 of his income in 1992 and
$84,077.74 in 1993 without the knowledge of
plaintiff or the court This information suggested that he did have sufficient income to
cover the additional $1000 per month he had
failed to pay since August 1,1992.
Plaintiff's August 19 and September 9 motions were heard on September 27, 1994.
Plaintiff was present with her counsel and
defendant's counsel was present. The court
heard arguments of counsel; the record does
not reflect the introduction of any evidence.
As fc result <tf the September 2,7, 1994
hearing, the trial court entered an order on
November 1, 1994. This order provided that
plaintiff be given a $20,000 judgment for the
support delinquencies for April 1994 through
September 1994. Paragraph three of the
order provided that because plaintiff "needs
her delinquencies paid in order to fund nec6. Defendant's justification for this was that the
garnishment was in lieu of support payments.
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essary trial preparation, Defendant is ordered to pay his delinquencies in full, $41,349.71, by November 15, 1994, or he will be
defaulted." Defendant objected to the order,
arguing it was improper for the court to
enter an order forcing defendant to pay support arrearages or his default would be entered. The court overruled defendant's objection.
As a result of defendant's failure to comply
with the court's November 1, 1994 order, the
court entered an Order of Default on November 30,1994. The Order of Default provided,
in pertinent part:
In this action the Defendant . . . having
been served through his counsel . . . on
September 27, 1994, with the Plaintiffs
Proposed Order on Order to Show Cause
and on Plaintiffs Motion to Default and
Defendant's Counterclaim to Reduce Support, and said Order having been entered
by the Court November 1, 1994, . . . and
having not complied with paragraph 3 of
said Order, now therefore pursuant to the
terms of that Order, the Default of said
Defendant in the premises is hereby duly
entered according to law.
Defendant filed a motion to set aside the
default on December 6, 1994, arguing the
trial court abused its discretion by entering
defendant's default for his failure to pay the
judgment for his support delinquencies.
Without notice to defendant, an evidentiary hearing was held on December 8, 1994,
during which the trial court received evidence in the form of testimony and exhibits
on the merits of the divorce.7 At this time,
the trial court signed the proposed findings
7- Rule 55(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

of fact and conclusions of law, but did not
enter them pending a hearing set for January 9, 1995, on defendant's contempt and his
motion to set aside the entry of default
[1] Apparently in response to defendant's
motion to set aside default, the trial court
filed an "Order Clarifying Default" nunc pro
tunc 8 on December 19, 1994.9 This clarifying order stated that defendant's position
that the default was entered based on defendant's failure to pay his delinquent support
was 'inaccurate," and went on to say
3. At the hearing September 27,1994, the
Court was persuaded, based on the Pleadings filed by the parties and their in-Court
arguments, that Plaintiff was unable to
determine the size of the marital estate.
This was because it was all in Defendant's
control and he vxis hiding the assets contrary to the Court's Order he disclose
them. Plaintiff asked that Defendant be
defaulted
7. The Court finds that Defendant's pattern in . . . (2) taking all known assets (a
niinimum of $552,000.00 at the time of
separation, these being solely in liquid assets held at his employer Prudential Securities), and converting them to unknown
accounts and refusing to reveal any of
them to Plaintiff or the Court
9. In her Motion for Default, Plaintiff
submitted pertinent Rules and Utah case
law justifying on the spot default in such
situations.10
(Emphasis added.)
order to correct the court's earlier error in not
sufficiently stating the grounds justifying the entry of defendant's default.

[a]fter entry of the default of any party, . . . it
shall not be necessary to give such party in
default any notice of action taken or to be
taken or to serve any notice or paper otherwise
required by these rules to be served on a party
to the action or proceeding.

9. At the December 8, 1994 hearing, plaintiff suggested the court enter this nunc pro tunc order to
clarify the grounds for defendant's default. The
trial court agreed and directed plaintiff to prepare the order.

*• A nunc pro tunc order is used to "correct the
court's omission or error." In re Estate of Leone,
860 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah App.1993). However, a
nunc pro tunc: order may not be used to address
411
issue not previously before the court. Id. In
this case, the court utilized the nunc pro tunc

10. Plaintiff's motion for default relied in part on
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which in pertinent part provides:
(2) If a party . . . fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery . . . the court in
which the action is pending may make such
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On the same day the court entered the 9, 1994 hearing without good cause; (5) "it is
clarifying order, the court entered another appropriate that Defendant's pleading be
order captioned "order and notice of hearing" stricken if for no other reason than on the
which, in pertinent part, provided:
basis of his non payment of child support;"
9. The Courts [six:] [November 1, 199U] and (6) u[t]he Court did expressly give the
Order to pay delinquencies or be defauti- Defendant the opportunity to provide discoved[] did not state the underlying reasons
ery in an appropriate manner which he
for the Default Order.
failed to do. And as a result of these things
10. To deal with this the Court directed
Plaintiffs counsel to submit a Clarifying the court felt that his default should be enOrder of Default setting forth the Court's tered and pleadings stricken." (Emphasis
reasons. The Order was to include by added.) The court concluded, in relevant
reference pleadings pending before the part, that (1) a bench warrant should be
Court on September 27, 1994, together issued for defendant's arrest and (2) defenwith the content of the Findings, Conclu- dant's motion to set aside the default should
sions, and Decree, these all together stat- be denied. Accordingly, based on the finding the reasons underlying Defendant's ings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
being in a position to be defaulted
court ordered, in pertinent part, that (1)
(Emphasis added.) The order also provided "Defendant has not adequately provided disdefendant notice of the hearing to be held on covery pursuant to Court Order and as such
January 9, 1995, which would address defen- it is appropriate that his pleadings be strickdant's motion to set aside the default and the en;" and (2) that a bench warrant be issued
entry of the findings of fact, conclusions of
for defendant's arrest. (Emphasis added.)
law, and decree of divorce. Additionally, defendant was ordered to personally appear at
Defendant appeals.
the January 9 hearing to address his contempt and the appropriate sanctions.
ISSUES
Although the January 9, 1995 hearing was
held as scheduled, defendant failed to appear,
[2] Defendant raises numerous issues on
citing threats on his life by plaintiff and their
son and a new job as reasons justifying his appeal. Defendant first argues the trial
absence. Following the January 9 hearing, court did not have a legal basis to enter a
the trial court entered the findings of fact, default against him and, therefore, abused its
conclusions of law, and decree of divorce discretion in doing so. Defendant next chalfrom the December 8, 1994 evidentiary pro- lenges the alimony award, asserting both
ceeding and entered an order on March 6, that the evidence does not support the alimo1995, titled "Order From Hearing Dated Jan- ny awarded to plaintiff and that the trial
uary 9, 1995, Re: Contempt and Other Is- court failed to make the necessary findings of
sues." In the findings of fact supporting the fact. Defendant also challenges the child
March 6 order, the trial court found, in rele- support award, claiming the amount awarded
vant part, that: (1) defendant's consistent
is contrary to the Child Support Guidelines.
position that he did not have sufficient income to pay the additional $1000 per month Defendant next alleges the trial court abused
was a falsehood; (2) in defiance of the court's its discretion in valuing and dividing the mardiscovery order, defendant had steadfastly ital estate. Defendant argues the trial
refused to reveal all of the accounts in which court's award of attorney fees to plaintiff
he had an interest; (3) defendant had failed should be reversed because the trial court
to pay support since July 1, 1994: (4) defen- failed to make the required findings. Lastly,
dant willfully failed to appear at the January defendant claims the trial court erred by not
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
among others the following:
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof, staying further proceedings until the

order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient
party.
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including the provisions of the juvenile
court's order regarding custody and visitation into the divorce decree.11
ANALYSIS
A. Default
[3] Defendant claims the trial court entered his default because he failed to pay his
past due temporary support obligations. Although the court's November 1 and November 30 orders support defendant's argument,
subsequent orders demonstrate the trial
judge defaulted defendant based on his failure to comply with discovery. Furthermore,
defendant was put on notice that plaintiff was
seeking default as a sanction for defendant's
wilful noncompliance with discovery requests.
Two of plaintiffs motions, one filed on March
10, 1994, and the other filed on September 9,
1994, requested that defendant be defaulted
for his failure to comply with discovery. At
the September 27, 1994 hearing, the trial
court heard plaintiffs September 9 motion
for default from which the order of default
arose.
Additionally, at the January 9, 1995 hearing the court stated to the parties that defendant was given numerous opportunities to
comply with discovery "which he failed to
do." Consequently, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to set aside his default
and reinstate his pleadings. In the March 6,
1995 order, the trial court again specifically
stated, "Defendant has not adequately provided discovery pursuant to Court Order and
as such it is appropriate that his pleadings be
stricken." Accordingly, it is clear the
grounds for entering defendant's default
were his failure to comply with discovery, as
well as his failure to pay the courtr-ordered
support. Thus, the issue becomes whether,
under these circumstances, the trial court
abused its discretion by entering the default
and striking the pleadings.
t4,5] The trial court has broad discretion
to impose discovery sanctions upon a non11. Although the Statement of the Case section of
defendant's brief states that the propriety of the
bench warrant is also on appeal, it is not mentioned anvwhere else in the brief. Thus, because
the issue was not briefed, we do not address it.
Sec State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App.
1992).

complying party. Utah Dept of Transp. v.
Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). We
will not reverse a trial judge's decision to
impose discovery sanctions absent an abuse
of that discretion. Arnica MvL Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah App.1989).
Discovery sanctions are intended to deter
misconduct and require a showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault Osguthorpe, 892
P.2d at 8.
[6] "The striking of pleadings, entering
of default, and rendering of judgment against
a disobedient party are the most severe of
the potential sanctions that can be imposed
upon a nonresponding party." Id. at 7. Because of the severity of this type of sanction,
<l
the trial court's range of discretion is more
narrow than when the court is imposing less
severe sanctions." Id. at 8.
In the case at bar, defendant secreted
approximately $180,000 of his income while
insisting to the court that he had insufficient
income to pay an additional $1000 per month
in support When defendant finally disclosed
what he had done, he explained the absence
of these funds by presenting copies of the
faces of cashier's checks purportedly sent to
the Internal Revenue Service and the State
of Arizona for tax liabilities. However, defendant has never presented the statements
evidencing payment of these obligations in
compliance with the May 27, 1994 discovery
order. Defendant also failed to reveal several savings and investment accounts he held
with Prudential and failed to comply with the
trial court's discovery order by providing
documentation of these accounts.
[7] "[T]he judicial system is not to be
manipulated in divorce proceedings by one
who actively and aggressively misleads the
court and the opposing party
" Boyce v.
Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in entering defendant's default12
12. Although the trial court may have erroneously
entered defendant's default partially based on his
failure to pay support arrearages, we may affirm
based on the fact that the default was also sup-
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[S-ll] Defendant also challenges the alimony award, claiming the trial court failed to
enter the required findings. We will not
disturb a trial court's alimony award absent a
clear and prejudicial abuse of the considerable discretion granted the trial court in determining the award. BreinhoU v. BreinhoU,
905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App.1995). It is well
grounded in Utah law that the trial court
must consider: " *(D the financial conditions
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a
sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the
supporting spouse to provide support.'"
Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah
App.1993) (citation omitted). A trial court
abuses its discretion when it fails to consider
the enumerated factors. Willey v. Willey,
866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App.1993). "Thus,
4
the trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to enable a
reviewing court to ensure that the trial
court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon'" the required factors.
Id, (citation omitted). Accordingly, " *[i]f sufficient findings are not made, we must reverse unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as to allow us to apply the . . .
factors as a matter of law on appeal.'" Id
(citation omitted).
After reviewing the trial court's findings
on alimony, we find them to be "so inadequate that we cannot determine the legal
basis of the award or whether the trial court
abused its discretion in the amount of the
award." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah
App.1991). Thus, <4we reverse and remand
ported on the basis of defendant's noncompliance
with the discovery orders. See generally, DeBry v.
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (may affirm
on any proper basis even though trial court's ruling
was based on other ground); State ex rei H.R.V. &
B.P.V., 906 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App.1995) (same).
13. This notwithstanding defendant's evidentiary
contribution to the fact finding process.
14. We note defendant's argument that the trial
court erred in valuing the marital property at the
time of the parties' separation. "However,

the alimony award for additional findings on
each of the . . . [required] factors . . . , and a
reassessment of the alimony award based
upon thosefindings[J" if necessary. Id
C. Property Division
[12-15] Defendant argues the trial court
abused its discretion in valuing and dividing
the marital estate. The trial court entered
findings regarding the value of the marital
property, which defendant now claims are in
error.13 However, in order to challenge a
trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the
challenger "must marshal all the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate
that the evidence is insufficient to support
the findings in question." Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App.
1995) (emphasis added). We will uphold the
trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to
appropriately marshal all of the evidence.
AUred v. Brvum, 893 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah
App.1995). Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence but has merely recited
the findings on point and then highlighted
the evidence which he deems contrary to the
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the
trial court's findings and affirm the awards
on appeal.14
D. Plaintiffs Attorney Fees
[16,17] Defendant claims the trial court
erred in ordering him to pay plaintiffs attorney fees because the court failed to consider
defendant's ability to pay and plaintiffs need
for the award. The trial court has the authority to award attorney fees in a divorce
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
(1995). However, the decision to make such
where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden
its value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the
trial court may, under its broad discretion, value
the property at an earlier date, i.e., separation."
Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App.
1987). Defendant has acted obstructively in the
case at bar by failing to give accurate, verifiable
accountings of his income and assets. Thus, it
was well within the trial court's discretion to
value the property at the time of the parties'
separation, as opposed to valuing the property at
the time of trial. See Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876
P.2d 429, 432-33 (Utah App.1994).

MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Utah 517

Cite as 915 P~2d 508 (UtahApp. 1996)

an award " 'must be based on evidence of the
finance] need of the receiving spouse, the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees.'" Willey v. WiUey, 866 P.2d 547, 555 (Utah App.
1993) (quoting Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493
(Utah App.1991)). The failure to consider
any of the enumerated factors is ground for
reversal on the fee issue. See id at 556;
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah
App.1991).
The trial court entered the following finding of fact regarding attorney fees:

case are granted to the prevailing party at
the trial court, and that party in turn prevails
on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on
appeal. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah
App.1991). In this case, if the trial court
determines that plaintiff is still entitled to
attorney fees after considering the above
enumerated factors, because she prevailed on
the central issue on appeal, the entry of
defendant's default, she shall be awarded her
attorney fees incurred as a result of this
appeal See id This amount shall be determined on remand.

Plaintiffs fees and costs were submitted
by ledger . . . to the court in the total sum
E% Failure to Incorporate Juvenile
of $25,844.88. Plaintiff's attorney . . . was
Court's Order
sworn and testified concerning the fees.
He testified that his hourly charge was
[20] Lastly, defendant takes issue with
$120.00, his associate . . . $100.00, that
the failure of the district court to incorporate
those were reasonable and customary, and
most were incurred in efforts to have De- into the divorce decree the juvenile court's
fendant reveal his finances. The Court order regarding custody and visitation.
finds under all circumstances including the Plaintiff agrees with defendant's position to
partiesO ability to pay and Defendant's the effect that crucial language regarding
demonstrated pattern of conduct, that joint Custody and ongoing counseling was
Plaintiffs fees and costs are reasonable omitted. Accordingly, we remand the issue
and necessary in full, and awards Plaintiff to the district court so that the order of the
judgment for fees and costs against the juvenile court can be incorporated into the
Defendant in the sum of $25,844.88.
divorce decree.
(Emphasis added.)
Although the trial court concludes that
CONCLUSION
plaintiff's attorney fees were "necessary,"
[21,22] We conclude the trial court did
there is no finding regarding plaintiff's need
for an award of attorney fees. As a result, not abuse its discretion in entering defenthe findings and conclusions are insufficient dant's default. As a result, the evidentiary
to allow a meaningful review of the trial hearing conducted on December 8, 1994, and
court's ruling, especially in the face of the the entry of the findings of fact, conclusions
award of substantial marital assets. See WU- of laWj and decree of divorce were proper.
ley, 866 P.2d at 555 (" We have consistently Furthermore, because defendant did not
encouraged trial courts to make findings to
marshal all of the evidence in support of the
explain the factors which they considered
trial court's findings regarding the valuation
retevant in srrivmg at an attorney fee
and
division of the marital property, this
award.'") (citation omitted). We therefore
reverse the attorney fees award to plaintiff court will not disturb the trial court's findand remand for the entry of further findings ings on appeal. We remand the issue of
alimony for the entry of further findings.
consistent with this opinion.
We also remand to the trial court for findings
[18,19] Plaintiff requests attorney fees on the issue of plaintiffs need for attorney
on appeal. GeneraDy, when fees in a divorce fees and, if appropriate, the determination of
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plaintiffs attorney fees on appeal Lastly,
we remand so the juvenile court's order may
be incorporated in the divorce decree.15

15. Defendant also claimed that the child support
amount was incorrect. However, after reviewing defendant's argument, we find the trial court
did not deviatefromthe child support guidelines,
see Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp.1995),
and accordingly, find defendant's claim to be
without merit Thus, we decline to discuss it on
appeal. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303
(Utah 1992).

GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.

We also reject defendant's argument that
plaintiffs brief should be stricken for failure to
comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Finally, we reject defendant's request that
Judge Harding be recused from the case because
defendant failed to brief the issue on appeal. See
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App.
1992).
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1]

Q.

Is it a Sub S corporation?

2]

A.

No, it's a regular.

3]

Q.

It's a C corp. So the corporation paid

4]

taxes?

5]

A.

In that year they did pay taxes, that's true.

6]

Q.

And they kept money in the corporation?

7]

A.

Yes, they did, in that year.

8]

Q.

And there are good reasons for a construction

9]
10]

company to keep money in the corporation?
A.

There are good reasons for a construction

11 ]

company to maintain a good cash balance. As to whether

12]

or not it's good for them to keep net income in there, I

13]

question that as a tax planning vehicle.

14]
15]

Q.

Some of the reasons the corporation may need

money, obviously, is to pay bills; that would be true?

16]

A.

That's correct.

17]

Q.

And an important reason they might need

18]

capital is for bonding; that would be true, wouldn't it?

19]

A

That's correct.

20]

0.

How do these figures, how do your figures

21]

with respect to the income that you claim that

22]

Mr. Thomas should have or should be impugned to him, how

23]

do those compare with his actual tax returns over the

24]

last two to three years?

25]

A.

His personal tax returns?

